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ABSTRACT 
In 2006, the Hon. Stephen Harper, PC became the Prime Minister of Canada after 
winning an election campaign in which his Conservative Party of Canada promised to get tough 
on crime. Over the terms of the three Harper administrations, 81 of the 399 government bills 
introduced in Parliament contained measures explicitly intended to increase the severity in the 
punishment of criminal acts. Using both descriptive and multiple regression techniques, this 
dissertation analyses Statistics Canada incarceration and court sentencing data to assess the 
substantive effect of the Harper administrations’ legislative changes. It is concluded that there 
was some toughening of criminal sanctions in Canada during this period, particularly for the 
offences of drug trafficking, production and importation. However, the toughening of sanctions 
was modest and left Canada’s incarceration rates stable. Judged against both government and 
opposition rhetoric, the carceral experience in the United States and a constructed ideal type of a 
tough on crime government, the substantive toughening of Canada’s criminal justice system 
during the Harper administrations was muted. The systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann 
informs an analysis of judicial decisions and provincial government prosecution policies that 
concludes a federal political regime has limitations on its ability to impose substantive changes 
in the outcomes of Canada’s criminal justice system. The theories of symbolic action developed 
by Murray Edelman informs an analysis of the legislative and fiscal record of the Harper 
administrations to argue that much of the criminal justice program of the Harper administrations 
was symbolic. It appeared to be designed to generate acquiescence to the Conservative 
government rather than to effect a substantive toughening in the outcomes of the criminal justice 
system. The muted substantive effect of the Harper administration’s tough on crime program 
resulted from both systemic limitations on the federal government’s powers and a lack of serious 
intent by government actors.  
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This dissertation would not have been completed without the support of my supervisor, 
Harley Dickinson. As an undergraduate three and a half decades ago, I served as his research 
assistant. He taught me valuable lessons about intellectual rigour. When I returned to academia, 
he added lessons about friendship. Hongming Cheng, John Hanson, Norm Zlotkin, and Laura 
Wright provided invaluable advice and support as members of my advisory committee. Justin 
Piché gave me rigorous critique and positive feedback as my external examiner.  
My sons, Nicholas and Jacob, were remarkably tolerant and indulgent as their father 
decided his mid-life (using the term loosely) crisis would take the form of becoming a student 
while they were in high school. Marilyn Totten agreed to join her life to that of a graduate 
student, which is surely an act of love. My parents, Margaret Munro and John Stobbe, have 
always been exceptionally supportive.  
Many others contributed to this dissertation in strange and wonderful ways. 
Margaret Sadler proof-read the manuscript with an eagle eye and good cheer. Tim 
Killeen, Sandra Chapman and Shannon McNicol made it possible because of their commitment 
to justice. Judy Samuelson, Delaine Scotten, Brian Topp, Myrna Hewitt, Cheryl Hewitt, Kim 
Pollock, Pat Atkinson, Roy Romanow, Ken Wilkinson and many others made it possible because 
of their commitment to friendship in good times and bad. Joe Garcea, Terry Wotherspoon and 
Peter Li made it possible by making a return to graduate school possible. Louis Dingley and my 
colleagues at Keyano College made it possible to bring my knowledge and experience into the 
classroom. 
Any errors or omissions are, of course, completely my responsibility. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PERMISSION TO USE ....................................................................................................................i 
ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................................ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................iv 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... xii 
1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1
1.1. Definition of “Tough on Crime................................................................................3 
1.2. Importance of the Issues Examined .........................................................................4 
1.3. What Was Known about the Harper Administrations’ Criminal Justice Policies ...6 
1.4. Research Questions ..................................................................................................6 
1.5. Approach to the Study .............................................................................................7 
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation ....................................................................................8 
2. Review of Literature on Incarceration Rates and the Harper Administrations’
Justice Policies ...................................................................................................................11 
2.1. Analysis of Canadian Incarceration Trends ...........................................................11 
2.2. Literature about the Justice Record of the Harper Administrations………………14 
2.2.1. Literature on the Political Context of the Harper Administrations’  
Tough-on-Crime Policies ...........................................................................16 
2.2.2. Literature on Individual Tough-on-Crime Legislative Initiatives .............17 
2.2.3. Summative Analysis of the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime 
Policies .......................................................................................................19 
v 
2.3. Limitations of the Literature on Canadian Incarceration Rates During the Harper 
Era ..........................................................................................................................22 
3. Systems and Symbolic Action Theories as a Framework for Analyzing the Record of the
Harper Administrations ......................................................................................................29 
3.1. Luhmann’s Systems Framework............................................................................31 
3.2. Edelman’s Theories of Symbolic Action ...............................................................34 
3.3. Explanation and Theory Testing ............................................................................36 
4. Methodology: Description and Issues ................................................................................39
4.1. Methodological Implications of the Nature of the Argument ................................39 
4.2. Textual Analysis ....................................................................................................40 
4.2.1. Hansard Recording of Parliamentary Debates ..........................................41 
4.2.2. Judicial Decisions ......................................................................................44 
4.2.3. Policy Directives ........................................................................................45 
4.2.4. Media Articles ............................................................................................46 
4.2.5. Party Platforms...........................................................................................46 
4.3. Records of Acts ......................................................................................................46 
4.3.1. Legislative Acts .........................................................................................48 
4.3.2. Judicial Acts ...............................................................................................49 
4.3.3. Corrections Systems Acts ..........................................................................50 
4.3.4. Acts of Police Recording ...........................................................................50 
4.3.5. Acts of Bureaucratic Decision-Making .....................................................51 
4.4. Treating Toughness as a Variable ..........................................................................51 
4.4.1. Comparison with Rhetoric .........................................................................52 
4.4.2. Comparison with the United States............................................................52 
4.4.3. Comparison with an Ideal Type .................................................................52 
4.5. Ethical Approval ....................................................................................................53 
4.6. Methodology: Conclusion………………………………………………………..53 
5. Trends in Punishment in Canada: System Results During the Harper Administrations…57
5.1. Trends in Incarceration ..........................................................................................58 
5.1.1. Incarceration Rates by Population .............................................................58 
5.1.2. Incarceration Rates by Reported Crime .....................................................60 
5.1.3. Comparison of Incarceration and Non-custodial Punishments ..................65 
5.1.4. Youth Incarceration Rates..........................................................................66 
5.1.5. Regression Analysis of Incarceration Rates ..............................................67 
5.1.6. Summary of Data on Incarceration Rates ..................................................68 
5.2. Court Treatment of Criminal Acts .........................................................................69 
5.2.1. Most Serious Sentence ...............................................................................70 
5.2.2. Severity of Incarceration ............................................................................74 
5.2.3. Regression Analysis of the Severity of Punishment of Crimes .................79 
5.3. Summary ................................................................................................................82 
6. Legislative Case Study: Bill C-10 or The Safe Streets and Communities Act ..................85
6.1. Precursors to the Safe Streets and Communities Act ............................................ 88 
vi 
6.2. Provisions of the Safe Streets and Communities Act .............................................89 
6.2.1. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act ..........................................................89 
6.2.2. Sentencing ..................................................................................................90 
6.2.2.1. Sentencing: Sexual Offences Against Children ............................90 
6.2.2.2. Sentencing: Drug Trafficking, Importation, and Production ........98 
6.2.2.3. Sentencing: Conditional Sentences .............................................102 
6.2.3. Pardons and Record Suspensions.............................................................105 
6.2.4. Corrections and Conditional Release .......................................................111 
6.2.5. International Transfer of Prisoners ..........................................................116 
6.2.6. Human Trafficking...................................................................................117 
6.2.7. Youth Criminal Justice ............................................................................118 
6.3. Summary: The Safe Streets and Communities Act ..............................................120 
6.4. Conclusions ..........................................................................................................121 
7. Systemic Limitations on the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime Program .........129
7.1. Impact of the Legal System .................................................................................130 
7.1.1. Appointment of Judges ............................................................................132 
7.1.2. Differential Operations of the Legal and Political Systems .....................135 
7.1.2.1. Differing Structure of Justifications............................................135 
7.1.2.2. Different Meanings of Proportionality........................................138 
7.1.2.3. Case Study: Judicial Processing of Mandatory Minimums ........139 
7.1.2.4. Case Study: Judicial Processing of Interim Release ...................142 
7.2. Federalism and Systems Constraints on Central Government Action .................146 
7.2.1. Extent of Interprovincial Variation in the Treatment of Crime ...............147 
7.2.1.1. Interprovincial Incarceration Rates .............................................147 
7.2.1.2. Interprovincial Variation in Court Sentencing Patterns ..............152 
7.2.2. Importance of Prosecutorial Discretion ...................................................155 
7.2.2.1. Interprovincial Variation of Prosecutorial Policies.....................162 
7.2.2.1.1. Interim Judicial Release .............................................163 
7.2.2.1.2. Election of Charges ....................................................166 
7.2.2.1.3. Plea Bargains .............................................................167 
7.2.2.1.4. Sentencing Recommendations ...................................167 
7.2.2.1.5. Non-enforcement Policies ..........................................169 
7.2.2.2. Comparative Case Study: Manitoba and Ontario .......................169 
7.2.2.3. Federal Prosecution Policies .......................................................173 
7.3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................173 
8. Symbolic Action and the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime Legislative
Program ............................................................................................................................183 
8.1. Characteristics of Being Tough on Crime as an Ideal Type ................................184 
8.2. Symbolic Aspects of the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime Program ...186 
8.2.1. Temporal Sequencing and Symbolism ....................................................187 
8.2.2. Fiscal Commitment and Symbolism ........................................................190 
8.2.2.1. Fiscal Commitment for Policing .................................................192 
vii 
8.2.2.2. Fiscal Commitment for the Courts ..............................................195 
8.2.2.3. Fiscal Commitment for Jails and Prisons....................................198 
8.2.2.4. Fiscal Commitment to Tough on Crime: Summary ....................204 
8.2.3. Sentencing Provisions and Symbolism ....................................................206 
8.2.3.1. Case Study: Mischief to War Memorials ....................................208 
8.2.3.2. Case Study: Quanto’s Law..........................................................209 
8.2.4. Legal Processes and Symbolism ..............................................................213 
8.2.4.1. Reverse Onus for Bail .................................................................213 
8.2.4.2. Dangerous Offenders ..................................................................213 
8.2.4.3. DNA Testing ...............................................................................213 
8.2.4.4. Possession for the Purposes of Trafficking .................................213 
8.2.4.5. Citizen’s Arrest ...........................................................................214 
8.2.4.6. Online Crime ...............................................................................214 
8.2.4.7. Not Criminally Responsible ........................................................214 
8.2.4.8. Legal Processes and Symbolism: Summary ...............................214 
8.3. Forging Political Consensus and Symbolism ......................................................215 
8.4. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................217 
9. Conclusion: The Dog That Did Not Bark ........................................................................225
9.1. Key Empirical Findings .......................................................................................225 
9.1.1. Empirical Findings of Systemic Limitations on Federal Powers .............226 
9.1.2. Empirical Findings Pointing to Goals Other Than Getting Tough ..........227 
9.2. The Evidence and its Limitations ........................................................................228 
9.2.1. Statistics Canada’s Criminal Justice Statistics .........................................229 
9.2.2. Record of Legislative Acts.......................................................................229 
9.2.3. Record of Legislative Utterances .............................................................230 
9.2.4. Court Rulings ...........................................................................................230 
9.3. Theoretical Implications of Empirical Findings ..................................................231 
9.3.1. Luhmann and the Problem of Systems Boundaries .................................231 
9.3.2. Edelman and the Contradiction Between the Efficacy of Symbolic and 
Substantive Action ...................................................................................234 
9.4. Policy and Sociological Practice Implications .....................................................237 
9.4.1. The Difficulty and Indeterminacy of Change ..........................................238 
9.4.2. The Relationship Between Ends and Results...........................................239 
9.5. A Note on the Author’s Normative Position on Incarceration ............................240 
10. Epilogue: The Trudeau Administration’s Criminal Justice Policies................................243
Appendix: Statistics Canada Data Tables ........................................................................251 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................253 
Books, Articles, Websites, and Government Documents ................................................253 
viii 
Legal Cases Cited ............................................................................................................297 
Legislation and Bills  .......................................................................................................302 
ix 
List of Figures 
5.1 Incarceration Rates in Canada ...........................................................................................59 
5.2 Admissions to Canadian Custodial Corrections Facilities .................................................60 
5.3 Average Daily Census in Canada’s Prisons and Jails (Adult and Youth) per Criminal 
Code Offence .....................................................................................................................61 
5.4 Average Daily Census in Canada’s Prisons and Jails (Adult and Youth) per Homicide ..63 
5.5 Convicted Custodial Admissions per Criminal Code Offence ..........................................64 
5.6 People in Community Supervision Programs per Inmate in Custody ...............................65 
5.7 Canadian Youth Incarceration Rate: Custodial Inmates per 10,000 Youths .....................67 
5.8 Most Serious Sentence: Guilty Findings – Total Offences ................................................71 
5.9 Severity of Treatment for Crimes Against the Person .......................................................76 
5.10 Severity of Treatment for Crimes Against Property ..........................................................77 
5.11 Severity of Treatment for Enforcement-Initiated (Non-complaint) Crimes ......................78 
6.1 Sexual Offences Against Children .....................................................................................93 
6.2 Severity of Punishment for Guilty Cases: Sexual Offences ..............................................94 
6.3 Sentences for Guilty Cases: “Other Sexual Offences” ......................................................95 
6.4 Sentences for Guilty Cases: Sexual Assault ......................................................................96 
6.5 Percentage of Guilty Cases Receiving Conditional Sentences ........................................104 
6.6 Percent of Pardon/Record Suspension Applications Successful .....................................109 
6.7 Complete Applications for Pardons/Record Suspensions................................................110 
6.8 Approval Rates for Applications for Full Federal Parole ................................................114 
6.9 Mean Percentage of Sentence Served Before the Granting of Day Parole ......................114 
6.10 Number of Incarcerated Inmates in Community Supervision: Federal Programs ...........115 
x 
7.1 Major Arguments Presented During Second Reading Debate .........................................137 
7.2 Incarceration Rates in Provincial Institutions: Canada ....................................................144 
7.3 Custodial Inmates in Provincial Institutions by Province ................................................148 
7.4 Remand Incarceration by Province: Inmates per 100,000 Adults ...................................149 
7.5 Custodial Inmates in Provincial Institutions by Province per Criminal Code Offence ...150 
7.6 Increase in Inmates in Provincial Custodial Institutions per Criminal Code Offence .....151 
7.7 Remand Incarceration Rates: Canada, Ontario and Manitoba .........................................165 
7.8 Incarceration Rates in Provincial Institutions: Canada, Ontario and Manitoba ...............171 
7.9 Cases by Median Elapsed Time in Days: Canada, Ontario and Manitoba ......................172 
8.1 Police Officers per 100,000 Population: Canada .............................................................194 
8.2 Percent Change in Police Officers per 100,000 Population by Province ........................195 
8.3 Drug Offence Cases Before Canadian Courts .................................................................197 
8.4 Expenditures on Custodial Corrections Services in Canada in Constant Dollars ............202 
8.5 Daily Spending per Incarcerated Inmate by Jurisdiction in Constant 2002 Dollars ........203 
xi 
List of Tables 
4.1 Parliamentary Calendar for Harper Administrations .........................................................49 
5.1 Time-series regression for Harper as Prime Minister and Crime Severity Index ..............67 
5.2 Regression for average amounts of fines for Harper administrations ................................73 
5.3 Regression for changes in punishment severity in the Harper era .....................................79 
6.1 Precursor Legislation to the Safe Streets and Communities Act ........................................88 
7.1 Severity of Sentencing: Interprovincial Comparisons: Selected Offences ......................154 
8.1 Timeline for Passage of Selected Tough-on-Crime Measures ........................................188 
xii 
List of Abbreviations 
CACC Canadian Association of Crown Counsel 
CANSIM Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System 
CPC Conservative Party of Canada 
CSC Correctional Service Canada 
CSI Crime Severity Index 
ICCS Integrated Criminal Court Survey 
LEEP Law Enforcement Education Program 
MMP Mandatory minimum penalties 
MP Member of Parliament 
NDP New Democratic Party of Canada 
PBO Parliamentary Budget Officer 
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
SCC Supreme Court of Canada 
UCR Uniform Crime Reporting Survey 
1 
1. Introduction
A spectre is haunting Canadian criminology: the spectre of American incarceration rates. 
Many in the Canadian criminology establishment have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise 
this spectre: academic researchers, prisoner rights groups, criminal defence lawyers, and 
members of the media. In short—many of those involved in the exercise of shaping policy and 
opinion on issues of crime and justice have decried the possible importation of “American-style 
mass incarceration.” 
There are real reasons to be concerned. Until 1974, Canada and the United States had 
similar and relatively stable incarceration rates. Beginning in 1974, the paths diverged. Canada’s 
incarceration rates remained relatively stable. In the United States, despite a similar trajectory for 
officially reported crime rates, incarceration rates soared exponentially—doubling, redoubling, 
and then doubling again before finally levelling off for the past half-decade. Today, incarceration 
rates in the United States are roughly eight times those in Canada. This had a profoundly 
destabilizing effect on some communities. American incarceration rates may have reached a 
level where they have a causal influence on increasing crime rates.1 
The fear that incarceration rates would begin to follow the example set in in the United 
States became more acute on February 6, 2006. Stephen Harper was sworn in as Canada’s 22nd 
Prime Minister. The Conservative Party of Canada’s (CPC) election platform had vowed that “a 
Conservative government will protect Canadians, ensure effective and appropriate justice is 
administered to criminals, and secure our country’s borders.”2 The prescription for providing 
protection and ensuring safety was presented in punitive terms. A Conservative government 
would get tough on crime and criminals. In introducing specific measures, the platform stated: 
A Conservative government will protect our communities from crime by insisting on 
tougher sentences for serious and repeat crime and by tightening parole. We will ensure 
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truth in sentencing and put an end to the Liberal revolving door justice system. The drug, 
gang, and gun-related crimes plaguing our communities must be met by clear mandatory 
minimum prison sentences and an end to sentences being served at home. Parole must be 
a privilege to be earned, not a right to be demanded.3 
Of the 183 specific platform commitments, 59 promised tough action on crime. More 
specific commitments were made about punishing criminals than were made about improving 
Canada’s economy, health, and social services systems combined. The only mention of youth in 
the platform was in the section dealing with crime. Conservatives promised that new criminal 
offences would be created, more people would be sent to jail, and convicted criminals would stay 
in jail longer. Of the 59 crime commitments in the Conservatives’ platform, only five were not 
based on increasing sanctions.4 
The Conservatives’ preoccupation with getting tough on crime was not forgotten on 
assuming office. During Harper’s three terms as prime minister between 2006 and 2015, 81 of 
the 399 government bills were wholly or largely composed of tough-on-crime provisions. The 
administrations’ legislative agenda was supported by private members’ bills. During these three 
Parliaments, 149 of the 311 private members’ bills put forward by Conservative MPs called for 
tough-on-crime measures. Fifteen were passed into law.5 
As demonstrated in chapter 2 of this dissertation, this veritable avalanche of tough-on-
crime legislation convinced many observers that Canada’s justice system was being 
fundamentally transformed into a punishment system—that Canada was implementing 
“American-style mass incarceration.” However, despite the preoccupation with punitive 
legislation by the Harper administrations, incarceration rates remained stable. In chapter 5, I 
argue that there was only a muted change in the volume of incarceration in Canada while 
Stephen Harper was Prime Minister. The major exception to a relative lack of incarceration 
effect during this period was in the treatment of those convicted of drug trafficking, importation, 
or production. At first sight, there appears to be a disjunction between the legislative agenda of 
the Harper Conservative administrations and the substantive result. It raises the question as to 
whether these administrations did, in fact, get tough on crime. 
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1.1. Definition of “Tough on Crime” 
Members of the Harper administrations explicitly defined their approach to criminal 
justice policy as being “tough on crime.” They used this self-definition to differentiate 
themselves from their Liberal party predecessors in government and the members of the 
parliamentary Opposition by describing them as “soft on crime.” The Harper administrations’ 
characterization of their own criminal justice policies was widely accepted, even though its 
political opponents resisted the accompanying characterization of themselves being “soft.” Given 
the centrality of the concept of “tough on crime” in the political discourse and in this 
dissertation, a precise definition of the term is required. 
Contrary to the bifurcated conceptual categories of “tough” and “soft” used by the 
members of the Harper administrations, I use the terms as relative points on a spectrum. 
Toughness or softness are relational rather than absolute. Policies and actions can be tougher and 
softer than other policies and actions. This immediately raises the issue of the appropriate 
comparators, which are considered in more detail in chapter 4. 
In defining toughness, I have adopted Black’s observation that “law is a quantifiable 
variable.”6 So too with toughness. The greater the sanction that is imposed in response to an act, 
the tougher the legislation, policy, or decision that resulted in the imposition of the sanction. 
Toughness can be increased by imposing sanctions on acts that were previously not deemed 
worthy of sanction, and toughness can be decreased by restricting the range of actions for which 
sanctions are imposed. Toughness can also be increased by increasing the sanctions imposed for 
a specified act and decreased by reducing the sanctions for the same act. One problem that arises 
is the comparability of different sanctions,7 which can include a reprimand, public humiliation, 
fine, non-carceral restrictions on liberty, incarceration, the infliction of physical pain, and 
execution. 
Thus far in the 21st century, the Canadian justice system has removed corporal and capital 
punishments from the range of acceptable sanctions. The members of the Harper administrations 
did not change or propose to change this restriction on the range of sanctions available to the 
justice system. This effectively removes the problem of attempting to give comparative ranking 
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to the punitive effect of corporal and carceral punishments. While the comparability of 
punishments such as humiliation, non-carceral restrictions on liberty, and fines present problems 
of assessing which is the harshest, incarceration itself is the most complete restriction on an 
individual’s liberty available in the absence of capital punishment. Further, incarceration is 
quantifiable with a simple numerical measure of the days, months, or years an individual is 
deprived of liberty. From this, an operational definition of “toughness” can be stated as any 
legislation, policy, or decision that increases the aggregate time incarcerated for criminal acts. 
More toughness means more jail, and less toughness means less jail. 
Excluded from this definition is any evaluation of the conditions experienced when an 
individual is incarcerated. Effectively, this definition positions a sentence in a jail or prison as 
the punishment, rather than conceptualizing the jail or prison as a place to be punished. Changes 
in the conditions of incarceration (such as the quality of food, comfort of cells, crowding, 
availability of recreational activities, use of solitary confinement, and so on) are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. There are two reasons for this exclusion. The first is jurisdictional. The 
majority of prisoners in Canada are in jails operated by provincial governments. Decisions 
affecting the conditions of confinement are therefore beyond the powers of a federal government 
administration. The second reason is operational. Any attempt to assess the conditions of 
confinement, over time, in dozens of correctional facilities across Canada would be a major 
research project in its own right – one which has been conducted with aplomb in recent years.8 
For these two reasons, toughness will therefore be measured on a quantitative basis, with the 
numbers of people incarcerated and the length of time they are behind bars serving as operational 
measures of toughness. 
1.2. Importance of the Issues Examined 
Criminal justice policy is central to the well-being of citizens living in the 21st Century. 
On the one hand, people need the ability to conduct their daily lives with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that they will not be victimized by force or fraud. On the other hand, the state’s power 
to punish necessarily inflicts hardship on individuals.9 When pursued past some (difficult to 
establish) level of toughness, imposition of criminal sanctions appears to have the effect of 
5 
undermining, rather than reinforcing, the functionality of communities and the well-being of its 
members.10 Incarceration also has a fiscal cost to government. In the fiscal year 2015-2016, the 
mean cost of keeping a prisoner in a federal prison was $103,295. Provincial spending per 
inmate ranged from $51,830 in Alberta to $100,010 in Prince Edward Island.11 The assessment 
of what the “right” level of toughness toward crime and most appropriate levels of incarceration 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, a fuller understanding of the processes that 
produce specific criminal justice system results can help shape the formation of policies that 
produce the normative and pragmatic results desired by those entrusted with the task of forming 
these policies. 
Examination the Harper administrations’ criminal justice policies results in an 
exploration of some of the fundamental questions of sociology, such as: 
 What are the constraints on the ability of individuals to freely pursue their goals?
 How do the interaction of individuals and the systems they operate come together to
produce a verifiable social fact?
 What are the basis of, and limitations on, the exercise of power?
 How do different systems interact in a dynamic fashion?
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis of this dissertation has the potential to 
indirectly contribute to an important debate occurring in the United States. In that country, 
incarceration rates increased dramatically in the years following 1974. This increase was 
sustained both during periods of rising and falling crime rates. It was not the result of any single 
legislative act nor any single governmental administration. In the past decade, efforts to reverse 
these increases have been made, but with only modest success. These developments have 
spawned a massive effort at explanation. The example of the Harper administrations provides the 
basis for an interesting comparative study. In the United States, the increase in incarceration 
occurred without an articulate policy objective. In Canada, for a decade, the federal government 
explicitly announced its intention to increase the utilization of carceral responses to crime, but 
incarceration rates remained stable. I hope that the detailed examination of this failure to achieve 
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these stated political objectives can be used as a case study to assist with the understanding of the 
American criminal justice system as well as the Canadian. 
1.3. What was Known About the Harper Administrations’ Criminal Justice 
Policies 
As is demonstrated in chapter 2, the existing literature on the Harper administrations’ 
tough-on-crime program is fairly sparse. Further, much of it is deeply flawed in that it conflates 
the political rhetoric of the Members of Parliament from the CPC with substantive result. The 
most important analysis comes in a series of articles by Webster and Doob12 who argued that 
increases in incarceration rates are driven by risk factors such as a punitive culture, primacy of 
utilitarian objectives in sentencing, and the systemic organization of political institutions that 
create a “prisoner’s dilemma” for political actors that drives them to increasingly punitive 
positions. Counteracting these risk factors are protective factors. Webster and Doob argue that in 
Canada these include a culture of restraint in the use of incarceration, the insulation of justice 
decision-makers from immediate and direct political pressure, and a division of authority that 
allows both levels of government to avoid direct blame for repugnant criminal acts. They argued 
that the interplay between these factors produced relatively stable incarceration rates but that 
future results are indeterminate. In this dissertation, I build on the basic insight by Webster and 
Doob that the substantive results of the criminal justice policies are indeterminate in advance and 
are the result of the ongoing dynamic activity in both the political and justice systems. 
1.4. Research Questions 
This dissertation represents an attempt to provide answers to two interdependent research 
questions: 
1. Given the volume of tough-on-crime legislation, why did the Harper administrations have
a muted substantive impact on incarceration rates?
2. Given the modest substantive effect, why did the Harper administrations continue to
make tough-on-crime legislation a cornerstone of its political agenda?
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1.5. Approach to the Study 
In order to build on the insights of Webster and Doob, I begin by conceptualizing the 
implementation of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime program as a series of acts that 
result in the passage and implementation of legislation. The systems theories of Niklas Luhmann 
are drawn upon to explore how these legislative acts did not always produce the results 
predicted. The insights of Murray Edelman on the nature of symbolic action were drawn upon to 
explore the possibility of a contradiction between the overall stated goals of the members of the 
Harper administrations and the objectives of unit actions taken as part of the fulfilment of the 
overall tough-on-crime program. 
The methodological approach employed in this dissertation was necessarily eclectic. 
Consistent with the advice of Becker, a quantitative approach was taken to establish the 
parameters of what must be explained while a more qualitative approach was taken to examine 
the processes that produced these results.13 
To examine the substantive results of the operation of the criminal justice system, I 
primarily relied upon Statistics Canada CANSIM series data tables to document trends in 
incarceration rates and sentencing patterns. These were presented in the form of graphs to allow 
the reader to identify changes and differences both temporally and jurisdictionally. 
To examine the processes, I began with the legislative record. Utilizing the parliamentary 
website, I examined what laws were introduced, what they stipulated and how they proceeded (or 
not) through the legislative process. In this analysis, allocation of time was used as a measure of 
commitment by both government and opposition members. I then turned to the legislative 
debate. For legislators, the primary focus was on statements made in second reading speeches 
(debate in principle) as recorded in Hansard. Arguments and justifications were coded and 
counted using NVivo 11 to measure the intensity of arguments being made. The testimony of 
witnesses before parliamentary committees were examined to evaluate who was supporting or 
opposing particular legislative initiatives and the arguments being made. In order to evaluate the 
processes by which the courts interpreted and implemented the legislation being passed, the 
written rulings produced by the judiciary in response to specific cases were analyzed. These 
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cases were selected by a combination of keyword searches using the Canadian Legal Information 
Institute repository of cases and snowball sampling from cited precedents. The decisions were 
coded and counted to measure the justifications for decisions. 
Media articles, election platforms, government reports and discussion papers, government 
accountability documents and policy directives were also used to provide further evidence. 
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 examines the extant literature on Canadian incarceration rates and the criminal 
justice policies of the Harper administrations. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis to inform the empirical study. The process of 
activity as a series of end-directed acts is defined. The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann as a 
way of explaining the limited ability of political actors to achieve their end and the theories of 
symbolic action developed by Murray Edelman as a way of dealing with the possibility of a 
disconnection of ends in the various unit acts and the overall ends of a political program are 
explored. 
Chapter 4 outlines the major methodological issues dealt with in this dissertation. This 
includes an articulation of the comparators used to evaluate the legislative initiatives of the 
Harper administrations and summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the major data sources 
used. 
Chapter 5 is designed to establish the central empirical claim of this dissertation, namely 
that the legislative initiatives of the Harper administrations had at best a modest effect on 
substantively toughening Canada’s criminal justice system. Incarceration rates were relatively 
stable when measured against population and increased slightly when measured against recorded 
criminal offence. With the notable exception of drug trafficking, importation, and production 
offences, there was little change in the treatment of those convicted by the courts. 
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Chapter 6 examines Bill C-10 or the Safe Streets and Communities Act in detail. This 
particular bill was chosen because it has been described as the culmination of the Harper 
administrations’ criminal justice polices. 
Chapter 7 examines the record of the Harper administrations from a theoretical 
perspective explicitly informed by Luhmann. In this chapter, I argue that one reason for the 
muted substantive effect of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime legislative program was 
systematic limitations of the powers of a Canadian federal government to directly determine the 
treatment of criminals. 
Chapter 8 is explicitly informed by the theories of symbolic action developed by 
Edelman. I examine the justice policies of the Harper administrations to argue that in some cases 
the substantive impact of legislative initiatives did not appear to be the most important priority. 
Instead, the members of the Harper administrations used their power to introduce legislation to 
maintain the centrality of safety from criminal activity as a central political issue even during a 
period of a sustained drop in reported crime rates. I postulate that one objective of the legislation 
was to create and maintain acquiescence to their rule. Symbolism often trumped substance. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the empirical evidence and tests the theoretical framework against 
this evidence. Key theoretical, political and policy conclusions are drawn. 
Chapter 10 serves as an epilogue. It consists of a brief overview of the criminal justice 
policies of the Trudeau administration from its assumption in office in the fall of 2015 through to 
the end of 2017. 
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2. Review of Literature on Incarceration Rates and the Harper
Administrations’ Justice Policies 
This chapter reviews the literature on Canadian incarceration rates and the criminal 
justice policies of the Harper administration. Prior to the 1970’s, Canada’s incarceration rates 
were similar to those in the United States. Over the next two and a half decades, there were 
dramatic increases in incarceration in the United States while incarceration rates remained stable 
in Canada. Despite the stated tough on crime objectives of the Harper administration, this 
Canadian stability continued. This chapter examines the literature on the role of criminal justice 
policy in the Canadian political debate during this period, the literature on individual legislative 
acts and the summative literature on the impact of the Harper administration on the criminal 
justice system.    
2.1. Analysis of Canadian Incarceration Trends 
The Canadian political and academic debate over the Harper administrations’ tough-on-
crime program was conducted against the backdrop of the experience of the United States. As 
late as 1990, Lipset argued that Canada’s cultural history of more deference to authority resulted 
in Canada having a more punitive orientation than existed south of the 49th parallel. On the other 
hand, he documented an increase in the number of police personnel in the United States while 
police numbers in Canada remained stable. Lipset argued that the Canadian symbolic and 
ideological commitment to social order reduced crime in an economical way.1 At this time, the 
primary focus of comparison between the two countries was centred on crime rates rather than 
punitive outcomes.2 Until the early 1970s, incarceration rates in both Canada and the United 
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States were similar enough that disputes about rates focused on definitions and counting 
methodologies.3 
A year before the start of a three decade-long increase in American incarceration rates, 
Blumstein and Cohen argued that incarceration rates were governed by a homeostatic process 
that produced a level of incarceration sufficient to maintain social stability independently of 
crime rates.4 The focus of sociological and criminological research turned from explaining 
American stability to explaining American growth in incarceration rates. Fifteen years after 
theorizing about societal mechanisms that produced stability in incarceration rates, Blumstein 
was describing the level of incarceration as “out of control”5 with his theoretical construct “sunk 
if not into complete oblivion at least into that limbo where theories which no longer seem 
relevant to current concerns or contemporary developments have their habitation.”6 For the past 
quarter century, American treatments of crime and punishment have been directed toward 
explaining high levels of incarceration. 
The volume of this literature is immense.7 In part, this is due to the stark reality that the 
United States has been transformed from the land of the free to the home of the incarcerated. 
There is also a supply-side explanation for the volume of this literature as the growth in the 
carceral system has been accompanied by a growth in criminology departments at universities as 
a result of the demand for training of police and corrections staff.8 The Canadian stability in 
incarceration rates has attracted much less attention. This is probably the result of the fact that 
the meaning of a dog not barking is less obvious than that of a barking dog even when the 
significance is similar.9 The exploration of processes creating stability largely disappeared as a 
result of the change in the American reality. Stability must still be explained where it does exist. 
As Webster and Doob put it: 
In some sense, there is no need to explain Canada’s unchanging imprisonment rate. Few 
social scientists spend much time exploring the reasons for the absence of change. 
However, particularly in light of the increases in the use of punishment in countries such 
as the United States and England and the high social, opportunity, and economic costs 
associated with rising levels of incarceration, the Canadian case takes on additional 
relevance. Explanations for Canada’s stability may shed important light on the growth of 
punishment in other nations and potential strategies for countering this trend.10
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Studies of incarceration rates in Canada often focus on differential rates within Canada, 
with primary attention to racial identity.11 The general finding is that Indigenous and black 
Canadians are incarcerated at higher rates than are white Canadians. This finding is consistent 
with analysis of the American experience, but the focus on internally differential rates tends to 
make overall stability unproblematic.12 
Just prior to the beginning of the long-term rise in American incarceration rates, debate 
focused on quantifying the question of which side of the border had higher incarceration rates. 
Hogarth argued that Canadian incarceration rates were approximately 20 percent higher than in 
the United States13 while Waller and Chan noted the regional variation in the United States to 
show that Canadian rates were lower than in rural northern states but higher than more urbanized 
and southern states.14 The differences that did exist were relatively trivial by today’s standards 
and there was a corresponding relative indifference to the cause of the variations. 
By the middle of the 21st century’s first decade, the difference in incarceration rates 
between the two countries was dramatic. The only comprehensive treatments were offered by 
Webster and Doob who argue that increases in incarceration rates are driven by risk factors such 
as a punitive culture, primacy of utilitarian objectives in sentencing, and the structural 
organization of political institutions that create a “prisoner’s dilemma” for political actors that 
drives them to increasingly punitive positions. Counteracting these risk factors are protective 
factors. Webster and Doob argue that in Canada these include a culture of restraint in the use of 
incarceration, the insulation of justice decision-makers from immediate and direct political 
pressure, and a division of authority that allows both levels of government to avoid direct blame 
for repugnant criminal acts.15 Webster and Doob argue that in Canada up to this point (2006–07) 
the protective factors had been sufficient to restrain the ever-present risk factors. However, they 
argue that this situation is conditional and that Canada’s record of relative restraint in the use of 
incarceration could not be assumed to be permanent. Writing at the beginning of the Harper 
administrations’ term in office they warn, “it would seem that Canada is currently experiencing a 
rise in (the strength of) one of its risk factors at the same time as a decline in several of its 
protective factors.”16 
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Implicit in the Webster and Doob analysis is a sense that, in the realm of justice policy, 
direct and unfettered democracy leads to higher incarceration rates. Against the backdrop of a 
culture oriented toward punitive responses to crime, the actors such as politicians, prosecutors, 
and judges must be insulated from public discontent arising from “soft” treatment of those 
convicted if more draconian responses are to be avoided. If nothing else, there must be an air of 
plausible deniability for direct responsibility. For example, Webster and Doob discuss how the 
separation of responsibility for the passage of criminal law and the administration of justice 
allows the federal Parliament to pass laws with high, rarely imposed, maximum sentences that 
help immunize federal politicians from blame for any individual lenient sentence. At the same 
time, the recourse to filing an appeal provides a convenient and effective response to provincial 
officials in the event of a controversially “soft” sentence in a high profile case. These 
mechanisms, along with the requirement for time-consuming consultations between levels of 
government that arise from the division of responsibility, has the result of “virtually (albeit not 
entirely) eliminating the possibility of introducing quick-fix politically motivated legislation in 
response to unusual circumstances that arise from isolated cases.”17 Another aspect of the 
implicit distrust of responses to crime driven by public opinion is the role of expert opinion. 
Webster and Doob disapprovingly note that the platform commitments of all major national 
political parties in the 2006 federal election contained calls “for harsher policies and practices 
[that] were clearly designed without the benefit of advice from those knowledgeable on criminal 
justice policy.”18 
Webster and Doob revisited their analysis approximately halfway through the Harper 
administrations’ terms in office. While reaffirming the finding of stability in incarceration rates, 
they warned that “several signs of change exist on the Canadian horizon, particularly within the 
political realm.” They conclude, “The simple maintenance of the status quo in imprisonment 
rates should—in our opinion—be viewed as a notable accomplishment.”19 
2.2. Literature About the Justice Record of the Harper Administrations 
My discussion of the literature about the justice policies of the Harper administrations is 
divided into three components. The first places the election of the Harper administration into a 
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general political context and framework. The second examines analysis of particular legislative 
and policy initiatives. The final component examines summative analysis of the Harper 
administrations’ record as a whole. 
The chapters that follow this summary of the literature are implicitly critical of some of 
the key conclusions reached in much of this literature. Quite simply, I reach a different 
conclusion about the impact of the legislative initiatives and policies of the Harper 
administrations. However, I feel it important to put my differences in context. Those whose 
findings I challenge were often working in the realm of foresight and prediction. They were 
attempting to predict the results of government initiatives. I am working in the realm of hindsight 
and reporting. This task is much easier. As Webster and Doob note in their 2007 treatment of 
Canadian incarceration rates, “it seems that those who focus exclusively on the harsh language of 
the law or on public statements about it appear to incorrectly equate language designed to sound 
harsh with actual treatment.”20 During the period in which the initial evaluations of the Harper 
administrations’ policies were being evaluated, researchers had little actual empirical evidence 
save the “harsh language of the law or on public statements about it.” Further, much of the 
analysis of the Harper administrations was produced in the context of a profound ethical and 
pragmatic objection to the stated objectives of the legislative initiatives. As such, much of this 
work is an exemplar of public sociology21 using sociological expertise to intervene in public 
debates to advance the cause of social justice. I believe one individual needs special recognition 
for this despite the dangers of inadvertently downgrading the contributions of others who are also 
worthy. Anthony Doob appeared as an individual six times before House of Commons 
committees22 and three times before Senate committees23 to explain that harsher punitive 
measures did not necessarily reduce crime or improve public safety. While I sometimes 
challenge his conclusions and those of other researchers, I do so with the appreciation that their 
efforts helped to prevent their predictions from being fully realized. 
The dominant finding in the literature on the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime 
policies is that they represented a transformative break with previous Canadian justice policies. 
Writing from a sympathetic political perspective, Kheiriddin said “the Conservative government 
sought to transform the Canadian justice system” and succeeded to the extent that it 
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“significantly impacted not only individuals involved with in the criminal justice system, but the 
larger relationship between executive, legislative and political branches of government.”24 In 
summing up the record of the Harper administrations, Doob and Webster argue that prior to 
Harper’s election a “broad consensus existed on the principles that should govern criminal 
justice reform.”25 The Harper administrations’ rupture with past policy is described as 
fundamental and revolutionary. There is a shared assumption about the significance and direction 
of the changes. Both observers also share a belief that the long-term effect of the changes still 
has an indeterminate outcome dependent upon whether successor administrations reinforce or 
reverse Harper’s legislative program and both express optimism that a pragmatic, evidence-based 
analysis of the justice system will support their respective diagnosis of the efficacy of the Harper 
era changes. Despite their argument that the Harper administrations’ presided over a fundamental 
shift in Canada’s criminal justice polices, Doob and Webster again confirm the stability of 
Canadian incarceration rates.26 Others allege more transformative short-term effects by asserting 
that incarceration rates increased during the Harper administrations’ terms in office27 or fail to 
present evidence about trends in incarceration such that intent is conflated with result.28 Others 
are predictive. Newell asserts “a massive policy shift toward the expansion of the Canadian 
prison system”.29 Analysis of intent or prediction of outcomes can be useful. However, just as a 
weather forecast cannot be conflated with a weather report, intent or prediction must be 
compared against actual results. 
2.2.1. Literature on the Political Context of the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-
Crime Policies 
The creation, electoral rise, and election of a reconstituted Conservative party under the 
leadership of Stephen Harper generated attention, both academic and journalistic.30 These studies 
identify a tough-on-crime position as a major component of the appeal for electoral support made 
by the Conservative Party of Canada, but do not address the substance of the issue in detail. 
Nonetheless, there is convergence on a few key points directly relevant to this dissertation. 
Of direct relevance to the argument by Doob and Webster that the policies of the Harper 
administrations represented a rupture with an existing consensus, the analysts of the political 
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emergence of the Harper-led Conservative party place the historical roots of the tough-on-crime 
policies within the Reform Party that had emerged in Alberta and supplanted the legacy 
Conservative Party in western Canada. “Tough on crime” was part of a package of populist 
protest measures against elite-driven policy agendas. Other elements of the Reform Party’s 
western populist appeals had been constitutional reform focused on the Senate as a mechanism 
for regional democratic expression and issues seen as moral choices such as opposition to 
abortion and same-sex sexual expression. In his efforts to expand the appeal of his party beyond 
the Reform Party’s regional base, Harper jettisoned the constitutional and morally based appeals 
while imposing a higher level of message discipline to ensure that these issues could not be made 
salient by his political foes. In a real sense, “tough on crime” was all that remained of the Reform 
Party’s populism. Aggressive promotion of this policy direction was described as the major 
policy victory of the remnants of the Reform Party. It should also be noted that this populism 
was rooted in a belief that common sense and citizens’ perceptions should be accorded primacy 
over elite expert opinion. 
The other key contextual factor influencing the centrality of the tough-on-crime approach 
of the Conservative party prior to the 2006 election was the “Sponsorship Scandal” arising from 
the Chrétien Liberal administrations’ efforts to raise the profile of the federal government in 
Quebec. As the program sank into a quagmire of royal commission and criminal investigations, 
the moral authority of the federal government was weakened. Harper’s Conservatives portrayed 
political corruption and moral lassitude as symptoms of the same disease that produced “soft-on-
crime” criminal justice policies. In this sense, the democratic reform and criminal justice 
components of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2006 platform and appeal for electoral 
support were intrinsically linked in a general critique of a perceived moral decay in Canadian 
society. 
2.2.2. Literature on Individual Tough-On-Crime Legislative Initiatives 
The 2009 passage of Bill C-25 or the Truth in Sentencing Act generated more academic 
analysis than any other single tough-on-crime legislation passed by the Harper administration. 
The bill legislatively limited the amount of credit given for time served in remand custody prior 
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to conviction and sentencing. The legislation was passed in the context of a decade and a half of 
rapidly increasing rates of remand custody.31 During this period of growth, one explanation 
offered by politicians and justice system administrators was that those criminally accused were 
manipulating the system in order to secure advantage from enriched credit for time served in pre-
conviction custody.32 This causal attribution was rejected by most prisoners,33 inmate advocates, 
criminal defence lawyers, and professional criminologists.34 Inmate advocates justified enhanced 
credit on the grounds of the differential intensity of punishment because of differential 
conditions in pre-conviction and post-conviction custody. The academic critique focused on the 
negligible impact the legislation would have on crime or remand rates, and on the workings of 
interrelated policies and laws that would cause differential treatment in the total length of 
incarceration depending upon whether an accused had been held in remand or released on bail 
prior to conviction and sentencing. This evidence-based and logical critique of Bill C-25 was 
ignored by parliamentarians. In the analysis that followed, the legislation was described as “the 
product of apathy and indifference on the part of many parliamentarians and, at worst, a wilful 
blindness rooted in political expediency”35 and as “irrational.”36 Blame for ignoring evidence and 
a disregard for sound public policy was thus attributed to some combination of incompetence and 
political expediency on the part of the government. This analysis fails to explain some key issues 
that will be explored later in this dissertation including the unanimous support from elected 
parliamentarians, the broader scope of the legislation than that promised Conservative platform, 
and the role of provincial governments in proposing and promoting the legislation. 
Analysis of other individual legislative initiatives includes the expansion of powers for 
private citizens making arrests,37 imposing sanctions on cyberbullying,38 speech promoting 
terrorism,39 the release of those found not guilty for reasons of insanity,40 and prostitution.41 
These legislative initiatives are described as being politically motivated responses to high profile 
events or, in the case of the prostitution legislation, a Supreme Court ruling. In each case, 
controversy was transformed into punitive sanctions despite either the rareness of the action 
being subjected to legislative sanction and/or the existence of expert opinion questioning the 
efficacy of the legislation. In a discussion of changes to parole eligibility for those convicted of 
murder,42 Manson summarizes the passage of the punitive legislation that affected very few 
individuals as being based on mobilizing the views of victims of criminal acts, an “indifference 
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to empirical data and the opinion of experts,” the attachment of labels “superficially, speciously 
and without scrutiny,” and the active support or indifference of opposition parties in 
Parliament.43 
The operation of Canada’s prison system also received attention. In a critique of the 2007 
policy paper A Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety. Jackson and Stewart argue that the 
government policy paper represents an abandonment of evidence-driven policy development and 
the replacement of a rehabilitative orientation with a punitive one.44 Piché argues that a major 
expansion of prison capacity formed an essential part of the Harper administrations’ justice 
polices.45 These two studies combine to establish the framework of analysis of the operation of 
the prison system during the Harper era. 
The abandonment of evidence-based decision-making and the occurrence of a punitive 
rather than a rehabilitative orientation within the context of expansion of carceral capacity form 
the underlying assumptions of studies into the experiences faced by prisoners and corrections 
workers46 and operational decisions such as the closing of prison farms by the Correctional 
Service of Canada (CSC).47 While the studies focusing on the political elements of prison policy 
and administration point to an increasingly punitive approach, countervailing pressures have 
been identified. Kerr traces the history of a punitive protocol on long-term solitary confinement 
implemented by the CSC in 2003, which was quietly abandoned in 2011 following legal 
challenges and public controversy.48 In this case, a punitive measure implemented prior to the 
inauguration of the Harper administration was modified through a process in which the primary 
fields of contention were legal, administrative policy, and the media rather than political. 
2.2.3. Summative Analysis of the Harper Administrations’ Tough-On-Crime Record 
As noted earlier, there is a virtual consensus in the summative literature on the Harper 
administrations’ justice policies that they represented a tough-on-crime approach. This is seen to 
represent a transformative shift in Canada’s justice policies from a rehabilitative orientation to a 
punitive one. All focus on both the rhetoric of Conservative officials and the volume of tough-
on-crime laws proposed and passed. All attribute primary motivations as a populist appeal for 
electoral support and a conception of those who violate criminal law as dangerous others. 
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The first point of divide in the literature is between those who treat the stated objectives 
of the Harper administrations as achieved result and those who do not. Those who take the first 
position either misstate or misinterpret the empirical evidence on incarceration numbers49 or 
simply ignore the issue of empirical results.50 This body of literature has value and applicability 
in some areas. For example, Weinrath’s examination of the CSC is a perceptive and valuable 
study of the operations of prisons in Canada. However, with respect to the research problems this 
dissertation is examining, the combination of the empirical error and a simplistic assumption of 
unity between the stated objective and ultimate result make this body of literature irrelevant. It is 
important to note that in making this critique, I am not referring to those who attempted to 
predict the results of the Harper administrations’ program early in its tenure. Nobody has a good 
crystal ball, and predictions that the government would succeed in meeting its stated objectives 
were not unreasonable. To repeat these predictions as accomplished fact a decade later is less 
tenable.  
Those authors whose work is grounded in the empirical reality that Canadian 
incarceration rates were relatively stable during the Harper administrations’ tenure in office 
provide much more interesting analysis. 
Zinger examines the impact of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime rhetoric and 
legislative initiatives on the internal operations of the CSC.51 He argues that CSC management 
used a punitive political climate and projections of increased prison numbers to increase budgets 
and create even more control-oriented operations within Canada’s prisons. CSC budgets almost 
doubled in the first half the Harper administrations’ tenure before being partially scaled back 
when “the expected influx of new prisoners with the coming into force of the Truth in Sentencing 
Act (2009) and other crime bills failed to materialize.”52 However, even with the budget 
correction, CSC management emerged from the exercise with a net gain in resources. At the 
same time, the CSC cut programs aimed at rehabilitation or integration into society and increased 
measures designed to control inmate activity. This aligned with a tough-on-crime political 
program by making prisons more punitive both in substance and perception. As a result, the 
political tough-on-crime mandate resulted in a qualitative rather than a quantitative toughening. 
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Webster and Doob provide a summative analysis of the Harper era that must be read in 
the context of their earlier work. As noted above, at the start of the Harper administrations’ 
tenure, they explained the stability in Canada’s incarceration rates in terms of the balance 
between risk and protective factors.53 At the mid-point of the Harper era, they report that risk 
factors in the form of the political orientation of the government have increased, but that the 
protective factors have thus far prevented a major increase in incarceration rates.54 In their 
summative analysis at the end of the era, they stress a profound shift in fundamental orientation, 
saying “the policy elite in Canada has taken the position that those who commit offences are 
inherently ‘bad’ people and qualitatively different from ‘ordinary law abiding Canadians.’”55 
Webster and Doob further report that “the Conservative government has introduced 
unprecedentedly harsh criminal justice legislation characterized by a greater use of 
imprisonment, increased reduction in judicial discretion, and a more punitive philosophy of 
corrections.”56 At the same time, “the relative stability of Canadian imprisonment rates suggests 
that it has largely been able to resist the wider forces compelling other countries toward more 
punitive responses to crime.”57 Webster and Doob rightly identify this as a conundrum in need of 
explanation. The role of the political opposition in Parliament is discounted with the observation 
that most punitive legislative initiatives received implicit or explicit support from other parties.58 
Primary attribution for the stability in incarceration rates is given to the protective factors 
discussed above. However, they also suggest that much of the tough-on-crime legislation was 
primarily symbolic59 and appeared to be an attempt to form public opinion rather than simply to 
follow it.60 They speculate that the broader objective of the tough-on-crime legislative agenda 
may have been part of a larger project to reinforce conservative values related to individual 
responsibility in all aspects of life.61 
Webster and Doob present the outcomes of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime 
program as still being contingent and indeterminate. They clearly hope for failure on moral, 
ethical, and pragmatic grounds. Kheiriddin, on the other hand, is clearly supportive of the stated 
objectives of the Harper administration.62 Despite this, she agrees with Webster and Doob’s 
analysis of both the nature of the rupture with the past and the indeterminacy of outcome. 
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2.3. Limitations of the Literature on Canadian Incarceration Rates During the 
Harper Era 
The review of literature on the results of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice 
policies is necessarily fairly short. In comparison to the analysis of the increases in American 
incarceration rates, there has been very little explanation of the stability in Canadian 
incarceration rates, even during the almost decade-long tenure of an administration which was 
explicitly attempting to increase the use of carceral response to crime. Some of the literature that 
does exist is intrinsically flawed because it does not recognize the empirical fact of stability. As a 
result, effort is wasted in attempting to explain the non-existent. 
The most sophisticated efforts to explain Canadian incarceration rates occurs in the 
trilogy by Webster and Doob.63 Their analysis suggests that elite, technically-informed 
administrators of the criminal justice system managed to thwart populist demands for increased 
use of carceral sanction. They also suggest that some of the criminal justice proposals of the 
Harper administration were symbolic in nature and primarily designed to mobilize political 
support for the governing party. This analysis is a very useful starting point. It leads to questions 
about the institutional locations and means by which the policy objectives of the governmental 
political administration are resisted. The analysis also implicitly calls for a further examination 
of the nature of political symbolism in the formation of criminal justice policies. 
In an article published at the end of the Harper administrations’ tenure, Doob and 
Webster present contradictory messages. On the one hand, on the basis of an analysis of 
rhetorical statements, they proclaim that a fundamental rupture has occurred in Canadian 
criminal justice policy.64 At the same time, they join Kheiriddin in arguing that the results are 
indeterminate.65 Both these arguments share a common problem in assuming the fact of a 
rupture. As Doob and Webster had noted in their earlier work, changes in substantive result were 
in fact relatively small. If there was indeed a rupture in political and policy discourse, why did 
this fail to be accompanied by a rupture in substantive results? If the results are indeed 
indeterminate, then the changes could produce either continued stability or future substantive 
changes in the processing of criminal cases in a way that leads to increased incarceration rates. 
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But is this in fact the case? If the actions of the Harper administration were indeed largely 
symbolic, is it not likely that substantively unchanged systems are more likely to produce 
substantively similar results? 
The balance of this dissertation will attempt to build on both the insights and lacunae of 
the Webster and Doob arguments. To explore the nature of the “protective factors” that may have 
helped prevent a transformation of political intent into more incarcerated Canadians, we will 
examine the interaction of the Canadian system of making political decisions and the systems of 
administering criminal prosecutions and adjudicating cases. We will also examine whether the 
legislative program of the Harper administrations was, in fact, largely symbolic in nature. If it 
was, the nature and results of the symbolic actions must be explained. To begin this analysis we 
now turn to the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and the theories of symbolic action developed 
by Murray Edelman. 
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3. Systems and Symbolic Action Theories as a Framework for Analyzing the
Record of the Harper Administrations 
The literature examined in chapter 2 points to a disconnection between the stated 
objectives of the Harper administrations and actual substantive results. In particular, the series of 
articles by Webster and Doob argue that the rhetoric employed by members of the Harper 
administrations points to a fundamental rupture in Canadian criminal justice policy. Despite this, 
they acknowledge that incarceration rates remained relatively stable. They point to both 
“protective factors” and the possibility that some actions may have been symbolic in nature in 
order to explain the disconnection between rhetorical rupture and substantive stability. This 
dissertation builds on their insights. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical 
framework employed during the subsequent empirical examination of the actions and results of 
the Harper administrations in the area of criminal justice in order to address the questions: 
1. Why did the Harper administrations have such little substantive impact on incarceration
rates?
2. Given a modest substantive effect, why did the Harper administrations make tough-on-
crime legislation a cornerstone of their political agenda?
Before taking up the theoretical approaches, we must first delineate an issue arising from 
different levels of analysis. As Parsons noted, this is an essential preparatory step in analysis. In 
his example, a bridge can be viewed as a collection of atoms or a single structural entity with a 
specific form and function.1 In this study, we must look at both the atoms and the single entity. 
Unlike Parson’s bridge, the single entity is not a rigid and fixed structure. Instead it is a 
comprehensive political program that is dynamic. Measurement and description of this program 
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and its effects is therefore more complex that examining the structure of a bridge and counting 
the traffic flow over it. The equivalent of Parson’s atoms are acts. 
Parsons defines an act as having four essential elements: the act “implies an actor;” “the 
act must have an ‘end,’ a future state of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented;” 
“it must be initiated in a ‘situation’ of which the trends of development differ in one or more 
important respects from the state of affairs to which the actor is oriented, the end;” and in “a 
certain mode of relationship between these elements…there is a ‘normative’ orientation of 
action.”2 The primary act being examined in this dissertation is the passage of individual pieces 
of legislation which, when taken as a whole, comprise the administrations’ criminal justice 
program. Passage of legislation consists of moving a written document through a chain of 
approval processes that result in the document achieving the status of a law, defined as “the body 
of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or custom, which a particular state or 
community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.”3 The single act of passing a piece 
of legislation consists of many individual acts, including drafting the legislation, introducing it 
into Parliament, placing it within the legislative calendar, speaking in favour or opposition to the 
legislation, referring the legislation to committee, voting (or refraining from voting) on the 
legislation and so on. If the legislation is passed, there must be many individual acts of 
enforcement and adjudication to transform the legislation into justice system outcomes. Parsons 
tends to assume that a series of acts will form a “single chain” of integrated by a single 
normatively established end goal.4 The final result of an action is seen as being the result of “a 
concrete end, concrete conditions, concrete means, and one or more norms governing the choice 
of the means to the end.”5 This statement hints at the possibility of a multiplicity of potential 
outcomes rather than a single chain, since there is a choice of normatively governed potential 
means to achieve a desired end. Some of choices of means can be contradictory to the 
normatively chosen ends.6 Different actors involved can differ in their choices of both means and 
ends.7 
The primary actor whose actions are under examination is the collective entity of the 
Conservative Members of Parliament who constituted Harper administrations in the Thirty-ninth, 
Fortieth and Forty-first Canadian Parliaments. In addition, the actions of Opposition Members of 
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Parliament, members of the judiciary, prosecutors and policy makers in provincial governments 
are also relevant to shaping the substantive outcomes of the legislation. These actors, and others, 
all engaged in discrete actions that combine to produce substantive outcomes in the state’s 
response to criminal acts. In contrast to Parsons, the existence of a single chain of actions united 
by a commitment to a specified end goal and a common normative commitment to the means is 
not assumed. There are many cooks in the state’s kitchen which makes the stew unpredictable. 
However, in rejecting analysis based on Parsons’ single chain of actions, we are reluctant to 
surrender to an assertion of randomness of both action and outcome. In this case, the challenge is 
to find theoretical constructs that allow for the explanation of outcomes that are both systematic 
and indeterminate. We also do not wish to assume a linear relationship between the normative 
basis for decision-making for all of the discrete actions that constitute the act of passing 
legislation and, ultimately, the construction of a political program. The two theoretical constructs 
used to supplement Parson’s conception of action that will be used to ground the analysis of the 
Harper administrations’ criminal justice policies are the systems theory articulated by Niklas 
Luhmann and the theories of symbolic action developed by Murray Edelman. 
3.1. Luhmann’s Systems Framework 
Luhmann’s systems theory provides a functionalist explanation of the operation of a 
society while rejecting a conception of the society as a unified organism. Instead, a society is 
seen as comprising different systems that operate to achieve autopoiesis—that is, the ability to 
maintain system boundaries by functioning according to an internal logic and coding of 
operations.8 
The implications of different systems operations can be seen by comparing operation of 
two related systems: the political and the legal. Luhmann argues the two systems are closely 
related and symbiotic, with the legal system legitimizing political power. This power, at the same 
time, provides the force that is available to enforce legal decisions if required.9 Each system 
forms part of the environment for the other, but the systems retain their distinctiveness. The legal 
system operates on the basis of the distinction between legal/illegal while the political system 
functions on the basis of “the distinction between superior power (authority) and those 
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subordinate (the governing/the governed)”.10 The political system deals with an issue by passing 
a law, which has the effect of moving the issue out of the political system. Once the political 
system deals with an issue by passing a law, interpretation moves into the realm of the legal 
system, which will process and dispose of the law using its own internal systems logic.11 The 
issue also moves to other systems after the passage of legislation and becomes subject to the 
distinctions and coding operations of a range of other systems, such as the system of law 
(courts), enforcement (police) and perception shaping (media). As a result, the political system 
has limited ability to determine outcomes.12 
Luhmann argues systems operate through communication and the processing of 
information, with different systems employing different communicative codes. If the first task of 
the system of law is the drawing, recording, and transmitting of distinctions to create a binary 
coding of acts as legal or illegal,13 the next step is more complicated. Once an act has been coded 
as illegal, to allow for expectations to be formed and fulfilled, equal cases must be treated 
equally and unequal cases unequally.14 To do this, the system of law functions self-referentially 
through a process of drawing factual distinctions in written rulings that both serve as 
justifications for the decision in the case at hand and provides a basis for comparison in future 
cases. In politics, however, the scope for agreement and disagreement is much greater. As soon 
as a decision is made, alternatives are available for presentation and debate. This congeals into a 
basis of opposition for all political decisions, resulting in a coding of the exercise of 
governmental power and opposition to this power.15 A legal decision thus “settles” a very 
narrowly defined point of controversy at least until another case with a different factual basis is 
presented. A political decision inevitably spawns a new, wider range of issues and debates. 
The courts deal with specific real or hypothetical cases simply to decide whether an 
action is legal or not legal. In doing so, it converts facts into decisions. The political system 
processes issues—that is, problems that have come to command the attention in a manner 
compelling enough to force a decision. The objective of the decision is to “get problems out of 
the system”16 with the general effect of transferring it to other systems where outcomes are 
indeterminate. In the case of crime and a fear of crime, the political responses available to deal 
with a problem are to pass a law or allocate resources to enforcement systems. Once the political 
system has thus dealt with an issue by passing a law, “we do not know anything about the effects 
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of statutes after they have passed (unless special studies have been carried out or we have 
specific knowledge of the local milieu).”17 
The legal system can only deal with issues presented as cases before it. The courts cannot 
seek cases. Instead, cases must be presented to it by actors within other systems. Once a case is 
brought into the legal system, the courts can pronounce an action or set of actions taken by one 
of the parties to the dispute to be legal or illegal. If an action is pronounced as illegal, sanctions 
can be imposed from a range of legally prescribed options. In general, the legal system does not 
make resource allocation decisions, except indirectly by mandating procedural requirements. The 
political system has more flexibility in response. It can proclaim rules in the form of legislation 
or regulation, confiscate or allocate resources, choose personnel to generate activity, or engage in 
communicative activity ranging from talk to symbolic acts. 
Luhmann notes that the legal system is “very slow” since it is “held back by the need to 
demonstrate substantiation and accuracy.”18 The process of comparison of cases in search of 
differences results in slow incremental change. The courts also have restrictions on their ability 
to determine when they will deal with an issue since this is dependent upon parties in dispute 
placing cases before them for adjudication. Because the system of law deals with disputes and 
actions that have already occurred which diminishes a sense of temporal urgency.19 In politics, 
temporality is highly variable. Some problems present as issues that appear suddenly with a 
compelling case for immediate attention. Other problems present as issues that can be denied, 
obfuscated, delayed, or ignored. Political actors possess considerable discretion in deciding when 
to deal with issues, although there can be considerable political cost in misjudging temporal 
urgency by acting too quickly or too slowly. 
In comparison to the system of law, Luhmann argues that “the political system operates 
on an altogether different terrain.”20 Rather than simply adjudicating specific acts, the political 
system deals with problems. The actors in the political system have discretion about which 
problems generated by itself or other systems it will attempt to deal with in a political fashion. 
Decisions influence future events rather than rule on past actions. Because these problems have 
implications for the future, there are differential degrees of urgency for different problems.21 
Because political acts attempt to influence future events and actions of many individuals, 
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institutions, and systems, there is an indeterminacy of result in any political action. Indeed, even 
retrospective analysis of the effects of political actions and decisions is very difficult.22 Because 
of these conditions on political actors, the history of politics 
is a history of ‘talk,’ of strategic positioning, of operations under the schema of 
government and opposition, of negotiations, of public declarations of intention and the 
secondary intention of testing public opinion, etc. Politically the matter comes to rest 
with a symbolic act of legislation and the possibility of a mention in the success stories of 
the party or government.23 
For Luhmann, those acting in the political system are guided by the imperative of 
attempting to gain and hold power—that is, to be the superior authority rather than the 
subordinated. To do so, they identify problems and process them with legislative acts or resource 
allocation. Once processed, the goal is to credibly declare the problem to be solved or “to get the 
problem out of the system”24 and claim political credit for so doing. However, the results of 
political actions are worked through on a case-by-case basis. As a result, these political decisions 
are indeterminate and ultimately unpredictable in substantive result. 
In effect, Luhmann replaces Parsons’ single chain of actions that are united by common 
ends and a common normative commitment to means with multiple action chains. Each one has 
its own distinct imperatives. Within each action chain, there is some consistent shaping of 
results, and hence predictability. However, there is more indeterminacy of final result since there 
are more than one systems’ logics at play. 
3.2. Edelman’s Theories of Symbolic Action 
Edelman implicitly challenges Parsons’ conception of action by challenging the 
assumption of a necessary unity between the desired ends of individual actions in the action 
chain. Edelman argues that the ultimate end of actors in the political system is to generate some 
level of acquiescence to the political system itself.25 For Edelman, the ultimate end of 
acquiescence is complicated by the indeterminate and unpredictable substantive results of 
political action. The primary focus of analysis moves from how government gives people “the 
things they want” to “the mechanisms through which politics influences what they want, what 
they fear, what they regard as possible, and even who they are.”26 Actions by political actors can 
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thus be taken either for the end of achieving a substantive policy outcome or for the end of 
building and maintaining acquiescence. 
Edelman argues that political leaders face two problems. The first is that most people 
have “no incentive to define joy, failure, or hope in terms of public affairs.”27 In short, most 
people are indifferent to the passions that motivate political actors. The second constraint is that 
social issues tend to be intractable. There are no absolute solutions.28 To mobilize and maintain 
political acquiescence, support, and involvement, the political actor seeks to create a series of 
spectacles29 in which acts such as the introduction of legislation become symbols around which 
political mobilization can occur.30 The creation of a successful spectacle is predicated upon the 
existence of interested spectators. Thus the challenge for political actors is to create and sustain 
an audience interested enough in the political process to allow for the acquiescence to be 
maintained. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, three aspects of this approach are most relevant. 
First, like Luhmann, Edelman argues that political actors have a degree of choice in deciding 
what problems they will turn into political issues. With this, he argues that political actors do not 
simply respond to pre-existing public definitions of problems, but often actively create the 
perception of a circumstance as a problem that can then be solved. Second, he argues that acts 
are communicative symbols that are as important as words. Finally, he argues that there is an 
inverse correlation between the ability of a political actor to achieve specified substantive results 
and the importance placed on the communicative value of the act. I consider each of these 
propositions in turn. 
Edelman argues that people living in a complex society experience a reality that is shaped 
by a vast array of influences. An individual experiences the world as “a complex of existential 
economic and social ties associated with a set of cognition.”31 A core task of someone aspiring to 
political leadership is to transform this multiplicity of influences into a small number of myths 
that can serve as a common framework to unify large numbers of individuals. These myths are 
stories that identify enemies or saviours and attribute a political causality to the negative aspects 
of people’s lives. Once a core organizing myth has been established into the political discourse, 
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the political leaders personify, intensify, and ritualize the myth-building discourse.32 From this 
perspective, “political issues” do not emerge spontaneously within the mass of the public, but are 
chosen for their potential capacity to create acquiescence to be ruled by a particular set of 
political actors. Some “damaging conditions” are selected to be defined as “social problems” 
worthy of attention and solution, while others are not.33 There are inevitably conflicts among 
“leaders and oligarchies”34 regarding which politically defined issue should be accorded 
primacy, since this is the key mechanism by which members of the public express a preference 
as to which leader or oligarchy it acquiesces to be dominated by. The creation of an issue 
becomes real in acquiescence. 
If the practice of politics can be seen as a process of generating acquiescence through the 
selection and creation of public issues to be politically solved, Edelman argues that words are not 
enough as conveyors of meaning. Acts, whether or not they are substantively effective, convey 
meaning. Indeed, acts can speak louder than words. In the practice of politics, the act of passing 
legislation, allocating resources, or creating an administrative bureaucracy becomes a key 
component in defining an issue as important enough to serve as a basis upon which to grant 
acquiescence to being ruled.35 In addition to serving as a mechanism for generating 
acquiescence, the political act may have substantive results. Indeed, Edelman argues, “Every 
instance of policy formulation involves a ‘mix’ of symbolic effect and rational reflection of 
interests in resources, though one or the other may be dominant in any particular case.”36 This 
mixture of symbolic and substantive opens many possibilities. Edelman suggests, “It is not 
uncommon to give the rhetoric to one side and the decision to the other.”37 The less important or 
successful the substantive results of the political act, the more important the symbolic attachment 
becomes.38 The symbolic importance of an act in defining something as a public issue can even 
have the paradoxical effect in which substantive failure generates demand for an intensification 
of effort or resources devoted to the policies that are, objectively, failures.39 
3.3. Explanation and Theory Testing 
In the balance of this dissertation, work of Luhmann and Edelman is used as a basis for 
informing the empirical study of the actions and utterances that comprise the unfolding of the 
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Harper administrations criminal justice program. These theories are treated as complementary 
rather than competitive. The empirical also serves as a test of the theoretical frameworks 
themselves. If Luhmann’s theoretical approach is valid, evidence of the existence and interaction 
of different systems acting in accordance with systems logic will be found. Further, the final 
results of legislation and other policy initiatives will be the result of operations of the different 
systems and the interactions between them. These results will be indeterminate. A correlation 
between the stated objectives of legislation or political acts and substantive policy outcomes 
cannot be assumed. If Edelman’s theoretical approach is valid, evidence of political acts 
undertaken at least in part for symbolic rather than substantive reasons must be found. Further, 
the symbolic aspects of these acts must be directed toward the mobilization of acquiescence to 
the political system in general and the members of the Harper administrations in particular. 
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4. Methodology: Description and Issues
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data used as evidence in support of the 
arguments made as answers to the research question, how these data were collected, and the 
methods utilized to analyse data. 
4.1. Methodological Implications of the Nature of the Argument 
In this dissertation, I am attempting to open a black box.1 In chapter 1, evidence is 
presented to argue that the Harper administrations had the stated intention of increasing 
incarceration levels in Canada and undertook legislative action that they described as fulfillment 
of this intention. In chapters 5 and 6, I examine actual achieved effects for both individual 
legislative initiatives and the Harper administrations’ program as a whole  to establish that the 
substantive effect of this legislative activity was, at best, muted. In short, there is a limited 
correlation between stated intentions and results. Victory could be declared by claiming that no 
causal relationship had been found. This would be unsatisfying. The primary task of the 
dissertation, therefore, is to present a plausible explanation as to why this result happened. This 
makes for an eclectic approach to methodology. To clearly establish what the stated intentions of 
legislative acts were, a close reading of the words spoken is required. To establish substantive 
results, a quantitative analysis of justice system outcomes is required. To follow the chain of unit 
actions leading to a single legislative act, a following of the legislative process is required. 
Finally, I assess the relationship between the symbolic and substantive nature of legislative 
initiatives and how legislation is processed by different systems. Each of these components of 
the evidentiary basis to the argument requires different data sets and different methodologies. 
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This dissertation is based on a discrepancy between stated intentions and results. I argue 
that one reason for this is a discrepancy between words and acts. This raises the question of the 
motivation for the acts. In undertaking the analysis of words, I have attempted to focus on what 
was said rather than assigning motive as to why the words were said. In some cases, motive is 
straightforward at one level. For example, the motivation for the choice of words in an election 
platform is to attract enough votes to win election. However, even in this motivation can be 
nuanced. Election commitments and language can attempt to win votes by attracting swing or 
traditionally oppositional voters or by creating and magnifying cleavages between groups of 
voters. The straightforward, singular motivation of winning elections can result very different 
motivations for specific commitments and language. In the end, ascribing motivation is based on 
an assessment of what is reasonable for an actor to do in a particular circumstance. This is 
dangerous because “what looks reasonable to us will not be what looked reasonable to them.”2 
The problem of motivation becomes even more difficult because of the nature of the core 
argument that many of the actions undertaken by the members of the Harper administrations in 
the realm of criminal justice appear to be symbolic rather than substantive in effect - and 
possibly in motive. If a symbolic act is undertaken to build acquiescence to the exercise of 
political power, the act can never be described in these terms. This inevitably posits a certain 
disconnect between stated and actual intent, which is drifting into the very dangerous realm of 
ascribing motive. Methodologically, I have attempted to resolve this by comparing the words and 
the acts to see if there was consistency. My task was to determine whether there was enough 
patterned inconsistency between the two to support the hypothesis that some of the actions were 
symbolic in nature. 
4.2. Textual Analysis 
In order to examine the structure and meaning of decision-making, this dissertation relies 
primarily on the textual analysis of existing documents, judicial decisions, and transcriptions of 
legislative debate. The exercise “consists of breaking down or fragmenting the pertinent units of 
information for their subsequent coding and categorization.”3 In addition to the meanings of the 
words, the context of the discourse is accorded attention.4 The utterance or writing of meaningful 
words is also considered as an act that has both meaning and consequence.5 The major 
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documentary sources relied on are the Hansard record of parliamentary debate with special 
emphasis on the second reading debate of tough-on-crime bills; the platforms of the major 
political parties contesting the 2006, 2008, 2011, and 2015 Canadian federal elections; the record 
of key events in parliament; written judgments from Canadian courts at both the trial and 
appellate levels; policy directives guiding the decisions of public servants, with particular 
emphasis on provincial prosecutorial policies; and media articles. The particular nature of and 
approach to each of these sources is discussed in turn. 
4.2.1. Hansard Recording of Parliamentary Debates 
The words uttered by recognized speakers in Canadian parliamentary forums (House of 
Commons, Senate, and committee meetings) are recorded and transcribed. Access is available in 
both print and internet-accessible electronic formats. For the most part, the record captures only 
the words uttered by a speaker formally recognized by the Speaker or committee chair, although 
from time to time unrecognized interjections (“heckling”) is uttered with sufficient volume and 
vigour to be recorded by the microphone and transcribed. Advance copies of the transcripts are 
provided to Members of Parliament, who are permitted to suggest minor alterations to improve 
clarity and accuracy. “Material changes to meaning” are not permitted.6 
Utterances are bound by many stylistic conventions that are usually observed. Violation 
of these conventions can result in a speaker being interrupted to reaffirm a commitment to these 
conventions.7 Failure to do so can result in sanction, including temporary expulsion from the 
chamber.8 Those speaking in parliamentary forums are rigidly governed by both legal 
qualification to speak and the time available for speaking to specifically defined issues.9 Those 
speaking in the chamber of the House of Commons receive their qualification to speak from 
winning a plurality of electoral votes from a precisely defined geographical area while those 
speaking in the Senate have been legitimized by appointment by the Governor General acting on 
the advice of the prime minister at the time of appointment. 
In both House of Commons and Senate Committees, people who are not members of the 
parliamentary bodies are granted the right to speak, subject to invitation or acceptance by the 
members of the committee.10 Those speaking during committee meetings include a subset of the 
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members of the House of Commons or Senate, government officials, representatives of interest 
groups, and people appearing as individuals. The latter group is usually either people who have 
been intensely and personally affected by issues arising from the legislation being discussed (i.e., 
family members of homicide victims) or academics who have either been asked or volunteered to 
share their expertise. 
Permission to speak is restricted by the clock, with all speakers being subject to strict and 
inflexible limits on the time available.11 The number of speakers and hence the time devoted to 
each individual piece of legislation is negotiated by the House leaders of each political party. In 
the event of major disagreement or delaying tactics by opposition members, the government can 
limit total time spent on a particular bill through the passage of a “time allocation” motion. The 
use of this expedient is an indication both of government commitment and opposition 
intransigence on a measure. As a result of the centrality of time in the operations of Parliament, 
evaluation of government commitment and opposition resistance must include an assessment of 
the time spent on a bill as well as the actual words spoken. 
Another contextual issue that must be considered in examining parliamentary debate is 
the intended audience of the speaker. If the general purpose of argumentative discourse is to 
change the minds of others toward your own interests,12 the reality is that members of 
parliamentary bodies rarely attempt to persuade each other during debate. Partisan positions are 
established in caucus meetings before debate opens. The “debate” is thus directed at convincing 
those outside of the parliamentary chamber about the wisdom of the speaker’s party position and 
the perfidious nature of other parties. For opposition party speakers, close attention is paid to 
positioning between opposition parties as well as between opposition and government. All 
utterances are capable of being amplified to audiences outside of the chamber by the media, 
academics, and other readers of Hansard, or by the active efforts of both political friend and 
foe.13 If the self is broadly defined to include individuals wrapped in a partisan banner, speakers 
in the parliamentary debate are often engaged in a form of systematically distorted 
communication14 in which debate ostensibly engaged to reach mutual understanding contains an 
element of self-deception in which the mobilizing and consolidation of general political support 
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can supersede real attempts to convince other legislators about the merits or limitations of 
particular measures in the legislation. 
The second reading of debate is deemed to ascertain “agreement in principle.” Votes are 
conducted by voice unless either the Speaker deems the bill to have been defeated at the voice 
vote or if any member calls for a recorded vote. The conducting of a recorded vote consumes 
time, so calling for a recorded vote is an indication of more vigorous dissent than is expressing 
opposition during a voice vote. The recorded vote also places the support or opposition of each 
member as an individual onto an easily accessible public record. 
During second reading debate, the lead government spokesperson explains the purpose 
and contents of the legislation. A specified period is allocated for questions and replies. A 
designated spokesperson from each recognized political party makes a response in reply, with the 
order being determined by the size of each party’s House of Commons delegation. Time is 
allocated for questions and answers. The opposition speakers generally describe the legislation, 
indicate their party’s position, and criticize either specific provisions in the legislation or mount a 
generalized critique of the government’s record. Avoidance of any discussion of the specific 
terms of the legislation is usually the good indicator of support, acquiescence, or tepid opposition 
to the legislation before the House. For most bills, second reading debate is confined to one 
round of speeches. However, for important or controversial bills, additional rounds of debate are 
conducted until the government effectively abandons the attempt to pass the bill by not bringing 
it forward on the Order Paper, the House leaders agree that enough time has been spent on the 
bill, or the government imposes time allocation.15 
The transcript of all second reading debates for all tough-on-crime bills during the Thirty-
ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-first Parliaments were analyzed using NVivo 11. All second reading 
debate was sorted according to the partisan affiliation of each speaker and coded according to the 
arguments presented in support or opposition to the legislation. Development of coding 
categories began with the principles of sentencing outlined in Section 718 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada. A preliminary reading of key speeches resulted in the addition of the argument 
categories of ease of conviction, confidence in the legal system, cost, proportionality and deserts. 
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A concern for public safety can form the basis of the Section 718 principles of rehabilitation, 
incapacitation or deterrence. In cases where a public safety appeal was embedded in an argument 
based on one of these three principles, the specific argument was counted. There remained a 
residual category of general appeals on the basis public safety arguments that did not specify the 
mechanism by which public safety was deemed to be enhanced. The first use of a coded 
argument by a speaker was recorded. If the speaker raised the argument repeatedly in different 
forms, the categorization was scored once for every fifth argumentative utterance to provide a 
measure of the centrality of different arguments advanced. It should be noted that in some 
opposition speeches, no arguments about the bill in question were advanced. These instances 
usually occurred when the opposition voted in favour of the bill but did not want to highlight 
their support. In these cases, voting support for the bill was accompanied by a generalized 
critique of the government’s record. As a check on coding accuracy, word frequency was 
analyzed for each party’s utterances on the legislative package in each parliamentary session. 
The results were consistent with the findings of the coding exercise. 
The transcripts of both Commons and Senate committee hearings were also reviewed 
with the primary goal of identifying the level of conformity between the arguments presented by 
parliamentarians and witnesses. These transcripts were not coded according to arguments, but 
examined to review the general tenor and tone of the debate and identify specific utterances 
deemed to be succinctly expressive of the arguments made in this debate. 
4.2.2. Judicial Decisions 
According to Luhmann, a primary mechanism for the system of law to maintain itself is 
the process of written argumentation in the form of case decisions. These decisions also serve as 
a key coupling mechanism with other systems, especially the political.16 Analyzing cases is a 
cornerstone activity of lawyers and judges, with the record of cases serving as the data for any 
analysis of the function of the system of law.17 
In this dissertation, cases were initially located using a keyword search on the case 
repository maintained by the Canadian Legal Information Institute (Canlii).18 Searches were 
initially conducted using the titles of eighteen bills which generated 486 trial court and 135 
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appellate court rulings. These were reviewed for relevance. The topical descriptive words of 
“firearm”, “conditional sentences”, “mandatory minimum”, “sexual interference”, “sexual 
offences”, “drug (importation/trafficking/production)” and “street racing” that were the focus of 
specific pieces of legislation generated another 5,603 cases for review of relevance. Because of 
the volume, only cases that generated appellate court rulings were reviewed. A snowball 
sampling technique was also used by reviewing cases cited in previously identified rulings. 
Decisions from both trial and appellate courts were examined including all Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions ruling specifically on the interpretation or constitutionality of any tough-on-
crime bill passed during the Thirty-ninth, Fortieth or Forty-first Parliaments. In total, 318 judicial 
decisions were deemed relevant enough to be subjected to coding and analysis. All cases 
reviewed were evaluated to assess any discernable effect rising from the legislative change being 
considered. 
All cases were reviewed to assess judicial application to legislation, application of 
sentencing principles, and relationship between sentences and any mandatory minimums 
legislatively imposed during the administrations being examined. Word frequency analysis was 
conducted on decisions using NVivo 11 to assess the emphasis placed on different sentencing 
principles by the courts. 
4.2.3. Policy Directives 
Policy directives to prosecutors dealing with the issues of sentencing recommendations, 
charge election, and position on bail applications were examined on a comparative basis. All 
directives issued to prosecutors by provincial governments from January 1, 2000, to the present 
were examined. The directives were obtained via searches of Justice Department websites and 
archived material and written requests to officials. Access to Manitoba policy documents was 
initially denied but was ultimately granted as a result of Freedom of Information requests 2017-
74, 2017-75, and 2017-76. 
46 
4.2.4. Media Articles 
For information about events cited as precipitating legislative changes and for utterances 
of elected officials made outside of Parliament, media articles were used. Appropriate articles 
were identified with keyword searches on Google, ProQuest Media, CBC, Global TV, CTV, and 
Globe and Mail search engines. 
4.2.5. Party Platforms 
One basis of a political party’s appeal for electoral support is a collection of policy 
commitments popularly known as a platform.19 These documents serve to organize a political 
party’s appeal to voters and provide an indication of the perception of issue salience by those 
making strategic political decisions during an election campaign. If a party wins sufficient 
electoral support to form or participate in government, the commitments in the platform become 
a justification for legislative initiatives. Fulfillment of platform commitments also becomes a 
standard against which the government is measured.20 
The platforms of all registered political parties winning enough seats to be accorded 
official party recognition following the 2006, 2008, and 2011 elections were examined both for 
specific commitments and for the overall prominence of criminal justice proposals in each 
party’s appeal for popular support. The platforms were treated as the primary documentary 
source for each party’s appeal to voters. The English language versions of all election platforms 
were used. The platforms were treated as the primary documentary source for each party’s 
appeal to voters. 
4.3. Records of Acts 
In addition to examining discourse, I focused on actual acts following Parsons’ definition 
outlined in chapter 3. In the process of passing legislation, specific unit acts include drafting a 
bill, introducing it into Parliament, presenting it for consideration at each stage of the legislative 
process, voting and so on. In enforcing the law, police officers decide whether to convert a 
complaint into a recorded crime by recording it. They take the act of laying charges or arresting. 
Prosecutors must take the specific act of presenting charges in court. In addition to being a forum 
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for discourse, judicial decisions constitute the act of declaring the accused guilty or innocent and 
imposing specific sanctions. Those working in the corrections system lock people behind bars or 
release them. Taken together, these acts constitute the substantive results of the criminal justice 
system. The aggregation of these acts determines such social facts as incarceration rates. In this 
dissertation, I examine a range of acts, most notably the acts involved in passing legislation, the 
acts of judicial decisions, the recording of crimes and the depriving of individuals of their liberty. 
The primary source of data on acts examined in this dissertation is administrative data 
derived from information collected for administrative purposes.21 This form of data generally 
consists of criteria-driven counts of individuals, cases, or transactions. In using this form of data, 
it is essential to understand the reasons the information was collected, the decisions made in 
counting, and any systematic biasing of results.22 
The primary source of quantitative evidence on the prevalence of cases and punitive 
outcomes was derived from administrative data collected by Statistics Canada’s Canadian Centre 
for Justice Statistics and published online in the sortable CANSIM series. In cases where data 
was unavailable from the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, data tables were constructed 
from departmental topical publications, annual reports, and departmental performance 
monitoring documents. The majority of these publications were accessible online on government 
websites. In the remaining cases, access to the reports was provided upon request to the 
appropriate governmental officials. In no instance was such a request denied or ignored. 
One complicating factor for some analysis is the inconsistency in reporting periods. Some 
of the CANSIM series report on the basis of a calendar year, while others report on the basis of a 
governmental fiscal year (April 1 to March 31). Where rates are reported using data collected for 
different time periods, aggregate numbers are assigned on a pro rata basis to allow for the 
calculation of a single rate. This procedure is identified when utilized. 
Temporality problems also exist as a result of the workings of the justice system. The 
reporting of a crime, laying of charges, and adjudication of the charges do not necessarily occur 
in the same reporting period. This issue is most acute for charges deemed most serious. One 
implication is that the impact of legislative changes lags since charges laid under the new 
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provisions often do not begin to appear as adjudication results by the courts until subsequent 
reporting periods. In the case of incarceration census numbers, counts of prisoners are often the 
result of legislation and policies implemented years earlier. As Zimring puts it, change in the 
criminal justice system is “a process, not an event.”23In order to explore the effects of this 
process of change, change was recorded over time. Identification of key events such as a change 
in government administration or passage of a particular piece of legislation are identified as 
being key events in the process of change, but the impacts of these changes will develop over 
time.  
In order to present the results of change in the carceral outcomes of Canada’s political 
and criminal justice systems, the methodology modelled by Zimring24 on a number of occasions 
is utilized in chapter 5 to explore the question of whether Canada’s treatment of those convicted 
of criminal offences became tougher. The trend over time for bottom line results are presented 
using descriptive statistics. The possible effect of factors such as changing crime rate or a change 
in the mix of offences is then explored and presented individually. The most important 
confounding variable on the measure of toughness is ongoing change in Canada’s crime rate. 
The general conclusions reached via the method of sequential measure was tested using time 
series regression analysis utilizing SPSS©. The dependent variable was Canadian incarceration 
rates, with the dependent variables being Statistics Canada’s Crime Severity Index (CSI) and the 
government administrations identified by the Prime Minister. To check the effect of delayed 
results, the regressions were run on a time-lagged basis for date of transition, one year delay and 
two year delay.   
4.3.1. Legislative Acts 
The consideration and passage of legislation in Canada’s Parliament contains a number of 
acts from introduction (first reading), voting, referral to committee, royal assent and 
proclamation. These acts are recorded on a Parliament of Canada website called LEGISinfo. This 
site was used to track the progress of legislation, the iterations it took, and the temporal markers. 
The calendar for Canada’s Parliament measures time in terms of Parliaments and Sessions rather 
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than years and months. The numbering of bills begins anew with each new Session of 
Parliament. Table 4.1 outlines the parliamentary calendar used in this dissertation. 
Table 4.1 
Parliamentary Calendar for Harper Administrations 
Parliament Session Begin Date End Date Number of 
Commons 
Sitting Days 
Reason for End of 
Session 
39th 1st April 3, 2006 September 14, 2007 113 Prorogation 
39th 2nd October 16, 2007 September 7, 2008 73 Election 
40th 1st November 8, 2008 December 4, 2008 8 Prorogation 
40th 2nd January 26, 2009 December 30, 2009 83 Prorogation 
40th 3rd March 3, 2010 March 26, 2011 99 Election 
41st 1st June 2, 2011 September 13, 2013 272 Prorogation 
41st 2nd October 16, 2013 August 2, 2015 235 Election 
4.3.2. Judicial Acts 
Data on court decisions was obtained from two sources. The first was record of decisions 
and sentences in the cases selected and analyzed as discussed in section 4.2.2. In addition, 
aggregate data on charge disposition and length of proceedings is derived from the Integrated 
Criminal Court Survey (ICCS). Data is extracted electronically from court administrative data. 
Coverage for the ICCS varies over time and between jurisdiction, with participation from all 
provinces and territories not beginning until the 2005–06 fiscal year. Coverage remains 
incomplete as superior courts in Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan 
and Municipal Courts in Quebec do not report results. The absence of data from the four superior 
court jurisdictions results in an unquantifiable underreporting of sentences for serious crimes in 
these jurisdictions. Manitoba does not report on sentence lengths from any level of court. The 
ICCS data contains a number of missing variables and variable values.25The limitations of the 
ICCS data presents two major problems. The limitations in coverage make comparability for any 
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temporal period prior to 2005-2006, or roughly the beginning of the Harper administrations 
tenure in office, impossible. This makes it impossible for any determination as to whether 
changes during the Harper era represents a change or extension of pre-existing trends. Further, 
the because of the partial coverage of superior courts, the data loses reliability concurrent with 
increases in the seriousness of the charge. The coverage limitations will have very little effect for 
charges such as Level 1 Assault, but court data on Murder is essentially worthless. In the 
presentation of ICCS data, this problem was imperfectly resolved by concentrating on charges 
most likely to be heard at the lower court level. However, it should be noted that there is some 
imprecision in this. For example, the choices made by prosecutors on election for hybrid 
offences can affect the level of court in which the charge is dealt with, and therefore upon data 
reliability,.  
4.3.3. Corrections Systems Acts 
In this dissertation, the key act of the corrections systems is the admission and continued 
incarceration of prisoners. Census and admissions data for incarceration and other corrections 
data are derived from the Corrections Key Indicator Report. Data is collected from federal, 
provincial, and territorial corrections services. Coverage is complete and no concerns about 
reliability are identified by Statistics Canada. Comparable data exists from 1981 to present.26 
4.3.4. Acts of Police Recording 
There is no data source from which an accurate recording of the number of acts that 
violate the Criminal Code (crimes) in Canada. The proxy measure is the number of criminal acts 
recorded by police in the Uniform Crime Report Survey (UCR). Statistics Canada notes, “In 
actuality, the UCR crime statistics represent a subset of all crimes occurring in Canada, but are 
an accurate measure of the number of incidents of crime being reported to the police.”27 
Individuals who have been victimized by criminal activity exercise discretion whether to file a 
report to police, while other criminal activities such as impaired driving, drug possession, and 
drug trafficking do not usually generate victims with a motivation to report the offence to police. 
For these crimes, incidence reports are affected by police staffing levels and enforcement 
priorities. In addition to variability and inconsistency in victim willingness to report criminal 
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offences, police processing of complaints into documented incidents is also variable.28 Data on 
the volume of criminal acts recorded by police and persons charged is derived from the UCR 
Survey completed by police forces and detachments across Canada. Participation is mandatory, 
and coverage is deemed to be almost complete. Comparable data coverage exists from 1988 to 
the present.29 During the period under review in this dissertation, there was a general downward 
trend in Canada’s reported crime rate from the UCR. This trend is consistent with estimates 
based on other methodologies30 but the impact of the limitations in the UCR data means that the 
resulting analysis should be treated as an estimate. 
4.3.5. Acts of Bureaucratic Decision-Making 
The commitment of fiscal resources involves acts of authorizing expenditures and the 
subsequent transfer of money for the purchase of goods and services or transferring this money 
to individuals or other corporate entities. Data on these expenditures was compiled from budget 
documents, departmental annual reports and performance reporting documents. These reports are 
subjected to official audit scrutiny and verification. However, changes in categorization criteria 
or program location within government has the potential to make comparisons over time 
misleading. Data on police staffing levels was compiled by Statistics Canada31 and is derived 
from the Police Administration Survey.32 
4.4. Treating Toughness as a Variable 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the metric utilized to operationalize “toughness” was 
incarceration. This is approached both in terms of the changes in the aggregate number of 
Canadians admitted and maintained in correctional facilities and in terms of the conversion of 
guilty case to days incarcerated. In my analysis of the criminal justice policies of the Harper 
administrations, I make the argument that the impact of the legislative tough-on-crime program 
was not unequivocally tough. In the language of popular analogy, its bark was worse than its 
bite. However, this is not meant to imply that there was no substantive effect. This presents a 
conceptual problem. If substantive toughness is viewed as measurable, at what point does a 
“somewhat tough” substantive outcome become “truly tough”? There is inevitably some degree 
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of subjective opinion in reaching this decision. To move beyond this, I use three different 
comparators: rhetoric, the United States, and an ideal type. 
4.4.1. Comparison with Rhetoric 
In political discourse, the members of the CPC consistently drew a bifurcated distinction 
between their own claimed toughness on crime compared to the alleged softness on crime of 
their political opponents. This was accompanied by claims about the scope and impact of 
legislative initiatives. As a result, the first comparator is the substantive results of legislation 
compared to the claims advanced. 
4.4.2. Comparison with the United States 
Case studies consist of the detailed analysis of a single example of a phenomenon.33 They 
have particular utility in developing typological theories for complex phenomena.34 Such 
comparisons involve a small number of historically or culturally important case studies that 
focus on the distinctive features of causally complex outcomes.35 
The backdrop to the political debate on criminal justice issues is the justice system in the 
United States. Until the mid-1970s, incarceration rates between the two countries were similar in 
magnitude. In 1974, the American incarceration rate began a sustained increase. Canadian rates 
remained relatively stable. By the time Stephen Harper became prime minister, incarceration 
rates between the two countries were different by an order of magnitude of roughly six to one. 
Increases in the level of incarceration experienced in the United States are thus treated as 
“tough” while lower levels are treated as “less tough”. Since substantive toughness was 
operationalized in terms of the extent of incarceration, the two countries provide the opportunity 
for comparative case study analysis. The use of the United States as a comparator has been used 
both in political debate36 and academic discourse.37 
4.4.3. Comparison with an Ideal Type 
In chapter 8, the Weberian concept of an ideal type is used as the basis of comparison. 
This introduces an imaginary construct as the basis of comparison. As such, it consists of the 
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abstracted essential features of a phenomenon.38 The approach consists of identifying the 
essential elements of a phenomenon against which the real historical instance can be examined.39 
4.5. Ethical Approval 
No human subjects, animals, or biohazardous material were used in the conduct of this 
dissertation. As a result, approval by the University of Saskatchewan’s Ethical Review 
Committee was not required.40 
4.6. Conclusion: Methodology 
The starting point for this dissertation is an examination of the results of the Harper 
administrations legislative program. From there, I turn to an analysis of both an analysis of 
legislative acts and the discourse accompanying these acts. As a result, the methodological 
approaches are, by necessity, eclectic.  
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5. Trends in Punishment in Canada: System Results During the Harper
Administrations 
As outlined in chapter 1, commitments to get tough on crime formed a core component of 
the Conservatives’ election platform in 2006. The stated goal of the administrations led by 
Stephen Harper, as highlighted in election platforms, was to protect Canadians from the harmful 
effects of crime by increasing the sanctions against people defined as criminals. The Harper 
administrations’ commitment to their campaign promises was measured by legislative activity. 
During the Harper era slightly more than one-fifth of government bills and almost half of all 
Conservative sponsored private members bills introduced in Parliament contained tough-on-
crime measures. 
Conceptually, the goal of increased safety could be achieved from the mechanism of 
deterrence, incapacitation, or even a tough-love form of rehabilitation. However, by the logic of 
any of these mechanisms, for the end goal of increasing safety to be achieved, measurable 
punishments would have to be increased. This could mean increased use of capital punishment, 
increased severity of corporal punishment, increased incarceration, an increase in the amount of 
money being assessed as fines, or increased non-custodial forms of supervision. The Harper 
administrations continued the long-standing Canadian prohibition on capital and corporal 
punishment,1 thereby leaving incarceration as the most severe punishment available for 
imposition. Incarceration rates have been widely used as a measure of how punitive a criminal 
justice system is.2 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the actual achieved effects rather than the stated 
intentions of this legislative program. The recent history of incarceration rates in Canada is 
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explored. This is followed by an examination of the court decisions that result in incarceration 
rates. The primary focus of analysis is on the adult criminal justice system. However, patterns in 
the youth justice system are briefly explored to determine whether there was consistency in the 
direction of the two systems. 
5.1. Trends in Incarceration 
This section examines trends in adult incarceration in Canada. This is approached in three 
ways. First, incarceration and admission rates are outlined. This measures changes in the 
proportion of the population that is incarcerated. In order to take into account changes in the 
volume of reported crime, I then examine the number of people incarcerated per reported crime. 
Finally, I examine trends in the ratio of those incarcerated and those in community-based 
correctional programs. 
5.1.1. Incarceration Rates by Population 
The incarceration rate is the average daily census by government fiscal year of jails and 
prisons per one hundred thousand adults. Figure 5.1 traces the Canadian incarceration rates for 
both federal and provincial institutions. The period between the two vertical lines represents the 
Harper administrations’ terms in office. The chart shows a slow decline in incarceration rates 
roughly coinciding with the Chrétien administrations, followed by an increase during the Martin 
administration. The rates then stabilized for the period coinciding with the Harper 
administrations. 
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Figure 5.1 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0006. 
Trends in admissions to jails and prisons show a somewhat similar pattern. Figure 5.2 
outlines the trends in admissions to custodial institutions, both remand and post-conviction. The 
available data does not permit quite as extensive a historical comparison. The general pattern, 
however, shows an increase in admissions roughly coinciding with the Martin administrations 
followed by a plateauing and subsequent decline during the Harper administrations. While 
admissions peaked during the term of the Harper administration, the decline in admissions 
towards the end of this period is inconsistent with toughening of the response to crime. During 
the period of increase in custodial admissions, change was primarily driven by changes in 
remand admissions. As will be argued in chapter 7, this appears to me more a function of 
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Figure 5.2 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and Community Admissions to Provincial and 
Territorial Programs, CANSIM 251-0020; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and 
Community Admissions to Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0028. 
During the first decade of increase in the use of incarceration in the United States, 
incarceration rates more than doubled. There is no evidence that the tough-on-crime legislative 
program of the Harper administrations had any similar effect. Incarceration rates were stable. 
Admissions, which had been increasing when the Harper administrations assumed office, 
stabilized, and then declined. 
5.1.2. Incarceration Rates by Reported Crimes 
Reliance on incarceration rates as a measure of “tough on crime” has the potential to be 
misleading because of fluctuations in the occurrence of crime. If the number of crimes 
committed and reported increases, incarceration rates will rise even if apprehension, conviction, 
and sentencing practices remain the constant. Conversely, a declining crime rate should naturally 
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increase in incarceration rates began during a period of increases in officially reported crime 
rates.3 During the first term of the Harper administration, the number of reported crimes 
continued a general downward trend dating back to the 1990s.4 
Statistics Canada reports crime incidence statistics on the basis of a calendar year. 
Incarceration statistics are based on the governmental fiscal year of April 1 to March 31. To 
construct a best estimate, total reported offences in a calendar year were proportionately assigned 
to the appropriate fiscal year. The result is an estimation for any particular year, but the trends 
should be reasonably accurate. Further, because until arrest and conviction it is impossible to 
determine whether a reported criminal offence has been committed by a youth or adult, the 
numbers incarcerated include both categories. 
Figure 5.3 outlines the number of people incarcerated per reported criminal code offence. 
When the incarceration rates are calculated per crime rather than on the basis of population, there 
is more support for a tough-on-crime conclusion. The number of people incarcerated per crime 
increased steadily throughout the Harper administrations’ terms in office rising from 0.015 
prisoners per reported crime to 0.021. Prisoners incarcerated in a particular point in time are 
being held as a result of sentencing decisions made in prior periods and to not necessarily reflect 
the degree of toughness at the moment of the inmate count. However, the sustained nature of the 
increases in the number of people incarcerated per crime committed suggests that there was some 
degree of toughening in responses to criminal acts during the Harper administrations’ 
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Figure 5.3 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0006; Statistics Canada, Youth Correctional Services, Average Counts of Youth in 
Provincial and Territorial Correctional Services, CANSIM 251-0008; Statistics Canada, Incident-Based Crime 
Statistics, by Detailed Violations, CANSIM 252-0051. 
Official counts of the numbers of people incarcerated can be treated as being reasonably 
reliable. Subject to administrative errors, it is possible to count the number of prisoners 
committed to a custodial institution. Statistics on reported crimes should be treated more 
cautiously since they are reliant on both an individual’s willingness to report victimization to 
police and the police decision to record the report as an actual crime.5 Some crimes, such as drug 
and prostitution offences involve willing participants. For these offences, the number of reported 
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most reliably reported to and by police.7 To confirm the findings outlined in Figure 5.3, the 
number of people incarcerated per reported homicide is reported in Figure 5.4 
Figure 5.4 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0006; Statistics Canada, Youth Correctional Services, Average Counts of Youth in 
Provincial and Territorial Correctional Services, CANSIM 251-0008; Statistics Canada, Incident-Based Crime 
Statistics, by Detailed Violations, CANSIM 252-0051. 
While the data on incarceration rates per crime presents trends, the approach suffers the 
weakness of failing to take into account the cumulative effect of sentences, particularly for 
federal institutions. Today’s incarceration numbers reflect the impact of crimes, policies, and 
sentencing decisions that occurred years or decades in the past. This lag factor is particularly 
relevant to incarceration in federal prisons. To eliminate the legacy effects of past cases, Figure 
5.5 illustrates trends in admission rates per reported criminal code offences. While this measure 
has the advantage of reducing legacy effects, tracking admissions is imperfect because it does 
not capture the length of time that people will be staying, once admitted. The combined results 
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suggests there was an increase in custodial admissions per criminal code offence for the first two 
terms of the Harper administration, followed by a drop in the third term.  
Figure 5.5 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and Community Admissions to Provincial and 
Territorial Programs, CANSIM 251-0020; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and 
Community Admissions to Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0028; Statistics Canada, Youth Custody and 
Community Services (YCCS), Admissions and Releases to Correctional Services, CANSIM 251-0010; Statistics 
Canada, Incident-Based Crime Statistics, by Detailed Violations, CANSIM 252-0051. 
Analysis of incarceration and admission numbers by reported crime presents a different 
picture than the more standard portrayal of population-based rates. The crime-rate-based analysis 
conforms to the population-based numbers by suggesting that a gradual decline in incarceration 
during the tenure of the Chrétien administrations was reversed during a period roughly 
coinciding with the Martin administrations. However, the increased use of incarceration 
continued during the first half of the Harper administrations before levelling off (incarceration 
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5.1.3. Comparison of Incarceration and Non-custodial Punishments 
My final approach to examining trends in incarceration is to compare trends in the ratio 
of the number incarcerated compared to those being supervised in community-based correctional 
programs. Figure 5.6 outlines the number of adults being supervised in the community compared 
to the number incarcerated. A decline in this ratio indicates an increase in the relative use of 
incarceration, while an increase indicates greater reliance on community-based supervision. This 
data suggests that a trend toward a greater reliance on incarceration began around the turn of the 
millennium and continued throughout the period coinciding with the Harper administrations. 
This change was confined to those in provincial correctional programs with the federally 
administered regime fluctuating within a very narrow range. This suggests that any trend toward 
increased use in incarceration was confined to those found guilty of less serious offences. 
Figure 5.6 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in 
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5.1.4. Youth Incarceration Rates 
The primary focus of this dissertation is the adult criminal justice system. However, the 
trends in youth incarceration provide another test of the salience of punitive measures. 
The implementation of the Young Offenders Act in 1984 created a legal regime that 
resulted in Canadian youths having a higher incarceration rate than did adults. By the end of the 
1990s, most provincial governments implemented policies designed to reduce the use of 
incarceration for youth. In 2003, the legal regime across Canada changed with the proclamation 
of the Youth Criminal Justice Act. The decline in youth incarceration rates accelerated before 
beginning to stabilize during the Martin administrations. The gradual drop continued during the 
first half decade of the Harper administrations. There was a minor increase concurrent with 
toughening the Youth Criminal Justice Act in 2012, but the slow downward trend resumed. In 
2005–06, 7.77 per ten thousand youth were incarcerated; by 2015–16, this had dropped to 5.44. 
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Figure 5.7 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Correctional Services, Average Counts of Youth in Provincial and Territorial 
Correctional Services, CANSIM 252-0008. 
5.1.5. Regression Analysis of Incarceration Rates 
The data presented above suggests that, by population, the use of incarceration as a 
response to criminal acts remained stable during the terms of the Harper administrations. 
However, during this period, reported crime rates in Canada were declining. Carceral response 
per criminal act increased. Taking these trends together, the results suggest some increase in the 
toughness of Canadian response to crime, but not of a magnitude to generate increases in the 
Canadian incarceration rate of anything approaching the American experience in the last quarter 
of the 20th Century. To test these findings, a time series regression model for the years 1997-98 
to 2015-2016 was utilized to control for the effects of changes in the volume and mix of criminal 
offences in Canada. The years coinciding with governments headed by someone other than  
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the lag involved between the commission of an offence and possible incarceration, the analysis 
was run also run with a lag of one and two years. The Durbin-Watson test was used to evaluate 
the fit of each model. A lag of one year had the best fit (Durban-Watson score = 1.589). The 
results with a one year lag are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
Estimated standardized coefficients for incarceration rates from a time-series regression 
(one year lag), by Harper as Prime Minister and Crime Severity Index (1997-98 to 2015-
16). 
       Unstandardized  p value 
                 B  
(Constant)      171.759   .009 
Year           1.223   .010 
Crime Severity Index           .453   .010 
Harper Government         3.150   .055 
Sources: Statistics Canada. Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, CANSIM 252-0005; Statistics Canada. Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 252-0006; Statistics Canada, Crime Severity Index and Weighted Clearance Rates, 
CANSIM 252-0052.  
 
 When controlled for changes in reported crime frequency and severity, the response to 
criminal acts was tougher during the Harper administrations than during the tenure of other 
Prime Ministers. However, these differences were not statistically significant to a level of .05. 
This is consistent with the analysis based on descriptive statistics presented above. 
 
5.1.6. Summary of Data on Incarceration Rates 
Trends for population incarceration rates do not support the contention that the Harper 
administrations increased the use of incarceration in Canada. Both incarceration and admissions 
data suggests that the use of incarceration declined during the period coinciding with the last half 
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Chrétien administrations. This trend reversed during the period coinciding with the Martin 
administrations. During the Harper administrations’ tenure in office, the use of incarceration 
eventually stabilized 
The story is different when changes in the reported crime rate are introduced. 
Incarceration and admissions rates per reported crime show the same pattern of a Chrétien-era 
decline turning into a Martin-era increase. However, instead of stabilizing concurrent with 
Harper’s assumption of office, these rates continued to increase for another half decade before 
stabilizing (total incarceration) or dropping (admissions). 
Regression analysis suggests that that the response to criminal acts was moderately 
tougher during the tenure of the Harper administration, but that this increase did not reach a level 
of statistical significance of p=.05.   
The data suggests that a modest toughening of the criminal justice system coincided with 
the tenure of the Harper administrations. The concentration of increases in incarceration in 
provincial facilities suggests that the toughening was largely confined to the treatment of crimes 
deemed by the law and the courts to be more minor in nature. The result of these changes was 
stability in overall incarceration rates. Normative assessment of the significance of the extent of 
any toughening is, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder. It is clear, however, that the 
toughening of the justice system that did occur was different than what occurred in the United 
States during either the decade following the beginning of the increase in incarceration rates in 
1974 or the decade following the beginning of the drop in reported crime rates in the 1990s. 
During both these periods, incarceration rates in the United States more than doubled.8 By any 
reasonable standard, doubling of the incarceration rate is different than a relatively stable rate. 
The data supports Zinger’s contention that “a decade of tough on crime government in Canada 
just did not result in the anticipated American-style-mass incarceration.”9 
5.2. Court Treatment of Criminal Acts 
End results such as incarceration rates can be described in a Durkheimian sense as a 
social fact.10They are the product of a myriad of decisions by legislators who make the laws, 
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individuals who decide to obey or disobey them, and the members of the judiciary who impose 
sanction. I now attempt to unpack this complex set of interconnections by examining the 
decisions of judges that are the proximate cause of individuals being incarcerated. This analysis 
is designed to achieve two goals. First, it indicates whether legislative changes had substantive 
effect on the judicial treatment of cases. Second, it allows disaggregation of the overall statistics 
to locate trends in the treatment of particular types of crime. 
5.2.1. Most Serious Sentence 
In 21st century Canada, the range of sanctions available to the courts includes 
incarceration, various forms of community-based restrictions on liberty, fines, restitution, and 
community service orders. Of these, incarceration is the most severe or toughest penalty 
available, “to be used only where no other sanction, or combination of sanctions, is appropriate 
for the offence or the offender.”11 Figure 5.8 illustrates trends in the most serious sentence 
imposed for all guilty findings by Canadian courts. National statistics are not reported prior to 
the government fiscal year of April 1, 2005, to March 31, 2006, so it is impossible to establish 
trends prior to Harper’s assumption of office. 
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Figure 5.8 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057. 
Custody as the most serious sentence increased from 33.92 percent of guilty cases in 
2005-2006 to 36.79 percent in 2014-15.  
The imposition of fines as the most serious sentence remained relatively stable during the 
tenure of the Harper administrations. Fines were the most serious sentence imposed in 25.29 
percent of guilty cases in 2006–07. his declined to 24.42 percent of cases in 2014–15.12 The 
major change in the regime governing fines came early. In the First Session of the Thirty-ninth 
Parliament, Bill C-23 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal procedure, language of the 
accused, sentencing, and other amendments) was introduced. It was described in non-ideological 
terms as housekeeping legislation by the Minister of Justice, with an increase in the maximum 
fine for summary convictions without a specific penalty from two thousand to ten thousand 
dollars being justified simply by referencing that the last adjustment had taken place 20 years 
earlier.13 The government accepted without objection an amendment lowering the revised 
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without a recorded vote.15 After dying on the Senate Order Paper with prorogation, the 
legislation was reintroduced as Bill C-13 and obtained royal assent on May 29, 2008.16 
The passage of Bill C-13 had little demonstrable effect on the level of fines imposed by 
the courts. The mean fine for all criminal code offences increased from $594 in 2006–07 to $848 
in 2014–15. Mean fines for crimes against property increased from $478 to $788 over the period, 
with the rate of increase being marginally statistically significant at .047. The largest increase in 
fines was for impaired driving, which was not affected by Bill C-13. The mean fine for impaired 
driving increased from $798 in 2005-06 to $1,286 in 2014-15.17 Table 5.2 presents regression 
results on the change in mean fines for categories of criminal offences. The table also presents 
results for the specific offense of impaired driving since the fines for this offence were subjected 
to the greatest increase during the era of the Harper administration. With the exception of 
criminal code traffic offences (primarily impaired driving), the percentage of fines issued that 
were over one thousand dollars remained stable at less than three percent.18 Analysis of changes 
in fine levels was conducted in current dollars. As a result, the substantive impact of increases in 
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Table 5.2 
Regression models for coefficients of changes in average amounts of fines (current dollars) 
for each additional year the Harper administrations was in power. 
       Unstandardized B  p value 
Total Criminal Code 
(constant)       560.333   
Additional year of Harper administration    42.521  .004 
Crimes Against the Person 
(constant)       440.533 
Additional year of Harper administration      -.133   .984 
Crimes Against Property 
(constant)       348.133 
Additional year of Harper administration    40.830  .047 
Crimes Against the Administration of Justice 
(constant)       278.533 
Additional year of Harper administration       1.139  .704 
Impaired Driving 
(constant)       716.667 
Additional year of Harper administration     65.242  <.001  
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Amount of Fine, CANSIM 252-0062.  
The members of the Harper administrations argued that community-based punishments 
were inappropriate for a broad range of crimes deemed to be serious.19 As is demonstrated in a 
subsequent chapter, reducing the use of community-based sanctions was a focal point of several 
legislative initiatives. Empirically, the use of non-custodial constraints declined during these 
terms of office. In 2005–06, the last year prior to the Conservative Party of Canada’s assumption 
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of power, 4.59 percent of guilty cases received conditional sentences and 29.59 percent received 
probation. By 2014–15, these had dropped to 4.01 and 26.35 percent respectively.20 There were 
declines in the use of both these sentences. Likely reflecting restrictions on the use of probation 
for more serious cases, the average length of probationary sentences declined by 16.67 percent 
during the same period.21  
The category of “other” penalties includes restitution, absolute and conditional discharge, 
suspended sentence, community service orders, and prohibition orders.22 Many of these penalties 
are generally considered to be elements of restorative—rather than punitive—justice.23 The use 
of these penalties as the most serious sentence increased during the term of the Harper 
administrations. 
The decline in the use of conditional and probationary sentences is consistent with the 
articulated tough-on-crime program, although the declines were modest. This was offset by the 
modest increase in the generally softer measures that constitute the “other” category. The use of 
fines and the amounts being imposed, with the exception of fines for impaired driving, remained 
stable. 
5.2.2. Severity of Incarceration 
As Figure 5.8 illustrates, the percentage of guilty cases receiving incarceration as the 
most serious sentence increased from 33.92 percent in 2005–06 (the last year prior to Harper’s 
assumption of office) to 36.79 percent in 2014–15.24 This supports the contention that the justice 
system became tougher. During the same period, however, the average length of incarceration 
sentence declined from 126 days to 105 days.25 Adults convicted of an offence were thus slightly 
more likely to be incarcerated by the end of the Harper administrations, but were on aggregate 
sentenced to shorter terms. In order to reconcile this, the analysis presented below adopts 
Statistics Canada’s methodology in creating a single Crime Severity Index (CSI). This is a single 
number index created by multiplying the proportion of guilty cases sentenced to incarceration by 
the average sentence length in days.26 Using this measure, the average severity index rating of 
sentence for all adult offences dropped from 42.74 in 2005–06 to 38.62 in 2014–15. Over the 
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period, the p value for standardized coefficient of annual changes in the severity index rating was 
a non-statistically significant .388. 
The modest decline in the overall CSI for total adult offences is suggestive of a decline in 
the severity of punishment—that is, a softening rather than a toughening, albeit a very modest 
softening. It could also simply be a statistical artifact rising from a change in the composition of 
cases being brought before the courts. In order to address this issue and to see if changes 
followed particular legislative initiatives, the results will be disaggregated into specific crimes. 
Several benchmark crimes have been chosen for presentation. For ease of interpretation, separate 
charts are presented for crimes against the person, crimes against property, and crimes that are 
usually identified as a result of police initiative rather than from victim complaint. Because 
information from superior courts in Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan 
is not collected,27 the analysis excludes the serious offences most likely to be heard in these 
courts. However, offences such as murder are the subject of long-standing mandatory minimum 
sentences that reduce judicial discretion. These remained unchanged during the Harper 
administrations. Because of data limitations, presentation of trends prior to 2005–06 is 
impossible. The results will first be presented in graph form. Regression analysis was then 
utilized to confirm these results and assess statistical significance.  
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Figure 5.9 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057; 
Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, CANSIM 252-
0059. 
Figure 5.9 presents data for selected crimes against the person. There is no overall trend 
in the direction of toughness or softness with respect to offences against the person. The 
treatment of robberies and sexual assault fluctuated, but the CSI was lower at the end of the 
Harper years than at the beginning. The treatment of assault, both major and common, was more 
stable but became slightly tougher during the period. It is noteworthy that the treatment of sexual 
assault cases became softer following the passage and proclamation of Bill C-10 (Safe Streets 
and Communities Act) in 2012. As will be outlined in detail in chapter 6, this legislation 
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Figure 5.10 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057; 
Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, CANSIM 252-
0059. 
 The severity of treatment for theft declined by 18.2 percent from 2005-06 to 2014-15. 
The severity of treatment for those convicted of breaking and entering declined by 9.9 percent 
during the same period, while those convicted of fraud, mischief and possession of stolen 
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Figure 5.11 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057; 
Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, CANSIM 252-
0059. 
Figure 5.11 outlines the severity of treatment for drug offences. There is an increase in 
the severity of treatment of adults found guilty of drug trafficking, production, or importation 
from 109.6 in 2005-06 to 190.6 in 2014-2015. Further, the timing of the major portion of this 
increase is consistent with the implementation of tougher sanctions prescribed for these offences 
in Bill C-10. The increase in the toughness of prostitution-related offences was not preceded by 
any legislative change. However, the increase in the severity of penalty for this group of offences 
was accompanied by a large decline in the number of offences recorded by police. The number 
of such recorded offences dropped from 5,679 in 2006 to 171 in 2015.28 Given that prostitution 
offences are generally charged and recorded as a result of police initiative rather than victim 
complaint, it is likely that the increase in severity of punishment was a result of increased police 
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5.2.3. Regression Analysis of the Severity of Punishment of Crimes 
 The annualized changes in the severity of punishment as expressed by the severity index 
utilized above were subjected to regression analysis to evaluate the correlation of sentences for 
each additional year of the Harper administration. The results are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Regression models for coefficient of changes in punishment severity for each additional 
year the Harper administration was in power. 
        Unstandardized B p value 
Crimes Against the Person 
Robbery 
 (constant)       528.318 
 Additional year of Harper administration     -5.089 .032 
Sexual Assault 
 (constant)       276.245 
 Additional year of Harper administration     -1.260 .456 
Common Assault 
 (constant)         6.765 
 Additional year of Harper administration      .069  .020 
Major Assault 
 (constant)        67.127 
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Crimes Against Property 
Theft 
 (constant)        23.550 
 Additional year of Harper administration      -.343  .036 
Fraud 
 (constant)        39.178 
 Additional year of Harper administration       .597  .008 
Breaking and Entering 
 (constant)       154.163 
 Additional year of Harper administration      -.636   .373 
Mischief 
 (constant)          6.857 
 Additional year of Harper administration       .004  .901 
Possession of Stolen Property 
 (constant)        39.385  
 Additional year of Harper administration     -.268  .315 
Other Selected Offences 
Impaired Driving        
 (constant)        30.460 
 Additional year of Harper administration     -.336  .164 
Other Criminal Code Driving 
 (constant)        54.836 
 Additional year of Harper administration     -1.065 .003 
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Drug Possession 
 (constant)          2.993 
 Additional year of Harper administration       -.031 .269 
Drug Trafficking, Importation and Production 
 (constant)       109.927 
 Additional year of Harper administration      6.294 .002 
Prostitution Offences 
 (constant)        -17.003 
 Additional year of Harper Administration     12.738 <.001 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057; 
Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, CANSIM 252-
0059. 
 There is no consistent pattern of in changes to the toughness of crimes against the person 
during the terms of the Harper administrations. The treatment of those convicted of robbery 
softened by a statistically significant amount. The treatment of those convicted of sexual assault 
also softened, but not by a magnitude sufficient to be statistically significant to a level of p=.05. 
The treatment of those convicted of common and major assault was toughed in a statistically 
significant manner.  
 The treatment of those convicted of crimes against property also shows no consistent 
pattern of toughening. Those convicted of theft experienced a softening of treatment that was 
statistically significant. Those convicted of breaking and entering and of possession of stolen 
property both experienced a small softening of treatment that was not statistically significant. 
There was a toughening of sentences for those convicted of mischief and fraud by an amount that 
was statistically significant.  
 The severity of carceral punishment of criminal code driving offences softened slightly 
during the Harper era. This softening was not statistically significant for those convicted of 
impaired driving but was statistically significant for those convicted of other criminal code 
driving offences. As was shown in Table 5.2, the fines for those convicted of impaired driving 
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increased significantly, which suggests that higher fines had some replacement effect for 
incarceration. Those convicted of drug possession experienced a non-statistically significant 
softening of punishment severity. Those convicted of prostitution offences experienced very 
large and statistically significant toughening of sentencing severity. However, as discussed 
above, the large drop in the number of charges likely means that this toughening is an artifact of 
changes in police enforcement decisions. If “minor” offences are ignored, the residual charges 
will be for the serious cases.   
 The clearest example of a toughening of the severity of punishment came in the response 
to drug trafficking, importation and production.  
5.3. Summary 
Despite the outpouring of tough-on-crime legislation from the Harper administrations, 
actual change in punitive outcomes for those convicted of criminal acts was muted. In aggregate, 
people found guilty of offences were slightly more likely to be incarcerated, but the average 
length of sentence declined. The arithmetical result was overall stability in incarceration. Within 
this aggregate stability, different offences were treated differently. Those convicted of drug 
trafficking, importation, or production were very likely more harshly treated. For those found 
guilty of other offences, the justice system appears to have delivered very similar results at the 
end of Prime Minister Harper’s terms in government as it did at the beginning. This is not to 
claim that no individual was adversely affected, but rather to simply observe that there was no 
momentous increase in the proportion of Canadians deprived of their liberty by way of 
punishment. Very certainly, Canada did not experience a movement toward the ill-defined 
destination of “mass incarceration.” 
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6. Legislative Case Study: Bill C-10 or the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
This chapter examines the passage, judicial treatment, and results of Bill C-10 or the Safe 
Streets and Communities Act passed in the First Session of the Forty-first Parliament—that is, 
after the CPC received a majority mandate. It thus represents the first major legislative 
expression of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime program after it was freed from the 
constraints of a minority Parliament. Since Bill C-10 was omnibus legislation consisting of a 
wide range of initiatives that were introduced but not passed during earlier Parliaments, focus on 
this bill also provides a panoramic overview of the Harper administrations’ legislative program. 
Each component of Bill C-10 is examined with a history of antecedent legislation, the main 
themes advanced by the government and opposition during debate, the treatment of the 
legislation by the courts, and, to the extent possible, an analysis of the substantive impact of the 
legislative provisions on the justice systems’ outcomes of those convicted of offences affected by 
the legislation. 
Bill C-10 was introduced on September 20, 2011, or the 16th sitting day of the Forty-first 
Parliament.1 In introducing the legislation, the Minister of Justice said, “We have bundled 
together crime bills that died on the Order Paper in the last Parliament into a comprehensive 
piece of legislation and it is our plan to pass it within the first 100 sitting days of Parliament.” 
The introduction and passage of Bill C-10 “fulfills the commitment in the June 2011 Speech 
from the Throne to quickly reintroduce law and order legislation to combat crime and terrorism. 
This commitment, in turn, reflects the strong mandate that Canadians have given us to protect 
society and to hold criminals accountable.”2 
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The Safe Streets and Communities Act was vigorously opposed by the parliamentary 
opposition. The Justice Critic for the NDP described the bill’s introduction as a “historic day” 
that was the culmination of an attempt “to reverse the approach to the criminal justice system 
that we have taken in our country for the better part of 40 years.” He described the legislation as 
“radical right wing ideology adopted mostly from the United States.”3 The Liberals agreed with 
this critique, with their spokesperson suggesting alternative names for the legislation: 
An act to divide Canadians and keep the Conservative base happy; an act to provide 
prisoners for empty prisons; an act to fill prisons in order to build new ones; an act to take 
more aboriginals off reserves and put them into prisons; an act to provide a Conservative 
comprehensive affordable housing strategy; an act to make prisons the largest mental 
health institutions in Canada; and, one I particularly like, an act to stimulate the penal 
sector.4 
The government needed its new majority to pass the Safe Streets and Communities Act. 
Time allocation was imposed, 19 recorded votes were taken5 and 13 days of hearings were held 
to hear from 87 witnesses.6 The witnesses were emphatic in their support for, or denunciation of, 
the legislation. The daughter of a murdered retired farmer told the committee, “As a victim, I am 
relieved to see that the government is taking statutory measures to ensure the protection of 
citizens.”7 Former NHL hockey player and co-founder of the victim advocacy group Respect 
Group Sheldon Kennedy said, 
To me, the fundamental reason for change to these laws is simple: we can’t let these 
perpetrators walk freely among our youth organizations, our schools, our 
neighbourhoods, and our workplaces. Children need to feel safe, and parents have to trust 
that the government is playing a role in protecting them. Criminals need to be held 
accountable and be dealt with consistently with clearly defined consequences. In my 
mind, child protection is paramount. 
In closing, I want to thank this government for standing up for victims and finally taking 
action. It’s about time someone gets tough on criminals.8 
In opposing Bill C-10, University of Toronto Professor Anthony Doob described sections 
as “a cruel and dishonest joke on the part of the government.”9 Kim Pate, the Executive Director 
of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, said, 
The direction of this bill is to encourage more use of imprisonment—in fact, 
unprecedented use of imprisonment in Canada—and that the cost of that will detract from 
other services and resources. It will make prisons more overcrowded, and it will ensure 
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that we have more women, people with mental health issues and, particularly, indigenous 
people in prison.10 
Elected officials from other levels of government joined in the debate. The New 
Brunswick Justice Minister told the Commons Justice Committee, “Without hesitation, we 
support the efforts to strengthen these laws aimed at protecting the victims of crime, protecting 
our children and giving a voice to victims.”11 Her Quebec counterpart took the opposite view, 
saying, “It is difficult to see how this is a tough-on-crime proposal” arguing the focus on 
incarceration “actually encourages repeat offences and increases the number of victims … 
[since]... prison may actually serve as crime school, thus encouraging prisoners to reoffend.”12 
Winnipeg Mayor Sam Katz told the Commons Justice Committee, 
I am encouraged by the bold steps in Bill C-10 to change the status quo and start taking 
real responsibility for our citizens’ safety. The revolving doors of justice need to close, 
and we need to change the Youth Criminal Justice Act so repeat offenders stay behind 
bars instead of escalating the nature of their crimes out in society. 
The rights of our citizens need to trump the rights of the criminals in our country. There 
is so much in this legislation that is vital to preserving the safety of our citizens.13 
Bill C-10 received third reading in the House of Commons on January 3, 2012. The 
Senate proposed minor editorial amendments to the section dealing with terrorism,14 which were 
accepted by the House of Commons. Bill C-10 received royal assent on March 13, 2012.15 This 
was the 95th sitting day of the First Session of the Forty-first Parliament. The government had 
met its throne speech commitment for timely passage. 
While the supporters and opponents of Bill C-10 differed on many things, there were 
points of consensus. All agreed that the Safe Streets and Communities Act represented a rupture 
in Canada’s criminal justice system and in the treatment of those accused of crimes. There was 
consensus that the legislation would lead to a major increase in Canada’s jail and prison 
populations. Finally, there was consensus that the legislation made incarceration the primary 
response to criminal offences. 
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6.1. Precursors to the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
There were no surprises in the Safe Streets and Communities Act. The omnibus 
legislation consisted of tough-on-crime legislation introduced in the previous minority 
Parliament before dying on the Order Paper when the election was called in the spring of 2011. 
As such, Bill C-10 consisted of nine pieces of independently introduced legislation that had, 
conceptually, simply been stapled together and provided with a new title. Table 6.1 provides a 
topic outline of this precursor legislation, the position taken by opposition parties on the original 
legislation, and where the legislation was in the legislative process when the election wiped the 




Precursor Legislation to the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
Legislative Topic Bill Liberal NDP Bloc Last Stage 
Violent Young Offenders* C-4 Ambiguous Support Support 2nd reading 
Repatriation of Canadian Inmates  C-5 Support Oppose Oppose Committee 
Conditional Sentences/House Arrest* C-16 Oppose Oppose Oppose 2nd reading 
Victims of Terrorism S-716 Support Support Support Senate 
Drug Offences (non-possession) S-1017 Support Oppose Oppose Senate 
Pardons* C-23B Oppose Oppose Oppose Committee 
Vulnerable Immigrants (sex industry) C-5618 Support Oppose Support 1st reading 
Early Release of Inmates C-39 Support Support Support 2nd reading 
Sexual Offences Against Children* C-54 Ambiguous Support Support Senate 
Source: Compiled from Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo, 
www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/Home.aspx?Language=E&ParliamentSession=42-1. Indication of party support is based on 
the votes of the members of each party at the most advanced stage of legislative debate. In cases where no recorded 
vote was held, the position of each party was determined from comments from each party’s lead spokesperson 
during second reading (debate in principle) debate. Precursor bills marked with an “*” proceeded without any 
recorded vote. 
The position of the opposition parties when dealing with the precursor legislation to the 
Safe Streets and Communities Act was much more ambiguous than the statements made during 
the debate on the omnibus legislation. Bill C-54, which provided for increased mandatory 
minimum sentences for sexual offences against children first imposed during the tenure of the 
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Liberal Martin administration,19 had passed through the House of Commons without a recorded 
vote and with unequivocal statements of support from the NDP and Bloc Québécois. Bill S-10, 
which provided for new mandatory sentences for drug trafficking, importation, or production in 
some circumstances, had passed through the House of Commons as Bill C-15 with the support of 
Liberal members. Bill C-16, which restricted the range of offences eligible for conditional 
sentences, had passed an unrecorded second reading vote despite all opposition parties declaring 
their dissent. A major theme of the opposition response to the legislation making up Bill C-10 
had been to refute government claims that they were responsible for the slow pace of passage of 
tough-on-crime legislation. 
6.2. Provisions of the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
Bill C-10 amended eight previously existing acts and created one new act. It is therefore 
not possible to speak of the overall impact of the Safe Streets and Communities Act. Instead, the 
bill must be disaggregated into its various component parts. 
6.2.1. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act 
Part 1 section of Bill C-10 completed the legislative approval for the Justice for Victims 
of Terrorism Act and amended the State Immunity Act. Although included in omnibus crime 
legislation, these provisions were not intended to deal with crime in Canada. Instead, this 
legislation permitted Canadian citizens harmed by acts of terrorism to sue supporters of 
terrorism, including foreign governments deemed to be supportive of the terroristic activity.20 As 
such, these provisions cannot affect Canadian incarceration rates. According to the Minister of 
Justice, the primary purpose of these provisions was to deter terrorism.21 The direct connection 
of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act with the rest of the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
is somewhat tenuous, but the point of underlying commonality is that they promise a response to 
perceived dangers facing Canadians.  The provisions of Part 1 were not subjected to any 
meaningful opposition, although the report of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism 
noted that some opposition had been expressed to leaving the right to designate “foreign 
governments deemed to be supportive of terrorism” in the hands of the Governor General in 
Council.22 
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At the time Bill C-10 was passed, the only country with equivalent legislation was the 
United States. In that country, seven countries had been designated at some time as supporting 
terrorism and were subject to civil suit. However, “a common problem … has been the refusal of 
defendants to recognize the jurisdiction of the American courts. Defendants do not appear and 
default judgments are rendered, which the debtor countries then ignore and refuse to pay.”23 
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic have been the two countries 
deemed to be supporters of terrorism and subject to civil action under the terms of the Justice for 
Victims of Terrorism Act.24 Presentation of cases before the courts arises from civil actions 
launched by individuals rather than criminal proceedings launched by the state. There do not 
appear to be court decisions based on this legislation.  
6.2.2. Sentencing 
Sections 10 to 36 of Bill C-10 toughened sentences for sexual offences against children 
and Sections 39 to 46 did the same for those convicted of trafficking, importing, or producing 
illegal drugs under specified conditions.25 
6.2.2.1. Sentencing: Sexual Offences Against Children 
Bill C-10’s provisions increased existing penalties for sexual offences against children 
and created the new offences of making sexually explicit material available to a child and 
agreeing or arranging to commit a sexual offence against a child. The bill’s provisions were 
almost identical to Bill C-54, which had received third reading in the House of Commons but 
died on the Order Paper in the Senate when Parliament was dissolved for the 2011 election. 
For the most part, the legislation left the maximum penalties unchanged. Instead, the 
focus was on increasing the mandatory minimum sentences that had been imposed in 2005 
during the Martin administration and imposing new mandatory minimum sentences for other 
offences. The mandatory minimum for an indictable conviction for sexual interference with 
someone under the age of sixteen was increased from 45 days to one year. The same charge on a 
summary election had the mandatory minimum increase from 14 days to 90 days.26 Previously, a 
conviction for bestiality in the presence of a child had no mandatory minimum. Bill C-54 
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provided for a mandatory minimum of one year for an indictable conviction and 30 days for a 
summary conviction.27 
When launching Bill C-54’s second reading debate, the Parliamentary Secretary for the 
Minister of Justice told the House of Commons: 
There are many issues on which parliamentarians may disagree but the protection of 
children against sexual exploitation should never be one of them. 
The proposals in Bill C-54 have two objectives: one, to ensure that all forms of child 
sexual abuse irrespective of how they are charged are always treated as serious offences 
for sentencing purposes; and two, to prevent the commission of sexual offences against a 
child.28 
The Liberal spokesperson suggested that the mandatory minimums provided for in Bill 
C-54 were “appropriate,” but cautioned against a “bidding war” on the imposition of mandatory 
minimums.29 The Bloc Québécois critic noted, “The Bloc Québécois has always maintained here 
in the House that minimum sentences are ineffective and unfair by nature,” but said they “will 
support this bill at second reading to ensure that it can be studied in committee and that it meets 
everyone's expectations.”30 The NDP said, “This is a very good bill.”31 Bill C-54 passed through 
the House of Commons promptly and received third reading on March 11, 2011, or only 50 
sitting days after introduction for first reading and 34 sitting days after the government brought 
the legislation forward for second reading. No recorded vote was called for by any party at any 
stage of the House of Commons process.32 Despite the dispatch with which the opposition parties 
helped move Bill C-54 through the House of Commons, its introduction late in the parliamentary 
session precluded its passage in the Senate prior to the 2011 election. 
When the provisions of Bill C-54 were reintroduced as part of the omnibus Bill C-10, the 
government members highlighted the mandatory minimums for sexual offences against 
children.33 In their critique of mandatory minimum sentences, the opposition members largely 
ignored these by focusing instead on the mandatory provisions for illicit drugs, particularly 
cannabis.34 An NDP member attacked the mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences with 
a proportionality argument: 
We believe people should be punished for crimes that are committed, but the punishment 
must fit the crime. We must look at it in a little bit bigger context. We cannot just 
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narrowly focus on setting minimums. It is very troubling when a minimum sentence for 
marijuana use is longer than for the rape of a child. That is very troubling to me.35 
The statement was misleading in that Bill C-10 provided for mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug trafficking, production, and importation rather than for “use” and because 
rape does not exist as an offence in the Criminal Code. Given that mandatory minimums were 
being increased for both drug and sexual offences against children, this proportionality argument 
could be viewed as an argument for increased sentences for the sexual offences rather than for a 
call for decreases for the drug offences. 
Seven reported cases where the new or increased mandatory minimum sentences were 
challenged on constitutional grounds have been located. In two cases, the court found that the 
mandatory minimum was within the range of proportionate and comparable sentences.36 In three 
cases, the court indicated that the mandatory minimum was longer than the sentence that had 
been imposed without the legislation, but that the disproportionality did not reach the threshold 
of gross disproportionality required to sustain the constitutional challenge.37 In one case, the 
judge indicated that in the absence of a mandatory minimum the sentence would have been nine 
months incarceration. The one-year mandatory minimum had raised the floor such that a 13-
month sentence was now appropriate. This increase was not deemed to create any gross 
disproportionality.38 The mandatory minimum did create a result deemed to be grossly 
disproportionate when it would have resulted in a proportionate four-month sentence becoming a 
one-year sentence. In this case, the judge’s criticism was directed toward the prosecution more 
than the legislation saying, “The Crown could have elected to proceed by summary conviction in 
which case the minimum sentence would have been 90 days and the issue of proportionality 
would not arise. The Crown elected to proceed by indictment and that changes the landscape.”39 
A case involving the retrospective implications of some provisions on historical sexual offences 
against children reached the Supreme Court, which ruled that the provisions were protective 
rather than punitive in intent. As a result, retrospective effect was deemed justifiable.40 
The introduction of Bill C-54 and the passage of its provisions in Bill C-10 coincided 
with a period of growth in the reporting and charging of sexual offences against children. 
Statistics Canada provided consistent data for offences such as sexual interference, invitation to 
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sexual touching, and sexual exploitation beginning in 2008.41 Figure 6.1 outlines the trends in 
reported cases and charges for these sexual offences against children. Sexual assault and 
pornography cases are not included in this data. From 2012 to 2015, the number of individuals 
potentially affected by the increased mandatory minimum sentences in Bill C-10 includes 3,881 
individuals charged with sexual interference, 833 for invitation to sexual touching, 189 for 
sexual exploitation, and 789 for luring via the internet. Data for cases of committing bestiality in 
the presence of a child is not reported, but appears to be rare since only 33 individuals were 
charged with bestiality over this four-year period. A total of 45 individuals were charged with the 
newly created offence of providing sexually explicit material to children during the period 2012 
to 2015.42 
Figure 6.1 
Source: Statistics Canada, Incident-Based Crime Statistics, by Detailed Violations, Annual, CANSIM 252-0051. 
Figure 6.2 outlines the severity of sentences received by those found guilty of sexual 
assault or Other Sexual Offences. Most of the offences affected by Bill C-10 reside in the Other 
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sexual assault or child pornography offences.43 Statistics Canada does not disaggregate the data 
by the age of the victim, but the overall severity of punishment for Sexual Assault decreases after 
Bill C-10 received royal assent on March 12, 2012. In the case of Other Sexual Offences, a trend 
toward an increase in the severity of punishment ended following the passage of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act. 
Figure 6.2 
Source: Compiled from Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 
252-0057; Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, 
CANSIM 252-0059. 
Figure 6.3 outlines the sentencing patterns for those convicted of Sexual Assault as their 
most serious offence. The benchmarks of three months and one year are highlighted because 
these were the primary mandatory minimum sentences imposed in the Safe Streets and 
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Figure 6.3 
Source: Compiled from Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 
252-0057; Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Length of Custody, Annual, CANSIM 252-
0058 
There was a trend towards the increased utilization of incarceration that predated the 
passage of the increased mandatory minimum sentences for offences against children contained 
in the Safe Streets and Communities Act. In 2007-2008, 49.8 percent of those convicted of 
Sexual Assault received custodial sentences. By 2011-2012, the year preceding the proclamation 
of the Bill C-10, this had risen to 54.5 percent. This trend continued following passage of the 
legislation. By 2014-2015, 56.9 percent of those convicted received custodial sentences. The 
greatest growth both before and after the passage of Bill C-10 occurred in sentences of less than 
three months, which is below the mandatory minimum threshold for offences against children as 
revised in Bill C-10. In 20015-2006, 10.3 percent of those convicted received a sentence in this 
range. In the year before the proclamation of Bill C-10, this had increased to 12.9 percent and 
reached 16.0 percent by 2014-2015. Sentences longer than two years was relatively stable prior 
to the passage of Bill C-10, but dropped from 23.1 percent in 2011-2013 (just prior to the 
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Figure 6.4 presents the sentencing data for “Other Sexual Offences”, the category of 
offences most impacted by the sentencing changes in the Safe Streets and Communities Act.  
Figure 6.4 
Source: Compiled from Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 
252-0057; Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Length of Custody, Annual, CANSIM 252-
0058. 
There was a dramatic increase in the utilization of custodial sentences during the period 
under examination. National data is not available prior to 2005-2006, but in that year, 39.7 
percent of those convicted of this category of offences received a custodial sentence. By 2011-
2012, the last year prior to the proclamation of the Safe Streets and Communities Act, this had 
increased to 65 percent. The greatest growth was in short sentences of less than three months, 
which increased from 12.4 to 28.3 percent of guilty cases. In 2012-2013, the first year following 
the proclamation of Bill C-10, this trend towards increased use of custodial sentences continued, 
reaching 67.9 percent of cases.  However, a number of the cases disposed of in 2012-2013 will 
have been for offences pre-dating the legislative changes and would not be subject to the new 
mandatory sentencing regime. The use of incarceration for this category of offences then 
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The aggregate data above is problematic in that it does not allow for analysis of sentences 
received by age of victim. In a Juristat publication, Allen uses access to the ICCS micro-data to 
examine sentencing patterns for the sexual offences specifically against children.44 She finds that 
the largest change in sentencing patterns subsequent to the passage of Bill C-10 for offences such 
as invitation to sexual touching and possession of child pornography occurred where summary 
charges were preferred. In these cases, “the greatest shift was from non-custodial sentences such 
as probation (pre-2005), to custody sentences at or just above the level of the MMP [mandatory 
minimum penalties] (post-2005).”45 The greatest shift to more cases resulting in incarceration 
occurred when the mandatory minimum sentences were imposed in 2005 during the tenure of the 
Martin Liberal administration. Allen’s conclusion is consistent with the data presented above, 
particularly in Table 6.4.  
Allen’s study documents the impact of the 2005 and 2012 legislative changes for both 
summary and indictable offences. It does not report on the proportionate mix of these charges, so 
it is impossible to determine changes in the total of these charges. It is possible that the increased 
mandatory minimum sentences for summary charges could be sufficient for a prosecutor to 
decide that a summary charge would result in an “appropriate” sentence of incarceration with the 
resulting decision to forego the more punitive indictable charge. In short, it remains unclear what 
effect the legislative changes had on the average penalty for all those convicted of these offences. 
The substantive effect of the provisions dealing with sexual offences against children 
contained in the Safe Streets and Communities Act remains murky. The most likely effect is that 
those facing summary charges were more likely to experience a relatively short period of 
incarceration rather than receiving probation or a conditional sentence. There is less support for a 
contention that those who would have been incarcerated in the absence of the legislative changes 
received a longer sentence. Further, the shift in sentencing patterns for sexual offences against 
children appears to have followed the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences during the 
Martin administrations’ tenure rather than the increase in the mandatory minimums imposed in 
the Safe Streets and Communities Act. Between the proclamation of the legislation in 2012 and 
2015, approximately 1500 people per year were charged with the sexual offences against 
children. 
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6.2.2.2. Sentencing: Drug Trafficking, Importation, and Production 
Clauses 32 and 33, 39 to 48, and 50 and 51 amended the sentencing provisions of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The provisions were almost identical to those in Bill S-10, 
which died on the Order Paper when the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament was dissolved 
for the 2011 election. Bill S-10, in turn, was based on Bill C-15, which had passed in both the 
House of Commons and the Senate but died on the Order Paper without royal assent when the 
Second Session of the Fortieth Parliament was prorogued on December 30, 2009. Bill C-15, in 
turn, had been based on Bill C-26 of the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Parliament. This 
legislation passed at second reading but died on the Order Paper when this Parliament was 
dissolved on September 7, 2008.46 The provisions thus took 1,179 calendar days or 481 
parliamentary sitting days. Two general elections had intervened. This lengthy process occurred 
despite the legislation being passed in the House of Commons at third reading once and at 
second reading twice during the two minority Parliaments. As Bill C-15, these provisions were 
supported by the Liberals.47 As Bill C-26, they had been supported by both the Liberals and Bloc 
Québécois, with only the NDP voting in opposition during second reading.48 
With a few exceptions, the drug sentencing provisions in the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act did not add to maximum sentences. Instead, the legislation imposed mandatory 
minimum sentences for the trafficking, importation, or production of drugs prohibited by the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The new mandatory minimum sentences were conditional 
upon specified circumstances. Trafficking of Schedule I drugs (primarily opiates or coca 
derivatives) and specified quantities of Schedule II drugs (primarily cannabis) were subject to a 
mandatory minimum sentence if the person convicted was acting as a member of a criminal 
gang, used or threatened the use of violence, carried a weapon, or had specified previous 
convictions.49 A mandatory minimum of two years held if the offence occurred in or near a 
school ground or playground or “near any other public place usually frequented by persons under 
the age of 18 years.” A two-year mandatory minimum was also imposed for drug sales in a 
prison or if the offender used the services of someone under the age of 18 to sell drugs.50 
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The minimum sentencing matrix was finely divided for some offences. For the 
production of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, the mandatory minimum sentence was set 
at six months incarceration for six to 200 plants, one year for 201 to 500, and two years for more 
than 500 plants.51 These minimums were statutorily increased if the offender used the real 
property of another person, posed a health or safety risk to someone under 18 or a residential 
neighbourhood, or who set traps to protect the grow operation.52 These factors had previously 
been listed as aggravating factors for sentencing.53 
In a rehabilitative exception to the general punitive approach, the mandatory minimum 
could be waived upon successful completion of an addictions treatment program.54 
Bill C-10 also specified that Parliament was to establish a committee to review the cost 
and effectiveness of the mandatory minimum sentences within five years of the implementation 
of the section.55 
The NDP opposed the drug sentencing provisions primarily on the basis of 
proportionality and cost. The NDP critic told the House of Commons, “We are going to have a 
mandatory minimum penalty for an offence of trafficking a drug that is double what the 
mandatory minimum is for the rape of a child.” He explained, “I am emphasizing the drug part of 
the bill because it is where the costs primarily are… the reality that the cost is totally 
unjustifiable in terms of this bill doing anything to combat drug trafficking.”56 Perhaps because 
of their previous support for the provisions contained in the drug sentencing sections of Bill C-
10, the Liberals questioned costs of the legislation and the effectiveness of mandatory sentences 
in general without criticizing the specific provisions. 
The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences contained in 
Bill C-10 generated debate in Canadian courts. The mandatory minimum sentences of Bill C-10 
challenged as being grossly disproportionate have been identified in 24 decisions. These 
decisions compared the mandated minimums to what the people would have otherwise received. 
The constitutional question was posed strictly within an argument of proportionality—that is, 
whether the legislation produced results that were grossly disproportionate to past judicially 
imposed sentences. In 11 cases, the court ruled that the mandatory sentence was within the 
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previously established sentencing range.57 In two cases, the mandatory minimum was deemed to 
be higher than the normal sentence, but not of a sufficient magnitude to be declared grossly 
disproportionate.58 In 10 cases, the mandatory minimum was deemed to have exceeded the 
normal sentencing range such that an unconstitutional gross disproportionality had occurred.59 In 
one case, an appeal court ruled that the trial judge had erred in imposing the mandatory 
minimum when the facts justified a higher sentence.60 
The mandatory minimum also introduced new debates around evidence, such as what 
constituted safety risks61 and how the number of marijuana plants was counted.62 
In dealing with the question of proportionality, the courts confined their comparison to 
like offences. That is, drug trafficking charges and individuals convicted were compared to 
others  convicted of drug trafficking charges. This differed from the parliamentary debate in 
which the severity of penalties for drug offences was compared with other, conceptually 
unrelated types of crimes. 
The courts also tended to take into consideration the personal characteristics of the 
perpetrator and its impact on the principles of rehabilitation and specific deterrence. In one case 
having “two children” and having “worked her whole life at a lawful occupation”63 resulted in 
the mandatory minimum being found to a grossly disproportionate result on the grounds of both 
rehabilitation and specific deterrence. In another case, the disproportionate consequences of the 
mandatory minimum resulted from the triggering of a deportation order arising from a sentence 
of the prescribed length.64 In yet another case, the mandatory minimum was deemed to be within 
the appropriate sentencing range, but its application was deemed to preclude any recognition of a 
guilty plea.65 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled on Bill C-10’s mandatory minimums in R v 
Lloyd. In this case, the sentence imposed by proportionate comparison was found to be consistent 
with the legislatively mandated minimum. However, the SCC declared the legislated mandatory 
minimums to be in violation of Section 13 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms because 
grossly disproportionate sentences could be produced by “reasonably foreseeable applications of 
the law.”66 
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The new and increased mandatory minimum sentences stipulated for drug offences in the 
Safe Streets and Communities Act had the potential to affect many more individuals than were 
affected by changes to the treatment of sexual offences against children. From 2012, when the 
penalties came into effect, to 2015, a total of 29,233 adults were charged with offences related to 
the trafficking, importation, or production of cannabis. Another 33,788 were charged with these 
offences related to cocaine, and 21,849 were charged with offences related to other proscribed 
drugs.67 With this volume of individuals charged, a toughening in the disposition of cases likely 
had an impact on incarceration rates in Canada. 
As was outlined in chapter 5, the total severity of punishment increased following the 
proclamation of Bill C-10. The overall severity index for these offences increased from 137.95 in 
2011–12 (the year before the passage of Bill C-10) to 190.58 in 2014–15.68 During this period, 
the mean length of an incarceration sentence rose from 343 to 362 days69 while the percentage of 
guilty cases resulting in incarceration rose from 40.22 percent to 52.65 percent.70 The percentage 
of those incarcerated sentenced to a term of less than six months (the lowest of the new 
mandatory minimum sentences) dropped from 52.45 percent to 47.04 percent.71 
The percentage of cases resulting in a finding of guilt dropped from 52.73 percent to 
49.87 percent during the same period.72 This could be indicative of less incentive to plead guilty 
with the existence of the enhanced mandatory minimum sentences. 
In summary, the drug offence sentencing provisions of the Safe Streets and Communities 
Act took the Harper administrations a long time to pass despite the support of the Liberal party in 
minority Parliaments. Once enacted, the legislatively prescribed mandatory minimum sentences 
were the object of resistance from the courts, which continued to stress the principles of 
proportionality, rehabilitation, and specific deterrence instead of an exclusive focus on 
denunciation and general deterrence. 
Despite resistance by the courts, the proclamation of the new and increased mandatory 
minimum sentences coincided—and likely directly or indirectly caused—some increase in 
incarceration for these drug offences. That being said, the evidence indicates that the mandatory 
sentences were established at a level within the general range of sentences already being imposed 
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by the court.. Cases in which the mandatory minimums produced results sufficient to trigger the 
provisions of Section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms usually were the result of the 
preclusion of mitigating factors. 
6.2.2.3. Sentencing: Conditional Sentences 
Clauses 34 and 51 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act expanded the number of 
offences in which conditional sentences, generally served in the community, were prohibited.73 
These provisions were almost identical to Bill C-16, the Ending House Arrest for Property and 
Other Serious Crimes by Serious and Violent Offenders Act, that was introduced in the Third 
Session of the Fortieth Parliament.74 This legislation had passed second reading without a 
recorded vote but died in committee without any attempts by the government to move it forward. 
In second reading debate, the Liberals, NDP, and Bloc Québécois all expressed opposition to the 
provisions of the legislation.75 This rare united front from the opposition against a minority 
Parliament likely caused the Harper administration to abandon the legislation until it achieved a 
majority while the opposition’s failure to call for a recorded voted at second reading allowed 
them to avoid placing their rejection of the bill on an easily verifiable public record. 
Under the terms of the precedent established by the Supreme Court in R v Proulx,76 new 
mandatory minimum sentences for some drug offences and sexual offences against children were 
also made ineligible for conditional sentences. 
 The Ending House Arrest for Property and Other Serious Crimes by Serious and Violent 
Offenders Act itself was a resurrection of provisions first introduced in Bill C-9 of the First 
Session of the Thirty-ninth Parliament,77 albeit with a much more descriptive and evocative title. 
Bill C-9 reflected a CPC platform commitment in the 2006 election and was introduced May 4, 
2006, or the 16th parliamentary sitting day of the new government’s mandate.78 Bill C-9 was 
amended as a result of a vote by a united opposition79 to restrict the new prohibitions on 
conditional punishment to terrorism offences, serious crimes committed as part of organized 
crime activity, and assaults resulting in serious personal injury.80 As amended, Bill C-9 was very 
similar to Bill C-70 which had been introduced by the Martin Liberal administration but which 
had died on the Order Paper after first reading.81 
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Restrictions on the use of conditional sentences were advanced on a reasonably persistent 
basis by the CPC. The opposition parties supported some narrow restrictions, but consistently 
and effectively opposed the broader restriction contained in Bill C-10. The CPC focused their 
arguments that conditions imposed by the courts were often ignored by those convicted of crimes 
and “confidence in the justice system erodes when serious criminals get to serve their time at 
home in front of their big screen TVs, their computers, and all the luxuries they would normally 
enjoy at home.”82 The opposition parties argued that conditional sentences were tougher than the 
CPC portrayed and conditional sentences were often a better rehabilitative tool than 
incarceration. The NDP and Bloc Québécois based their objections on rehabilitative and crime 
prevention arguments. The Liberals stressed the fiscal argument that incarceration cost more than 
community-based sentences. The financial critique was based on a report by the Parliament 
Budget Officer that estimated the financial cost of the resulting increased incarceration to be 
$156 million per year, with the bulk of this cost being incurred by provincial and territorial 
governments.83 All opposition parties attacked the scope of restrictions on the use of conditional 
sentences.84 
The SCC has not ruled on a case challenging the restrictions on the use of conditional 
sentences contained either in Bill C-10 or the passage of Bill C-9 (as amended) five years earlier. 
There have been relatively few cases where these provisions were challenged in lower courts.85 
The courts have usually been deferential to Parliament’s right to restrict the use of conditional 
sentences. In R v Veljanovski, the court observed: 
It is clear that Parliament’s intent was to emphasize the objectives of denunciation and 
deterrence for serious crimes…the fact that a custodial sentence may be entirely 
appropriate does not become grossly disproportionate because I am precluded from 
allowing it to be served in the community.86 
One temporary exception to this deference came in R v Neary. The Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen’s Bench rejected a Section 12 constitutional challenge to the prohibition on a 
conditional sentence arising from the Safe Streets and Communities Act, but then went on to state 
that “no larger good is served by sentencing Seamus John Neary to jail.” Citing promised 
changes to the legal regime governing cannabis, the judge sentenced Neary to a community-
based conditional sentence.87 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the 
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Section 12 constitutional argument but said, “Judges are bound to apply the law as it exists not as 
it might be in the future especially when, as here, it is unknown when the law will be changed, 
what the terms of it will be, and how it will affect the offences of trafficking drugs or possession 
for the purpose.”88 In accordance with the terms of the Safe Streets and Communities Act, Neary 
was ordered to serve his sentence in jail rather than in the community. 
Figure 6.5 outlines trends in the use of conditional sentences for total offences, offences 
against property, and offences against the person. Results for weapons offences and drug 
trafficking, importation, and production are also reported on this chart. The implementation of 
restrictions on the use of conditional sentences for both C-9 (2007) and C-10 (2012) are 
represented by the vertical lines on this chart. 
Figure 6.5 
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Because of the length of time the criminal justice system takes to process cases, a lag 
between the proclamation of the restrictions on the use of conditional sentences and actual 
sentencing decisions can be expected. The data presented in Figure 6.5 suggests there has been 
very little effect arising from Bill C-9 passed in 2007. The use of conditional sentences for drug 
trafficking, production and importation offences actually increased. Bill C-10, on the other hand, 
appears to have had a very uneven result. The rate at which conditional sentences were utilized 
dropped slightly for total offences and offences against property but increased slightly for 
offences against the person and weapons offences. The big change occurred for the offences of 
drug trafficking, importation, and production. The trend towards increased utilization of 
conditional sentences forthese offences was reversed.  For these offences, conditional sentences 
were imposed in 39.76 percent of guilty cases in 2011–12, the full year prior to the proclamation 
of Bill C-10. Three years later, this had fallen to 20.25 percent of guilty cases. In the year prior to 
the proclamation of the Safe Streets and Communities Act, those charged with drug distribution 
offences accounted for 22.71 percent of all conditional sentences imposed by the courts. Three 
years later, this had fallen to 10.70 percent.89 
The restrictions on the use of conditional sentencing was consistently and persistently 
promoted by the Harper Conservative governments and opposed by the opposition. Parliament’s 
right to impose these restrictions has generally been upheld by the courts. The provisions in this 
legislation appear to have had little effect on actual judicial sentencing practices with the 
exception of cases dealing with drug trafficking, importation, and production. 
6.2.3. Pardons and Record Suspensions 
Clauses 108 to 134, 137 to 146, and 148 to 165 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
mandated a change in terminology from the word “pardon” to the term “record suspension” in 
Canada’s criminal records administration. Waiting time before an application could be made 
were increased from three years to five for a summary offence and from five years to ten for 
indictable offence. Applications were prohibited from individuals with any convictions for 
sexual offences against children and for those with three or more convictions for indictable 
offences. The provisions also required that the Parole Board of Canada provide Parliament with 
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an annual accountability report on the issuing of record suspensions and that Parliament establish 
a committee to examine the legislation’s effect within five years of passage.90 These provisions 
in Bill C-10 had been previously contained in Bill C-23B. C-23B had been part of a more 
straightforwardly named Bill C-23. 
Pardons had the effect of removing an individual’s criminal record from criminal record 
searches. Routine granting of pardons upon application following a waiting period from the time 
of the last offence had been in place since 1970, with over 400,000 being issued since that time.91 
Obtaining a pardon allowed an individual to work in occupations in which licensing bodies 
prohibited people with criminal records, allowed people to become bondable, and allowed them 
to meet American border entry requirements. 
Tightening the issuing of pardons had not been on the Conservatives’ priority list for 
justice reform in the first years of the Harper administrations. The issue was not mentioned in 
either the Conservative 2006 or 2008 election platforms.92 In 2006–07, Public Safety Minister 
Stockwell Day conducted a review of the pardon system. No legislative or policy changes 
resulted. Instead, the government made the administrative change of having applications 
reviewed by two members of the Parole Board instead of one.93 This acceptance of the status quo 
changed abruptly in 2010 following a public and media outcry arising from news reports that 
convicted sex offender Graham James had applied for, and received, a pardon. Among the 
Canadians outraged by the James pardon was the Prime Minister, who phoned the Public Safety 
Minister at home the day the story broke in the media to demand an explanation as to how this 
had occurred.94 Bill C-23 followed with dispatch. In introducing Bill C-23 for second reading, 
the government explained: 
We have heard from many ordinary Canadians who wonder how a serial sex offender 
such as Graham James could have his record sealed just five years after finishing his 
sentence. 
We have heard from other Canadians who asked the same question about other offenders 
who may be eligible to receive a pardon for their offences with almost no regard for what 
kind of crimes they have committed or the lasting impact on victims.95 
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Spokespeople from all three opposition parties supported aspects of Bill C-23 but argued 
it failed to differentiate between people who had committed serious offences or posed an 
ongoing threat to the community from those who were unlikely to reoffend. The Liberals said, 
Someone who was in a desperate financial situation and made a really dumb choice to 
engage in cheque fraud could be in a situation where she or he would not get a pardon for 
10 years. 
This is a major difference, because someone who is 18 years old and has to wait three 
years for a pardon and are then able to continue their life at 21, is materially different 
than someone who has to wait 10 years for a pardon and would be then 28 years of age 
before he or she could begin his or her life.96 
The debate appeared to be heading down a path that was common during the Harper 
administration, with the Conservative members insisting that anything short of expeditious 
passage constituted opposition to the legislation and with the opposition members indicating 
support in principle but demanding the right to careful study and deliberation. In this case the 
NDP member from Welland had a powerful symbolic weapon to counter the symbolism of 
Graham James. His constituents included the parents of the victims of convicted sex-murderers 
Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka. He pointed out that Homolka was approaching the end of her 
waiting period before being able to apply for a pardon and that, under the current legislation, her 
application would be successful. The NDP member said, 
Clearly, for us, the granting of a pardon to Karla Homolka is unconscionable. 
Unfortunately, the bill before us cannot be passed in time to prevent Ms. Homolka from 
applying for a pardon. 
New Democrats offered the government a way out by suggesting that we split this bill 
with a motion that would allow us to deal now with people like Karla Homolka. We 
would look for unanimity in the House, which I believe the government could get, to fast 
track it so that Ms. Homolka would not be granted a pardon.97 
Intransigence would mean the Conservatives would be vulnerable to accusations that they 
granted Karla Homolka a pardon. They surrendered almost immediately by agreeing to split Bill 
C-23. As a result, Bill C-23B died on the Order Paper until resuscitated in the Conservative-
majority Forty-first Parliament as part of Bill C-10. The remainder of the legislation, now known 
as Bill C-23A, sped through the House of Commons and Senate to receive royal assent twelve 
days after the first introduction of Bill C-23.98 The revised legislation confined the extended 
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waiting period needed before an application for a pardon to those convicted of violent offences 
or sexual offences against children. It also stipulated that the Parole Board conduct an 
investigation to ensure that the applicant was in “good standing” in the community and that the 
applicant provide a statement of the “measurable benefit” a pardon would create for 
rehabilitation. The Parole Board was granted the authority to deny pardons that would “bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.”99 The opposition parties supported a toughening of the 
laws governing the issuing pardons but its scope was restricted when the symbolism of sex-killer 
Karla Homolka trumped the symbolism of pedophile Graham James. 
These provisions in both C-23A and C-10 transformed the issuing of pardons from an 
automatic administrative act into one involving the discretionary judgment of worthiness. The 
symbolism of specific language was noteworthy. While the legislation made pardons more 
difficult, and in some cases impossible, it did not affect their substantive impact. The naming of 
the action was changed from “pardon” to “record suspension.” The Minister of Public Safety 
said that the term pardon implied forgiveness and 
Implicit in the concept of a pardon is that once the pardon is granted, society is removing 
responsibility for the crime from the applicant… the issue of personal forgiveness is not 
something for the state to do on behalf of victims… that is something victims do. The 
state has certain roles in assisting the rehabilitation of convicted individuals, and I believe 
the term “record suspension” more appropriately reflects the role of the state in that 
process.100 
One result of making the granting of a record suspension discretionary was an increase in 
the information requirements and processing costs. The Parole Board reported that processing 
costs climbed from $231 to $725 per application and that “due to the additional requirements 
imposed by Bill C-23A, the costs for the processing of pardon applications have increased 
substantially, making the pardon program unsustainable.” In accordance with legislatively 
prescribed cost-recovery principles, application fees were increased from $150 to $631.101 
Increased discretion coincided with a drop in the success rate in applications. Figure 6.6 
outlines the trends in the percentage of decisions that resulted in the granting of a pardon or 
record suspension. In the five years prior to the proclamation of Bill C-23A, two percent of 
completed applications were denied. This increased to an average of 5.76 percent. Since the 
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Source: Compiled from Parole Board of Canada, Performance Monitoring Report (annual). 
The combination of restrictions on the offences qualifying for pardons/record 
suspensions, increased waiting periods before eligibility, increased application complexity, and 
fee increases appears to have resulted in a decline in the number of applications for 
pardons/record suspensions. Increased complexity also generated a backlog in application 
processing, which reached 22,500 applications by 2012–13.103 In 2010–11, before the legislative 
changes, the average processing time for a pardon application took 3.7 months.104 Average 
processing time for residual pardon applications climbed to 36 months by 2013–14, while 
processing times for record suspensions peaked at 13 months in the same year105 before being 
reduced to 151 days for summary files and 242 days for indictable files in 2015–16.106 
The granting of pardons/record suspensions fluctuated on an annual basis depending, in 
large part, on the priorities of the Parole Board. As a result, it is impossible to disaggregate the 
impact of the legislative and resulting fee changes on the granting of pardons and record 
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trends of the volume of complete applications. The vertical lines correspond with the passage of 
Bills C23A and C-10. 
Figure 6.7 
Source: Parole Board of Canada, Performance Monitoring Reports (Annual). 
Court cases arising from the changes to pardon/record suspensions are relatively rare. 
They result from challenges to the review and decision-making processes of the Parole Board as 
it exercises its discretionary powers. These are heard in the Federal Court which has simply 
deemed application rejections as “reasonable”107 unless the Parole Board decision “lacks 
transparency and intelligibility and is unreasonable”108 or simply “entirely unreasonable.”109 The 
Federal Court has confined itself procedural review rather challenging of the legislation on 
constitutional grounds. In Chu v Canada (Attorney General), the constitutionality of the 
retrospective nature of the legislation was denied by the British Columbia Supreme Court. The 
right of Parliament to set or change the conditions for granting pardons/record suspensions was 
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legislation’s passage was deemed to constitute an unconstitutional retrospective increase in 
punishment.110 This decision has not been tested by appellate courts. 
Both Bill C-23A and the provisions of Bill C-10 dealing with the granting of pardons or 
record suspensions were generated in response to specific controversial cases which cast a 
spotlight on what had hitherto been a relatively uncontroversial rehabilitative aspect of the 
justice system. The changes had both symbolic and substantive importance. The granting of 
pardons or record suspensions has dropped by more than 50 percent annually. Most of the 
decline is likely as a result of the increased cost and complexity of application. 
6.2.4. Corrections and Conditional Release 
Clauses 52 to 107 and 147 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act tightened the rules 
governing conditional release from federal correctional institutions. The provisions also allowed 
police to arrest without warrant a parolee suspected of being in breach of conditions and allowed 
Corrections Canada to mandate the use of monitoring devices as a condition of release. Finally, 
the provisions increased the level of disclosure about the inmate to people deemed to be victims 
and enshrined the right of victims to make statements at parole hearings.111 
The corrections and conditional release sections of Bill C-10 supplemented the 
elimination of early parole eligibility for designated offences passed as Bill C-59, the Abolition 
of Early Parole Act,112 during the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament to receive royal assent 
on March 23, 2011. Bill C-59 had received unanimous support at second reading.113 The Liberals 
and NDP opposed Bill C-59 at third reading, but it passed with the support of the Bloc 
Québécois.114 While two opposition parties ultimately voted against this legislation, their 
opposition did not slow passage. The government waited until February 9, 2011, or sitting day 
127 before introducing this legislation at first reading. It cleared all stages of the House of 
Commons a week later, on February 16, or sitting day 132.115 The Abolition of Early Parole Act 
received royal assent on March 23, 2011, just three days before Parliament was dissolved for a 
general election. 
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The provisions contained in the Safe Streets and Communities Act replicated almost 
exactly the provisions of Bill C-39, the Ending Early Release for Criminals and Increasing 
Offender Accountability Act, from the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament.116 Bill C-39 had 
received unanimous support at second reading117 but died on the Order Paper in committee 
without being brought forward for consideration.118 Bill C-39, in turn, replicated Bill C-43, the 
Strengthening Canada's Corrections System Act,119 which had also died on the Order Paper 
without being called forward at committee despite passing second reading without a recorded 
vote being called for.120 In short, these provisions took 902 calendar days or 261 parliamentary 
sitting days to clear the House of Commons. They died on the Order Paper once because of 
prorogation and once because of an election call. This slow passage occurred despite the fact that 
the opposition parties voted to support the provisions and did nothing to impede or delay their 
passage. The provisions were based121 on the recommendations of a review of by Correctional 
Service Canada that reported to the Minister of Public Safety on October 31, 2007.122 In addition 
to the time expended in the legislative process, it had taken the Harper administration 595 
calendar days to convert the report recommendations into draft legislation. 
In the limited debate on Bill C-43 and C-39, the Conservatives stressed the need to 
“protect the safety and security of Canadians” by “requir[ing] offenders to conduct themselves in 
a way that demonstrates respect for other people and property.”123 The Liberals described the 
legislation as “placebo policy” but “supportable.”124 The Bloc Québécois focused their remarks 
on attacking the slow pace at which the government was moving saying, “Peoples' safety should 
come before political games.”125 The NDP said that most of the provisions were “housekeeping-
type amendments,” while insisting on the importance of both rehabilitation and victims’ rights.126 
When the provisions were reintroduced as part of Bill C-10, the opposition parties ignored them 
in their general critique of the legislation.127 
The changes to the granting of parole and statutory release contained in Bill C-10 do not 
appear to have been tested in the courts. 
Parole Board data on decisions is consistent with a toughening of conditional release 
adjudication following the passage of the Abolition of Early Parole Act in 2011 and the Safe 
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Streets and Communities Act in 2012. Figure 6.8 outlines the success rate of applications for full 
federal parole. A drop in the success rate for full parole applications predates legislative changes, 
which suggests that policy changes did not necessarily need to be implemented by legislative 
means. 
Figure 6.8 
Source: Parole Board of Canada, Performance Monitoring Reports (annual). 
Another indicator of a toughening of conditional release is the average percentage of a 
sentence served before an inmate receives day parole, which is usually the first step toward full 
release. Figure 6.9 outlines the trend for this indicator. Prior to the legislative changes, the mean 
period of incarceration prior to the granting of day parole was just under one-third determinate-
length sentences. This abruptly rose to 38 percent of sentence length concurrent with the 
legislative changes. The case adjudication data is thus consistent with a toughening of 
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Figure 6.9 
Source: Parole Board of Canada, Performance Monitoring Reports (Annual). 
Another indicator of toughness is the distribution of people in incarceration and 
community supervision programs. Figure 6.10 outlines the trends in the relationship between the 
number of incarcerated prisoners in federal programs and the number of people being supervised 
in community programs. Since the granting of full parole and statutory release were most 
affected by the Abolition of Early Parole Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, 
equivalent data is presented for these two forms of community supervision. The assumption of 
office of the Harper Conservative administrations is represented by the first vertical line, and the 
proclamation of the legislation tightening parole and statutory release by the second. Given that 
these pieces of legislation affect people serving sentences ranging from two years to life, the 
impact of legislative changes will be gradual and cumulative. The line illustrating trends in 
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number being supervised on parole. This is consistent with a toughening in the adjudication of 
parole applications. This trend accelerates concurrent with the legislative changes, but reverses 
direction soon after. The trend in the numbers on statutory release shows a long-term decline 
prior to the legislative changes. This is also suggestive of a toughening in the granting of parole 
since being released on statutory release implies that efforts to obtain parole were either not 
taken or were unsuccessful. This trend also reverses direction concurrent with the 
implementation of the legislative changes. 
Figure 6.10 
 
Source: Calculated from Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Offenders in Federal 
Programs, CANSIM 252-0006. 
The daily census data is inconsistent with a toughening in treatment in the granting of 
parole and other forms of community. While the legislative changes almost certainly resulted in 
some individuals remaining incarcerated longer than they would have without the changes, the 










































Number of Incarcerated Inmates per Person Subject to 
Community Supervision: Federal Programs
2000–01 to 2015–16
Number Incarcerated per Community Supervions Number Incarcerted per Full Parole
Number Incarcerted per Statutory Release
2006 Election
Bill C-10
  116 
6.2.5. International Transfer of Prisoners 
Clauses 135 and 136 of Bill C-10 amended the International Transfer of Offenders Act. 
This provides for the international transfer of prisoners so that people convicted of crimes in 
foreign countries can serve their incarceration in their own country. The Bill C-10 amendments 
introduced an explicit public safety criteria for such transfers and increased the discretionary 
powers of the Minister. The provisions copied the provisions of Bill C-5, the Keeping Canadians 
Safe [International Transfer of Offenders] Act of the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament 
and Bill C-59 of the Second Session of the Fortieth Parliament. Bill C-59 died on the Order 
Paper after first reading. Bill C-5 received Liberal support at second reading,128 but was allowed 
by the government to die on the Order Paper in committee after the legislation was amended to 
place restrictions on ministerial discretion.129 
Government speakers said the legislation was needed to ensure “the safety of any 
member of the offender's family, the safety of children and the safety of victims.”130 Opposition 
speakers used Bill C-5 as the basis for a generalized attack on the government’s record in dealing 
with crime.131 
In the period subsequent to the passage of the amendments to the International Transfer 
of Offenders Act, there was a small flurry of court challenges to the Minister’s use of discretion 
to deny the transfer of Canadian citizens to serve sentences in Canadian institutions. The results 
were mixed, with the Minister’s use of discretion sometimes being upheld132 but sometimes 
rejected on the grounds of unreasonableness in others.133 The amendments to the legislation 
contained in Bill C-10 were not central to any of the decisions. During the term of the Harper 
administrations for which data is available, the number of transfers approved fluctuated between 
a low of 24 and a high of 121 with approval rates ranging from 27 percent to a high of 97 percent 
with no pattern to the fluctuations.134 
6.2.6. Human Trafficking 
Clauses 205 to 208 of Bill C-10 authorize immigration officers to refuse work permits to 
individuals believed to have been trafficked or to work in sexual industries. Earlier versions of 
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the legislation appeared as Bill C-56 (Fortieth Parliament, Second Session), C-45 (Fortieth 
Parliament, First Session), C-17 (Thirty-ninth Parliament, Second Session) and C-57 (Thirty-
ninth Parliament, First Session).135 The provisions took from May 16, 2007, to December 8, 
2011—1,664 days—to proceed from introduction at first reading to passage at third reading in 
the House of Commons. The legislation died on the Order Paper four times despite being 
supported by both the Liberals and Bloc Québécois. NDP opposition was muted, with the party 
never demanding a recorded vote. 
The legislation was designed to prevent women from being the victims of human 
trafficking to work as exotic dancers.136 For some time, applications for temporary workers had 
been “fast tracked” for temporary work permits in order to meet an identified labour shortage.137 
Controversy had erupted in 2004 when the Liberal Minister for Citizenship and Immigration 
resigned amidst conflict of interest allegations that she had approved the work permit for a 
Romanian-national exotic dancer who worked in the Minister’s re-election campaign.138 
Following the controversy the fast tracking of these work permits ended. This, buttressed by 
changes in administrative procedure, reduced the number of applications for temporary work 
permits for exotic dancers from 423 in 2004 to 17 by 2006.139 
Despite the curtailment of human trafficking associated with sexually oriented industries 
with administrative measures, the Conservatives introduced the legislative changes in 2007. The 
introduction of Bill C-57 was accompanied by a major press event with endorsement from 
groups including the Stop the Trafficking Coalition, the Future Group, and the Salvation 
Army.140 In Bill C-57’s second reading debate, government said they were “taking real action to 
help prevent the exploitation of women and children” and “no longer shall our government be 
complicit in facilitating human trafficking by permitting foreign strippers into the country when 
they could be potential victims of abuse or exploitation.”141 
The lack of sedulousness with which the legislation was subsequently guided through the 
House of Commons invites a cynical interpretation of the government’s intentions. 
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6.2.7. Youth Criminal Justice 
Clauses 167 to 204 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act replicated the provisions of 
Bill C-4 or Sébastien’s Law (Protecting the Public from Violent Young Offenders) from the 
Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament.142 The provisions introduced protection of the public as 
one of the explicit purposes of the Youth Criminal Justice Act143 and added denunciation and 
deterrence as factors for judges to consider when sentencing.144 The legislation imposed a 
number of specific measures, such as making pre-conviction custody for young people easier,145 
lowering the age at which youths convicted of major violent crimes could be sentenced as 
adults,146 and allowing the publication of the names of youth sentenced as adults.147 The 
legislation required police to keep records of cases in which they had used extrajudicial measures 
for alleged offences.148 
When introducing Bill C-4 in 2010, the government said that Sébastien’s Law (Protecting 
the Public from Violent Young Offenders) was a response to a Nova Scotia Commission of 
Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Nunn.149 The commission followed the death of Theresa McEvoy 
who was struck by a stolen car driven at high speeds by a 16-year-old youth with a long record 
of offending. Ms. McEvoy’s death was portrayed by the media and politicians in Nova Scotia as 
an example of systemic failures of the youth criminal justice system.150 Bill C-4 was named in 
honour of Sébastien Lacasse151 who was murdered in 2004 by a gang that included a 17-year-old 
youth. Speaking at the committee hearings on Bill C-4, Lacasse’s parents said, “Sébastien's Law, 
in memory of our son and in honour of our determination, makes our hearts sing a little. It is 
gratifying and reassuring to see that a government body is looking into this problem.”152 
In introducing Bill C-4, the government described its approach as a balance between 
“prevention, enforcement and rehabilitation.” When dealing with youth, “the law must be 
adequate to hold them appropriately accountable for the offences committed, consistent with 
their degree of responsibility in a manner that protects the public.”153 The Liberals criticized the 
two and a half year delay between the issuing of the Nunn Report and the introduction of 
legislation and demanded full implementation of Nunn Report.154 The Bloc Québécois contrasted 
what they described as a rehabilitative provincial approach with a punitive federal one, but said 
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that notwithstanding “quite a few irritants…the Bill is not as excessive as we had been led to 
believe it would be.”155 The NDP promised support at second reading but said the wording was 
“quite clumsy in some areas.”156 Concern was expressed about a “hidden agenda.” Bill C-4 
passed second reading on a voice vote. 
The legislation became very controversial in committee. Over the 16 committee sitting 
days, 91 witnesses appeared.157 Support for the legislation was led by family members of people 
murdered by young people. A typical comment came from the parent of a murdered girl who 
said, “We need to do a better job of controlling young offenders.... It is imperative to protect the 
public from repeat young offenders with a history of violent behaviour.”158 Despite the calls for 
tougher measures, all supporters of the legislation acknowledged the need for a separate justice 
system to deal with the reduced culpability of youth and called for additional rehabilitation and 
prevention services. Opposition to the legislation was summarized by the Executive Director of 
the Moncton Youth Residences Inc. who said, “What concerns me is that although the proposed 
changes may give the appearance of creating safer communities, the actual consequences of such 
changes that have an increased reliance on incarceration may indeed have the reverse effect.”159 
The tone of the debate was polite and respectful with a common acknowledgement of both the 
imperatives of public safety and the differential culpability of youth. The intense interest in the 
legislation at committee and the resulting number of witnesses contributed to Bill C-4 dying on 
the Order Paper. When the provisions were reintroduced as part of the omnibus Safe Streets and 
Communities Act, they were uncontroversial. 
The youth justice provisions contained in the Safe Streets and Communities Act do not 
appear to have been subjected to any constitutional challenge in the courts. There is little 
evidence that the changes have contributed to any substantive increased reliance on 
incarceration. As noted in chapter 5, the overall level of youth incarceration has continued its 
downward trend. The number of youth remand admissions has dropped every year since the 
proclamation of Bill C-10, declining from 7,281 in 2011–12 (the last full year prior to the 
legislative changes) to 1,581 in 2015–16.160 Custody as the most serious sentence declined 
marginally from 15.19 percent of youth cases in 2011–12 to 14.89 percent in 2014–15.161 The 
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percentage of cleared cases involving youth resulting in charges has increased marginally from 
43.77 percent in 2012 to 44.70 percent in 2015.162 
6.3. Summary: The Safe Streets and Communities Act 
Bill C-10 received detailed attention because it has been portrayed as the crystallization 
of the Conservative administrations’ tough-on-crime policies. The common narrative is that with 
a majority in Parliament, the government was now able to act swiftly to implement a set of 
comprehensive tough reforms that had been previously thwarted by the opposition. 
The reality is more nuanced. The opposition parties supported many of the provisions 
contained in Bill C-10. Opposition was carefully structured to avoid defeating legislation. The 
opposition parties took turns voting in favour of legislation, allowed reading votes to succeed on 
a voice vote despite having expressed opposition, or voting in favour at second reading 
(agreement in principle) claiming this was to allow detailed examination. Most of the delay that 
caused legislation to die on the Order Paper was caused by tardy introduction or lethargic 
advancement by the government. The political shell game undertaken by all parties is 
summarized by the amendment put forward by the Liberals during the second reading debate for 
Bill C-10. This amendment called for Bill C-10 to be defeated, because its provisions ignore the 
best evidence with respect to public safety, crime prevention and rehabilitation of offenders; 
because its cost to the federal treasury and the cost to be downloaded onto the provinces for 
corrections have not been clearly articulated to this House; and because the bundling of these 
many pieces of legislation into a single bill will compromise Parliament’s ability to review and 
scrutinize its contents and implications on behalf of Canadians.163 
Even when opposing the legislation during debate-on-principle, the reasons advanced for 
defeating Bill C-10 were lack of attention to social science evidence, cost, and procedure. 
Perhaps reflecting the awkward fact that most of the provisions had been supported as stand-
alone pieces of legislation in the previous Parliament, the mover of the motion did not list a 
single objection to the actual provisions of the legislation. 
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The provisions of Bill C-10 did not have the dramatic effects, for good or for ill, that 
were predicted. That is not to say there were no effects. The provisions restricting the granting of 
pardons seems to have contributed to a drop in applications, likely in large part because the new 
vetting processes resulted in a major fee increase to cover the cost of the program. The 
sentencing provisions for drug trafficking, importation, and production offences appear to have 
made sentencing harsher. Even here, the new or increased mandatory minimum sentences were 
established at a level that appears to be within the established sentencing range. In striking down 
the legislation as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Section 12 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, the SCC relied on hypothetical cases. 
6.4. Conclusions 
The detailed examination of Bill C-10 reveals patterns that are explored in the next two 
chapters: 
 The Harper administration was extremely inconsistent in its sense of urgency. Legislation 
to fulfill some 2006 election commitments were introduced promptly and pursued with 
focus. In other cases, there appeared to be no haste in passage. Introduction of the 
legislation rather than its passage sometimes appeared to be the primary concern of the 
administration. During the two minority Parliaments, the government frequently blamed 
the opposition parties for delay and obstruction. The opposition vigorously denied these 
allegations. 
 The opposition parties supported most of the legislative initiatives. In some cases, 
opposition to legislation was token, as opportunities to defeat or seriously obstruct 
passage were foregone. 
 With the exception of some drug trafficking, production, and importation offences, the 
legislative changes in sentencing regimes were generally within the range of penalty 
already being imposed by the courts or affected a very small number of actual cases. As a 
result, with the exception of some drug offences, the legislative changes increased the 
severity of penalty for some individuals but had little discernable effect on the overall 
pattern of punishment. 
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 The implementation of some legislative initiatives had operational implications that 
appear to have been unanticipated. The expansion of Parole Board discretion in the 
granting of pardons or record suspensions increased the complexity of the adjudication 
process increased processing time. One result was a fee increase for applicants. The 
number of applications declined. This had much more impact on the number of pardons 
or record suspensions being granted than did changes in the pattern of adjudication 
decisions. 
In the next two chapters, I return to analysis of the processes and impact of the entire 
legislative program. Chapter 7 deals with the systemic factors that limited the substantive impact 
of the Harper administrations’ legislative program. Chapter 8 deals with the symbolism inherent 
in the government’s program and opposition to it. 
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7. Systemic Limitations on the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime 
Program 
If the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime legislative program had effects that were 
more muted than acknowledged by either the government or its opponents, the obvious question 
is “Why not?” 
In this chapter, I present a partial explanation. This can be summed up with the simple 
observation, “Because it couldn’t.” That is, there are systemic constraints on the powers of a 
federal government to directly influence justice system outcomes. The Harper administration did 
not throw a lot more people into jail for longer periods of time, because it could not do so. There 
were other players in the game. Specifically, the court system is a system distinct from the 
legislative and executive arms of government. The legal system operates according to a different 
logic and dynamic than does the political system. 
Further, within the political system, the constitutional division of powers in Canada’s 
federal system give provincial governments a bearing on the outcomes of the justice system. This 
will be examined with specific reference to the governance of prosecutorial discretion. Between 
them, the courts and the provincial governments impose restraints on the ability of a federal 
administration to turn punitive intent into prisoners. 
In an overstated sense, the federal government is in the position of a castaway on a desert 
island who attempts to get rescued by putting a message in a bottle. After the message is tossed 
into the sea, she is hostage to the vagaries of currents and tides that determine in whose hands, if 
any, the message is read. The federal government is not as helpless as the castaway in this 
analogy, but the point is that the result of legislative initiative is indeterminate and unpredictable. 
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Sometimes the other systems served to reinforce and magnify the Harper government’s punitive 
intent. Sometimes they served to undermine or mitigate. Taken as a whole, the effect seems to 
have been to restrain the punitive attempts of the Harper administration. 
7.1. Impact of the Legal System 
According to liberal theories of government and the state, the cornerstone of limitation on 
state power over individuals is a division of power and responsibility. The classic liberal 
formulation is that the legislative bodies are responsible for making laws, the executive for 
implementing law and the judiciary for interpreting laws.1 Unlike a presidential system such as 
exists in the United States, in the Westminster system adopted by Canada, the executive gains its 
authority from the legislature and is accountable, or responsible, to it. On the one hand, an 
executive administration only has a mandate to administer while it enjoys the confidence of the 
legislature. On the other, the executive operating as the government-of-the-day possesses the 
ability to exercise a substantive degree of control over the legislature, most importantly by 
controlling the content and timing of proposed legislation presented for consideration. This 
blurring of the boundary between the legislative and executive gives a government 
administration in the Westminster system a greater ability to impose a coherent and consistent 
policy direction than does a presidential system.2 In this context, the role of the judiciary and 
court system becomes a key potential barrier to government policy initiatives3 such as a tough-
on-crime program. The ability of the courts to moderate, subvert, or obstruct government policy 
direction has been vigorously attacked4 and celebrated5 usually depending on the alignment of 
the court with the political and normative position of the observer. 
There are two aspects to the potential restraint the courts can place on the legislative and 
executive functions of the political system. The first is the system of common law derived from 
England. The second is constitutionalism derived from the United States. 
The normal business of the courts is the judging of cases. In a common law system, 
judges are guided by past precedent, that is, jurisprudence or judge-made law. There is an 
organizational and temporal hierarchy to the evolution of law, with the rulings from higher levels 
of courts and the past serving as operative precedent for court rulings in the present.6 Judges thus 
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have one eye on the statute book created by the legislature and the other on compilations of cases 
created by other judges, living and dead. I argue below that this normal operation of the courts is 
inherently conservative in the sense of mitigating against ruptures and policy departures created 
by the political system. 
The second aspect of the operation of the courts is adjudicating the validity of laws 
passed by the legislature against an enduring standard. Writers such as Ronald Dworkin argue 
that the courts should evaluate the validity of law against universal moral principles.7 More 
prosaically, the common basis of judging the validity of laws in the United States and Canada is 
measurement against the constitution.8 For the first 115 years of Canada’s existence as a nation, 
the primary basis of challenging the validity of legislation was the delineation of powers between 
the federal and provincial governments. With the adoption of the Charter as part of the 
constitution in 1982, it became possible to challenge the validity of laws on substantive as well 
as jurisdictional grounds.9 As retired Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson noted, this 
substantive increase in judicial power was as a result of a political decision: 
That by a widely accepted constitutional process Canadians decided to charge the courts 
with the onerous responsibility of reviewing legislative and executive action for 
compliance with the constitution, and they did so with full knowledge of the American 
experience and the criticism of the role of the courts in that society by some of its most 
eminent judges.10 
Particularly since the implementation of the Charter, much of the debate in Canada has 
centred on the actual or appropriate level of “activism” or “deference” shown by the court 
(particularly the Supreme Court of Canada) in relation to Parliament. When the courts declare a 
legislative initiative invalid, “one side argues that the courts have a key responsibility to protect 
the rights of Canadians within a system of constitutional supremacy. The other side argues that 
the courts have inappropriately come to act as legislators.”11 The normative position on the 
ability of the courts to challenge majority opinion as expressed through elected legislators varies 
over time and the nature of decisions. In the 1930s, as the courts were obstructing the 
implementation of social welfare programs, the left tended to support legislative supremacy 
while opposing judicial review. More recently, as court rulings have resulted in substantive 
challenges to legislation restricting such things as recognition of human rights protection on the 
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basis of sexual orientation12 or legislative restrictions on access to abortion,13 the location of 
support for the powers of the court changed.14 The approach of the Supreme Court has been 
described in terms such as “submissive deference,”15 “dialogue” with Parliament,16 or a judicial 
“monologue” in which the court talks and Parliament listens.17 
The twin pre-occupations of keeping an ideological scorecard of court rulings and 
conducting a quasi-psychological assessment about the inclination of the Supreme Court on a 
scale of submission–dominance toward Parliament leaves much unexplained. As Supreme Court 
Justice Rosalie Abella notes, courts and legislative bodies “respond to different imperatives.”18 
This points the way to an analysis of how the two systems operate and the coupling between 
them. With this approach, I move past the classical differentiation based on function (legislature 
= passing laws, courts = interpretation) toward exploring how the different systems imperatives, 
modes of operation, and method of processing information lead to different outcomes. In 
chapter 4, I reviewed Luhmann’s argument that the political system has a limited capacity to give 
purposeful direction to other societal systems. Political initiatives are introduced to other systems 
through coupling points. The political decisions are treated as input by other systems, but each 
will process decisions according to their own systems’ logic and criteria. In this section, I 
examine a coupling point between the systems of politics and law, namely the ability of the 
political system to appoint personnel to the courts. This is followed by an examination of the 
operation of the courts as a test of systemic constraints on the ability of the Harper 
administrations to implement tough-on-crime policies. 
7.1.1. Appointment of Judges 
Following the British conception that “the courts were the King’s courts and the judges 
were the King’s judges,”19 Canada follows a model of executive appointment of judges. There 
have been various consultation, vetting, and recommendation processes implemented, but the 
decision on judicial appointment still ultimately resides in the hands of the Crown acting on 
advice from the leader of the government-of-the-day. In the end, the prime minister has the right 
to appoint superior and appellate court judges, subject to the criteria that they be lawyers with a 
specified length of practice experience20 and, for at least three members of the Supreme Court, 
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practice and residency requirements from the Province of Quebec.21 The power of judicial 
appointment by the prime minister is also limited by the provincial appointment of lower court 
judges. The lower courts are responsible for adjudicating the vast majority of criminal cases. If 
the power to make judicial appointments contains the ability to influence the toughness of the 
justice system, this power resides in the hands of provincial premiers as well as the prime 
minister. As I argued in the preceding section of this chapter, the orientation of provincial 
governments can either reinforce or mitigate against federal tough-on-crime measures. Further, 
judges in Canada are appointed for terms that extend past the terms of the appointing 
government. Change in judicial composition is a gradual process although a long term in office 
can yield a cumulative effect. By the time the last Harper administration left office, 
approximately 600 of the 840 federally appointed judges in Canada had been appointed by his 
administrations.22 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the ability to appoint judges is commonly deemed 
to convey the ability to influence the content of subsequent judicial decisions. Attributions of 
ideological effect of appointment are long-standing—the Mulroney Conservative government 
had been accused of using appointments to create a more conservative court using mechanisms 
such as appointing a disproportionate number of prosecutors to superior courts.23 Prime Minister 
Harper initially optimistically subscribed to the belief that power to appoint judges could 
determine the direction of decisions, telling the House of Commons, “We want to make sure that 
we are bringing forward laws to make sure we crack down on crime and make our streets and 
communities safer. We want to make sure that our selection of judges is in correspondence with 
those objectives.”24 To assist with this objective, in 2006 a judicial representative on the 
appointments advisory committee was replaced with a representative from law enforcement.25 
To examine the ability of appointment to shape direction, I focus on the rulings of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on the validity of tough-on-crime legislation passed by the Harper 
administrations. The SCC issued rulings declaring the mandatory minimum sentences for drug26 
and firearms offences27 invalid. Decisions affecting the administration and application of tough-
on-crime legislation included restrictions on the retrospective effect of restrictions on early 
parole,28 effectively loosening the impact of the Truth in Sentencing Act.29 The Supreme Court 
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also issued rulings affecting tough provisions dealing with prostitution,30 the relationship 
between lawyers and clients,31 and the licensing system for the production of medicinal 
cannabis.32 A substantive executive decision on extending the licence of a drug injection site was 
also overturned.33 While this later basket of rulings placed restrictions on a general tough-on-
crime approach and were viewed as defeats for the Harper government,34 they involved 
legislation passed by Parliament during other administrations and are not included in the analysis 
of the position taken by judges appointed on the advice of Prime Minister Harper. 
Six Supreme Court Justices were appointed during Harper’s tenure in office. These were 
Michael Moldaver (October 2011); Andromache Karakatsanis (October 2011); Richard Wagner 
(2012); Clémont Gascon (June 2014); Suzanne Côté (December 2014); and Russell Brown 
(August 2015). By the end of 2014, judges appointed by the Harper administrations comprised a 
majority on the Supreme Court. Despite this, decisions declaring mandatory minimum sentences 
imposed or increased for drug and firearms offences were declared invalid by the Supreme Court 
in 2015 and 2016. In both these cases, judges appointed by the Harper administrations split 
evenly. In total, Supreme Court judges appointed by the Harper administrations wrote or 
concurred with judgments dealing with the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime legislation as 
25 individual acts of judicial decision-making—20 opposed the government position, with only 
five supporting. Two of the six judges have never supported the administrations’ positions in 
their decisions. 
As a mechanism for imposing the government’s political and ideological objectives, the 
Harper administrations learned that control over Supreme Court appointments was singularly 
ineffective. This suggests that these judges make decisions on grounds other than strict 
conformance to the political program of the administration that appointed them. But what of 
judges at trial and appellate levels? It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a large-scale 
comparative analysis of the sentencing decisions of judges appointed by different political 
administrations, but it should be noted that while judges in Canada are appointed by politicians, 
their work is supervised by other judges. Sentences that depart from the normal, proportionate 
driven range are subject to appeal. This serves to create consistency in sentencing35 and thereby 
mute the effects of legislative change. 
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Control over judicial appointment thus appears to have a less dramatic effect on 
sentencing than the Prime Minister and his critics believed. I now turn to the different processes 
and criteria for decision-making in the systems of law and politics. 
7.1.2. Differential Operations of the Legal and Political Systems 
The fundamental implications of Luhmann’s argument in favour of conceptualizing 
society as an aggregation of intercoupled, autopoietic systems operating according to their own 
coding and logical systems is indeterminacy of result.36 The final impact of decisions in the 
political system are mediated, influenced, reinforced, or mitigated through the operations of 
other systems. Human society is too complex for a simple positivistic statement of causality. 
If society is too complex to predict results of political decisions, ex post facto measuring 
of the effects is correspondingly difficult. In other sections of this paper, data is presented on 
changes in incarceration rates and sentencing patterns during the terms of the Harper 
administrations both in aggregate and for specified offences that were the object of particular 
legislative attention. There is a natural tendency to treat these as the result of the Harper 
administrations’ policy decisions. In the words of Alana Cook and Ronald Roesch, the legislative 
changes “have or will increase the number of people incarcerated as well as longer periods of 
incarceration.”37 This interpretation is incorrect on both empirical38 and interpretive grounds. 
More accurately, the end results reflect the effect of the policy and legislative changes made by 
the political system as processed by the legal and enforcement systems. A legislative change 
does not “cause” a change in the treatment of those accused of crimes. Instead, it changes the 
parameters of actions and decisions by those operating and maintaining the intercoupled systems. 
One methodological problem that arises is the difficulty inherent in teasing out the effects of 
different systems’ operations and inputs. 
7.1.2.1. Differing Structure of Justifications 
One way of addressing this methodological difficulty is to turn our attention from 
outcomes to processes—that is, the institutional contexts of how the different systems make and 
justify decisions.39 A common feature of both the political and legislative systems is that reasons 
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and justifications are advanced decisions. Figure 7.1 outlines the justifications offered by 
parliamentarians during second reading (debate in principle) debate on the package of 
government sponsored tough-on-crime bills during the Harper administrations. These 
justifications can be made to support or oppose a provision. For example, the government 
members almost invariably invoked the mantra of the need to improve public safety when 
speaking to their legislative initiatives. It was generally left unspecified as to how the measure 
would address safety, but it seemed implicit that, for them, increasing public safety was based on 
a combination of deterrence and incapacitation. 
When supporting legislation, members from opposition parties would join the 
Conservatives in claiming improvements to public safety. When opposing particular legislative 
initiatives, the opposition parties would assert concurrence with the goal, but emphasize that 
safety could be better improved by measures directed toward rehabilitative instead of punitive 
measures. For the NDP and Liberals, the primary justification for opposing legislation was the 
fiscal cost of increased incarceration. This was usually accompanied by the accusation that the 
federal Conservatives were offloading these fiscal costs onto the provinces. Even when the 
opposition parties were voting in favour of legislation, the government was often criticized for 
failing to produce costing estimates. 
There are differences between the parties in the nature of arguments made during a 
tough-on-crime legislative debate, but there are also grounds of commonality. The most 
important was a consensus that the primary purpose of criminal legislation was to reduce the risk 
of victimization and improve public safety. The second is the support for a basket of explicitly 
punitive measures of deterrence, incapacitation, deserts, and denunciation. Every party based its 
arguments much more often on this package of tough justifications than it did for the softer 
argument in support of rehabilitation. 
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Figure 7.1 
Source: Compiled from Hansard, 39th, 40th, and 41st Parliaments. 
The justification structure of judicial sentencing decisions was very different. The fiscal 
cost to the state of incarceration was not mentioned in any of the judicial decisions reviewed. 
Concern for the balancing of the government’s books belongs squarely in the system of politics, 
not the courts. The structure of judicial sentence justification begins with a recitation of the 
objectives of sentencing outlined in Section 718 of the Criminal Code. The judge will then often 
note that Parliament has identified the particular offence for deterrence or denunciation. The 
substance of the arguments, however, is based on the justification of proportionality. The judges 
will evaluate the facts of the case at hand with cases cited as similar by the prosecution and 
defence. The judge will outline how the case under adjudication has facts that should accentuate 
or mitigate punishment in relation to the comparison cases under review. In cases such as R v 
Nur and R v Lloyd, where the validity of a mandatory minimum sentence was being 
challenged—even when the mandatory minimum did not produce a disproportionate sentence—
the comparators were hypothetical cases whose imaginary facts would result in a 
disproportionate sentence if the case were real. 
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The judicial process of justification is intrinsically conservative in that it is backward 
looking to similar case precedent. Changes in what sentence is deemed to be proportionate is an 
incremental process, as facts justifying sentences departing from the norm result in these 
sentencing outcomes becoming the basis for future comparison. This process of precedent-based 
comparatives mitigates any legislatively specified change in the sentencing range. During the 
tenure of the Harper administrations, this operating procedure of the court system likely served 
to mitigate politically driven directives toward harsher penalties. However, if a future political 
administration moves to legislatively lower sentencing ranges, it is likely that this same 
procedure would dampen any move toward leniency. 
7.1.2.2. Different Meanings of Proportionality 
As trial judges impose sentences and appellate courts evaluate their appropriateness, the 
key consideration is proportionality. By this, the courts invariably mean comparisons with 
similar offences. 
Thus, in R v Nur, the court found that Hussein Nur was attending school, had no past 
involvement with law, came from a “supportive law abiding family,” and had “not been found to 
have been involved with the threatening behaviour”. These facts were cited in favour of leniency. 
On the other hand, the offence had occurred in a neighbourhood with “very high levels of crime. 
Gun violence was a serious problem” and his semi-automatic pistol had an “oversized 
ammunition clip” making it possible to fire “all 24 rounds in 3.5 seconds.”40 Balancing these 
mitigating and aggravating factors, the trial, appellate, and Supreme Courts all ruled that the 
mandatory minimum did not create a disproportionate result. 
In another case involving the same charge and election, Leroy Smickle was deemed to 
have an irreproachable background similar to Nur’s. However, he was “alone in [a] private 
dwelling” rather than the “aggravating circumstance” of being in public with the restricted 
weapon. Thus, notwithstanding the “aggravating circumstance” of the gun being loaded and 
cocked,41 the combination of a hitherto blameless past and the lack of a threat to public safety 
resulted in the court declaring the mandatory minimum sentence to be invalid as a 
disproportionate outcome. At about the same time and in the same city, Sidney Charles was 
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discovered by police to have a loaded restricted weapon in a private residence. His past was not 
blameless, however. With several previous convictions,42 he was sentenced to seven years—that 
is, two years longer than the specified mandatory minimum. The weighing of circumstance and 
the record of the offender resulted in different punitive sanctions being deemed to be 
proportionate and determinative of the sentence. 
While proportionality is the key and central justification for sentencing, it is a relatively 
minor consideration for legislators. The concept figured in less than five percent of all 
justifications made by Conservative, Liberal, and NDP members. Block Québécois members 
stressed proportionality more often. Accounting for slightly less than eight percent of their 
arguments, proportionality for these members still ranked well below arguments such as public 
safety, deterrence, cost, rehabilitation, and the ease of gaining convictions. 
When the Members of Parliament made arguments based on proportionality, they used 
the concept very differently than did members of the judiciary. Judges examine proportionate 
outcomes for offences within the same category of offence. Politicians use it to compare 
outcomes for different types of crime. Almost all of their arguments using the concept of 
proportionality came in debate on two pieces of legislation: the Standing up for Victims of White 
Collar Crime Act43 and the Safe Streets and Communities Act.44 In chapter 6, I discussed the 
NDP proportionate comparison between those convicted of drug trafficking offences and sexual 
offences against children. In the case of the legislation dealing with fraud, the government 
compared the damage done by large-scale financial fraud with other criminal offences such as 
robbery.45 The opposition parties joined in the proportional comparison to criticize the 
government for setting a one million dollar threshold before a two-year mandatory minimum 
sentence would be triggered.46 Despite these criticisms that the Harper government was being too 
“soft” in its treatment of this form of crime, the legislation passed with unanimous support. 
7.1.2.3. Case Study: Judicial Processing of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
There can be two related political purposes to mandatory minimum sentences. One is to 
increase the severity of sentences. The other is to increase the consistency of sentences by 
restricting the range of judicial discretion. The political discourse on mandatory minimums has 
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been to conflate these two objectives. Responding to the passage of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act, one trial judge wrote, “With the new legislation, we will see a change in the 
sentences imposed on criminal offenders. We will see more jail for longer periods of time.”47 
However, as Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin put it so graphically, there is a vast difference 
between a haircut and a beheading, even though the two exercises can share a common 
categorical descriptor.48 I argued in chapter 5 that, with the partial exception of the mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug trafficking, importation, and production offences, the mandatory 
minimum sentence levels established by Parliament during the Harper administrations tended to 
be within the previously existing, judicially driven sentencing range. Indeed, while Justice 
Pomerance predicts that the legislative changes initiated by the Harper administration will lead to 
more incarceration, she acknowledges a substantive difference with the mandatory minimum 
sentences prescribed in California’s “three strikes” law by saying, “We have, to date, been 
spared the draconian legislation at issue in that case.”49 
The effect of the restriction on judicial discretion is to remove the possibility of 
disproportionately “soft” sentences rather than to have an immediate impact on the overall level 
of toughness. The clear and immediate effect of the legislative mandatory minimum sentences is 
to toughen the sentence of those individuals who have mitigating factors of personal 
characteristics or circumstances of the offence that would have caused a judge to substantially 
reduce a sentence below the normal range. The mandatory minimum sentences prevent 
sentencing decisions such as delivered by the trial judge to a varsity football player, honour-roll 
university student convicted of drug trafficking who said, “No larger good is served sentencing 
Seamus John Neary to jail. He has conducted himself well as a citizen but for this single 
unfortunate foray into the mire of the drug world.”50 A legislatively imposed mandatory 
minimum gives primacy to the offence and the charging decision of the prosecutor over any 
judge’s assessment of the culpability and moral worth of a convicted individual. As such, the 
immediate and direct impact of legislative mandatory minimum sentences on overall 
incarceration levels would be relatively minor if that was the only effect of the legislation. 
Luhman’s conception of the autopoietic systems dealing with inputs provided by another 
system introduces more complexity to the outcomes of the judicial processing of cases to create 
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sentences. Just as an increase in the minimum wage can create upwards pressure on wages set 
slightly above minimum wage by increasing the point of comparison,51 the imposition of a 
legislative mandatory minimum can have an escalating effect on punishment by creating a floor. 
The existence of aggravating conditions or circumstances can cause proportionate punishments 
to build from this floor. The inflationary impact of mandatory minimum sentences was 
highlighted in Canada’s leading text on sentencing.52 Long before the new and enhanced 
mandatory minimum sentences imposed by Parliament during the Harper administrations, the 
Supreme Court observed that “the mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related offences 
must act as an inflationary floor, setting a new minimum punishment applicable to the so-called 
“best” offender whose conduct is caught by these provisions.”53 As such, the procedure of 
judicial reasoning can mean that the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences can toughen 
sentences even in cases that are normal rather than exceptional. 
The imposition of mandatory minimum sentences can also have the opposite effect on 
judicial reasoning, particularly when the legislatively prescribed minimums are attached to 
general offences subdivided according to characteristics or circumstances that trigger the 
mandatory minimum. Thus, a higher statutory minimum for those convicted of sexual offences 
against people under the age of 16 can become grounds to argue for more lenient treatment if the 
victim was, or believed to be, over 16.54 Using a stick rather than a gun as a weapon in a home 
invasion can become the basis for a sentence less severe than the minimum prescribed when a 
gun is used.55 Mandatory minimums based on the number of cannabis plants being cultivated can 
become grounds for lower sentences for the defendant who can argue imprecision in police 
counting56 or even whether cloned plants constitute a single or many organic entities.57 
A similar effect can be obtained with the creation of a specially defined offence carrying 
a higher maximum, but no mandatory minimum. The creation of the specially defined offence of 
dangerous or negligent driving while street racing generated justifications for more lenient 
treatment of those engaged in dangerous or negligent driving without being engaged in street 
racing.58 In both cases, the process of judicial reasoning can respond to the singling out of an 
offence in some circumstances for especially severe treatment, and can have the effect of 
reducing the severity of sentencing in cases where these circumstances are absent. If the presence 
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of the aggravating circumstance is less common than its absence, a tough-on-crime legislative 
provision can have the perverse effect of lowering the overall level of sentencing severity. For 
example, the imposition of tougher sanctions for criminal traffic offences committed while 
engaged in street racing was followed by a 20.9 percent decline in the sentencing severity for 
criminal traffic offences nine years after the passage of the imposition of harsher penalties for 
street racing.59 In dealing with other cases, of dangerous driving, judges pointed to the special 
denunciation of street racing by Parliament to impose lower sentences.60 
The processing of cases by the court system thus generates indeterminate results from 
legislative changes. Sometimes this can magnify toughness. Other times it can create “softness.” 
The method of operation of the court system does ensure that whatever results emerge will be 
gradual. Evaluation of the actual impact of legislative change cannot be based on either stated 
intentions of legislators or the short-term impact on a few cases. In a very classical Luhmann 
fashion, the system of law receives inputs from the system of politics and processes them with 
indeterminate and unpredictable results. 
7.1.2.4. Case Study: Judicial Processing of Interim Release 
The major legislative initiative affecting pre-trial custody during the Harper 
administrations was the 2009 passage of Bill C-25 or the Truth in Sentencing Act. This 
legislation limited the granting of credit for pre-conviction custody to one day for every day 
served in remand.61 Judges were authorized to grant credit at a rate of one and a half days per day 
served “if the circumstances justify it” except in cases where interim release had been denied 
because of a prior criminal record or had been revoked for the violation of release terms. On 
these occasions, judges were required to provide a written justification for the more generous 
recognition of time served.62 Prior Bill C-25, the only legislative initiative by the Harper 
administration dealing with pre-conviction custody was the implementation of a reverse onus 
provision for those charged with offences involving the use of firearms, which was passed as part 
of the Tackling Violent Crime Act. 
Bill C-25 was uncontroversial among MPs. The bill received third reading 35 sitting days 
after introduction. No recorded vote was called for.63 In the second reading debate the Liberals 
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said, “Our objective will be to pass this legislation expeditiously, to ensure that it passes all 
stages of the House in a way that is responsible but that proceeds quickly to adoption of the 
legislation.”64 The Bloc Québécois said, “The Bloc Québécois supports this bill…. The measures 
were part of our election platform.”65 The NDP said, “Bill C-25 is an appropriate bill to deal with 
a problem and a perception of a problem in our sentencing process.”66 Bill C-25 was more 
controversial amongst Senators. The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs recommended amending Bill C-25 to increase the recognition of time served in remand,67 
which prompted the NDP Premier of Manitoba to call for the abolition of the Senate.68 The 
committee recommendations were defeated by the Senate as a whole and Bill C-25 received 
royal assent on November 22, 2009.69 
Legislative restrictions on the recognition of pre-conviction custody does not appear to 
have initially been a high priority for the Harper administrations. In the 2006 election campaign, 
the Conservatives promised to “prevent courts from giving extra “credit” for pre-trial custody 
(remand) for persons denied bail because of their past criminal record or for violating bail.”70 
During the Harper administration’s first term, no action was taken on this commitment The 
commitment was not repeated in the Conservative’s 2008 election platform. Demand for 
legislation emerged from provincial justice ministers who “unanimously encouraged the federal 
ministers to proceed with these criminal code amendments as a priority”.71 This provincial 
request was cited by the federal Justice Minister during his second reading speech for Bill C-
25.72 Justice ministers from Manitoba and Alberta appeared before the Senate committee to urge 
quick passage on behalf of all their provincial and territorial colleagues. The Manitoba Justice 
Minister told the Senators that “we represented virtually every political party in Western Canada: 
the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Saskatchewan Party, and I, from the New 
Democratic Party. We were at one in our consensus on the importance of this amendment.”73 
The provincial request for legislative change came in the context of a growth in use of remand. 
Figure 7.2 outlines the incarceration rates in provincial institutions for remand and sentenced 
prisoners. The vertical line signifies the proclamation of the Truth in Sentencing Act. During 
second reading debate, the federal Justice Minister said: 
There is a concern that the current practice of awarding generous credit for pre-sentence 
custody may be encouraging some of those accused to abuse the court process by 
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deliberately choosing to stay in remand in the hope of getting a shorter term of 
imprisonment once they have been awarded credit for time served.74 
The government also argued that the reasons for granting extra credit for time served in 
remand lacked transparency and undermined confidence in the justice system.75 
Figure 7.2 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 252-0005. 
With a virtual political consensus on the merits of Bill C-25, opposition within the 
parliamentary process was left to a small group of academics and criminal defence lawyers who 
appeared before the House and Senate Committees. They mounted a qualitative argument for 
enhanced credit because conditions of confinement were worse in remand than in post-
conviction facilities and a quantitative argument that the interaction between Bill C-25 and post-
conviction conditional release programs would mean people who waited for trial in remand 
would face a total longer period of incarceration than a person receiving the same sentence but 
who had been granted bail or released on a recognizance.76 The Minister of Justice anticipated 
the quantitative argument in his second reading speech by promising other legislative changes to 
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Following the passage of the Truth in Sentencing Act, much of the debate centred around 
the question of cost. Federal and provincial ministers argued that the legislation reduced costs. 
The federal Justice Minister said: 
We have had overwhelming support from attorneys general and solicitors general 
because they believe that Bill C-25 will help them cope with the growing number of 
accused who are awaiting sentencing while housed in their jails. They believe it will help 
them stem the tide of increased costs due to a growing demand.78 
People accused of crimes being held in remand await a finding of guilt or innocence prior 
to any possible sentencing. The Justice Minister, however, seemed to assume guilt by stating 
remand prisoners were simply awaiting sentencing. The legislation was portrayed as a cost-
saving measure because of its perceived effect in reducing remand numbers. However, Bill C-25 
had the explicit purpose of causing people convicted of crimes to serve a longer proportion of 
their sentence—that is, more days in jail. For those ultimately sentenced to more than two years 
of incarceration, Bill C-25 would increase the proportion of time served in federal penitentiaries 
rather than provincial jails. In 2008–09, the average cost of a federal inmate was $322.51 
compared to $161.14 for the average inmate in a provincial jail.79 The potential of Bill C-25 to 
increase total costs in the justice system by increasing the volume of incarceration and changing 
its location was raised by witnesses during committee hearings on Bill C-25, but no interest in 
the issue was displayed by parliamentarians.80 In response to a request from a Liberal MP, the 
Parliamentary Budget Office released a report that estimated the total financial cost of Bill C-25 
would be in excess of a billion dollars per year.81 This belatedly changed the tone of the 
discussion around the Truth in Sentencing Act. For example, a columnist in the Globe and Mail 
opined, “There's a difference between being "tough on crime," as the federal Conservatives 
profess to be, and being stupid about crime, which is what they are.”82 
The Truth in Sentencing Act immediately generated challenges in the courts. The 
arguments centred on judicial discretion in the granting of recognition for time served at a rate 
between the “one day per one day” specified as standard in Bill C-25 up to the legislative 
maximum of a day and a half stipulated as the maximum in the legislation. In a series of related 
rulings, the Supreme Court ruled against the argument that the wording of “if the circumstances 
justify it” implied exceptional circumstances.83 The Supreme Court said that it is “inconceivable 
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that Parliament intended to overturn a principled and long-standing sentencing practice, without 
using explicit language, by instead relying on inferences that could possibly be drawn from the 
order of certain provisions in the Criminal Code.”84 As a result, “normal” circumstances could be 
sufficient to justify enhanced recognition of time served in remand up to the statutory limit of 
one and a half days credit per day in remand. The Supreme Court rulings were widely interpreted 
as a “loss to the government”.85 Ignoring his party’s support for Bill C-25 while it was before the 
House of Commons, the NDP’s Parliament Reform Critic said, “It’s a slap in the face for the 
government.”86 The interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decisions as striking down the Truth in 
Sentencing Act occurred despite the rulings’ affirmation the legislation as written. Despite a clear 
statement by the Supreme Court that it was within the authority of Parliament to impose a harder 
cap, no such legislation was introduced. 
A further challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions of Bill C-25 was made in R v 
Shayne Arthur Beck. A Territorial Court judge in the Northwest Territories ruled that the 
limitation of credit for time served in remand to one day per day served, where remand was the 
result of a previous criminal record violated Charter rights. Credit was granted at the rate of one 
and a half days per day served in remand in accordance with the general cap imposed by the 
Truth in Sentencing Act.87 The decision does not appear to have been appealed. 
As interpreted by the courts, the general effect of the Truth in Sentencing Act appears to 
have been to lower the “normal” credit to one and a half days per day served in remand from two 
days. This represents a modification of the stated purpose of the legislation to establish a one to 
one recognition as the norm. 
7.2. Federalism and Systems Constraints on Central Government Action 
Luhmann portrayed the system of politics functioning as an autopoietic system in which 
“the centre of the system here is occupied by the state organization.”88 However, as a federal 
state with each provincial government being deemed as sovereign within their sphere of 
constitutional jurisdiction, Canada possesses multiple systems within the system of politics. 
Canada’s long and gaudy history of jurisdictional conflict between the federal and provincial 
states89 suggests that each is self-referential and attempts to maintain its boundaries in 
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autopoietic fashion. Indeed, Canada has been described as having a “dual constitutional 
structure.”90 I argue in this section that interprovincial variation in incarceration and sentencing 
points to Canada having a fragmentary crime punishment policy rather than a single policy that 
can be imposed by directives from the national Parliament. 
The differential results of provincial justice systems has many causal components, 
including the differential commitment of resources for the programs to deal with convicted 
people or the utilization of alternative resolution measures by police forces,91 provincial control 
over the appointment of lower court judges combined with the “progressive expansion” of their 
jurisdiction92 and provincial passage of “quasi-criminal” laws.93 Provincial governments 
determine whether trial court decisions mitigating tough-on-crime legislation are appealed and 
can intervene to support or challenge federal legislation as interveners in cases.94 I will examine 
one of these, namely the differential use of prosecutorial discretion between provinces. 
7.2.1. Extent of Interprovincial Variation in the Treatment of Crime 
In this section, the extent of interprovincial variation in the treatment of crime is 
documented by examining provincial incarceration rates and sentencing patterns. 
7.2.1.1. Interprovincial Incarceration Rates 
As was outlined in chapter 4, the adult incarceration rate for those in provincial 
institutions remained essentially flat during the Harper administrations’ tenure in office. In 
2006–07, the first year of Harper’s terms in office, there were an average of 87.73 prisoners per 
hundred thousand adults in provincial institutions.1 In 2014–15, the last year for which data is 
available at the time of writing and the last full year of the Harper administrations, this had risen 
marginally to 87.9.95 Figure 7.3 outlines the interprovincial variation in this data. By this 
                                                 
1 For those sentenced to a term of over two years, there is no necessary correlation between the province in which an 
offender is convicted and the location of the federal institution in which all or a portion of the sentence is served. As 
a result, inmate counts for federal institutions cannot be used as a measure of the differential interprovincial degrees 
of punitiveness. 
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measure, the justice system became more punitive in Manitoba and, to a lesser degree, in 
Saskatchewan even though crime rates in these two provinces declined. The incarceration rate 
dropped in Ontario and British Columbia, with small increases in the six remaining provinces. 
Figure 7.3 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 251-0005. 
By 2014–15, Manitoba had an incarceration rate of 241.85 prisoners per 100,000 adults, 
almost four times the rate of Nova Scotia despite having a crime rate less than twice as high96. 
In addition to overall incarceration rates, prosecutorial decisions can have a effect on pre-
conviction (remand) custody. If an accused is arrested and held by police when charged, the 
courts can either grant interim judicial release or order that the accused by held in remand 
custody.97 The decision of the prosecutor to oppose or accede to an application for judicial 
interim release has an influence on the outcome.98 Figure 7.4 outlines changes in the remand 
custody rate from the first full year of the Harper administrations to the last. There is 
interprovincial variation in the extent of remand custody. This custody rate remained stable 
nationally while increasing in seven provinces and decreasing in three. In 2014–15, the average 
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daily census of remand inmates per 100,000 adults ranged from 14.00 in Prince Edward Island to 
155.32 in Manitoba. The increase in the remand custody rate in Manitoba during the terms of the 
Harper administrations nationally exceeded the 2014–15 rate in every other province except 
Saskatchewan and Alberta.99 
Figure 7.4 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 252-0005. 
The changes in incarceration rates by population obscure the effect of ongoing declines in 
the volume of reported crimes. As outlined in chapter 4, this measure indicates a general increase 
in the level of punitive response during the Harper administrations’ tenure in office. Figure 7.5 
provides the interprovincial breakdown of the number of provincial prisoners per reported 
criminal code offence. There is interprovincial variation with Manitoba having a 2014–15 rate 
three times that of the province that is least punitive by this measure (British Columbia). 












Average Daily Census of Remand Inmates per 100,000 Adults
Remand Incarceration by Province
Inmates per 100,000 Adults
2006–07 and 2014–15
2006-2007 2014-2015
  150 
Figure 7.5 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Incident-Based Crime Statistics, by Detailed Violations, 
Annual, CANSIM 252-0051. 
The incarceration data is suggestive of a justice system that generates different 
interprovincial results. For our purposes, however, the question is how the justice systems in 
different provinces responded to the national legislative changes imposed by the federal 
government. Figure 7.6 outlines the total change in incarceration rates per criminal code offence 
during this period. The number of prisoners per reported crime increased across Canada, but at 
different interprovincial rates. This measure of punitiveness increased 22.9 percent in Prince 
Edward Island and 117.47 percent in Manitoba. 
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Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 251-0005; Statistics Canada, Incident-Based Crime Statistics, by Detailed Violations, 
Annual, CANSIM 252-0051. 
The incarceration data suggests that Canada’s justice system became somewhat more 
punitive during the Harper administrations’ terms in office. There was interprovincial variation 
in the incarceration outcomes when Harper assumed office. The justice systems in each province 
processed the legislative changes passed during this decade in different ways, with different 
interprovincial results. It should be noted that Manitoba had the greatest increase in 
incarceration, regardless of the measure selected. During the entire period under examination, 
this province was governed by an NDP administration. 
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7.2.1.2. Interprovincial Variation in Court Sentencing Patterns 
As discussed in chapter 5, the overall severity of sentencing for criminal code offences 
dropped during the Harper terms in office. There was an increase in the proportion of guilty 
cases that resulted in incarceration, but the mean length of sentence decreased. This national 
finding obscures interprovincial variation. For total criminal code offences, the severity of 
sentencing index for all criminal code offences rose in Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, 
Ontario, and Saskatchewan, but dropped in Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, 
Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia. Because Manitoba does not report data on sentence 
length, it is not possible to calculate a severity index rating for this province. However, Manitoba 
had both the largest increase in the percentage of criminal cases resulting in incarceration (from 
36.30 percent in 2006–07 to 50.99 percent in 2014–15)100 and incarceration rate during this 
period, it is likely that the overall sentencing severity rose in this province as well. 
Table 7.1 presents the change in severity of all criminal code offences along with the 
standard deviation of provincial severity rates. This increased from 8.91 in 2006–07 to 13.93 in 
2014–15, indicating an increase in interprovincial variability during this period. The percentage 
of guilty cases resulting in incarceration increased in all provinces except Newfoundland and 
Labrador, but the extent of the increase in other provinces varied. As noted above, the percent of 
guilty cases resulting in incarceration increased by 40.47 percent in Manitoba compared to 
Ontario’s increase of 6.25 percent and a drop of 5.80 percent in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
While nine of ten provinces experienced an increase in the proportion of guilty cases 
resulting in incarceration, seven of the nine reporting provinces experienced a drop in the mean 
sentence length. Variation ranged from a 50.41 percent decrease in mean sentence length in 
British Columbia to a 20.83 percent increase in Prince Edward Island. 
The variation in interprovincial results for total criminal code offences could simply be 
the result of differential variation in the composition of the aggregate of criminal offences. If a 
province saw a relatively small increase in an offence such as murder, but a drop in prosecutions 
for Level 3 Assault, the aggregate sentencing severity index would show an increase in the 
severity of sentencing even if prosecution and sentencing behaviour remained identical. As a 
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result, Table 7.1 also presents results for four benchmark offences. Robbery and breaking and 
entering were chosen because they are offences that generate public consternation, but (except in 
cases where firearms were an aggravating factor) there were no legislative changes directly 
affecting the sentencing severity of these offences. However, when these charges were elected by 
the prosecutor as indictable offences, severity would be affected by restrictions on conditional 
sentences. A uniform application of the Harper administrations’ legislative package would be 
expected to produce a modest increase in the sentencing severity index and a modest decrease in 
the spread of sentencings and a resulting reduction in the standard deviation. Other Sexual 
Offences primarily comprise sexual offences against children and Other Drug Offences comprise 
drug trafficking, importation, exportation, and production offences. These two categories were 
the primary object of new and increased minimum mandatory sentences imposed during the 
Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-first Parliaments. The toughening of sentencing laws can be 
predicted to increase the sentencing severity for these cases while the imposition of mandatory 
minimums can also be predicted to decrease the standard deviation by eliminating sentences 
below the legally specified threshold. 
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Table 7.1 














41.889 36.357 8.908 13.927 
Robbery˟ 522.253 455.658 249.47 220.930 
Breaking & 
Entering 
145.275 135.467 35.025 76.390 
Other Sexual 
Offences 
170.789 234.624 91.190 64.740 
Other Drug 
Offences° 
129.683 190.583 82.977 137.453 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057; 
Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean and Median Length of Custody, CANSIM 252-
0059. 
*All Severity Data excludes Manitoba, which does not report on length of sentence. 
˟2006–07 robbery standard deviation data does not include Prince Edward Island because small sample size would 
result in a breach of Statistics Canada’s privacy policies.101 
°Other Drug Offences does not include Quebec because data is not available.102 
Other Sexual Offences includes offences such as sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, luring a child via 
a computer, and sexual exploitation.103 It includes most of the offences affected by the changes in the age of consent 
in the Tackling Violent Crime Act and the sexual offences against children affected by the mandatory minimum 
sentences in the Safe Streets and Communities Act. 
Other Drug Offences consists of drug trafficking, production, importing, and exporting.104 
Of these benchmark crimes, only those in the category of Other Sexual Offences behaved 
as predicted had there been a uniform application of the legislative changes. The severity of 
sentencing for these offences increased and the range of sentences decreased. That is, sentences 
became both tougher and more consistent. The only province that departed from this trend was 
Quebec, where those found guilty became slightly less likely to be incarcerated, while the mean 
sentence length declined by 20.17 percent. Even with this decline, sentences in Quebec were still 
higher than the national average. 
The prosecution of offences in the category of Other Drug Offences differs from the other 
offences gathered in that prosecutions are conducted by federal prosecutors in all provinces 
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except Quebec and Nova Scotia. As such, the interprovincial variation in the selection, 
supervision, and policy direction is lessened for these offences. The federal government has 
much more direct influence over the prosecution of drug trafficking and related offences. 
Sentencing data for these offences is not available for Quebec. Nationally, both the proportion of 
guilty cases receiving a sentence of incarceration and the mean length of incarceration increased. 
Sentencing severity increased in all provinces except Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, 
and Alberta. In Newfoundland and Labrador, the proportion of guilty cases sentenced to 
incarceration increased, but the mean sentence length decreased. In Alberta, both the proportion 
sentenced to incarceration decreased while the mean sentence length increased. The Alberta 
sentencing severity index rating remained higher than the national average, with incarcerated 
people in that province receiving the longest mean sentences of any reporting province (80.66 
percent above the national average). 
Because the court data presents results based on the cases that reach the courts, the effect 
of both differential crime rates and police clearance rates are removed. The interprovincial 
variation in sentencing severity, both in overall scores and in trends, suggests  provincial systems 
impact upon the toughness of the justice system. For offences for which the Harper 
administrations devoted specific attention to imposing minimum mandatory sentences—
primarily those associated with drug trafficking and the sexual abuse of children, there was a 
toughening effect in most provinces. This toughening was most uniform in dealing with sexual 
offences against children, where the only province to register a “softening” of treatment was 
Quebec, which moved toward the national norm (but remained tougher than Canada as a whole). 
For offences such as robbery or breaking and entering that did not receive specific legislative 
attention, sentencing severity declined despite general toughening measures, such as restrictions 
on the use of conditional sentences. 
7.2.2. Importance of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors working in adversarial justice systems such as Canada and the United States 
exercise discretion that has a impact on the outcomes of the criminal process.105 Prosecutors 
decide whether and what charges will be pursued, the election of charges for hybrid offences, 
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position on applications for interim judicial release, and, in the event of conviction, the nature of 
the sentence to recommend.106 An overwhelming majority of guilty findings are obtained 
through a negotiated agreement with the accused, with sentencing heavily influenced by 
negotiated joint submissions from the prosecutor and accused.107 The multiplicity of charges 
available and the differential sentences specified in legislation give the prosecutor power and 
flexibility in such negotiations.108 In short, prosecutorial powers and the exercise of discretion 
can have a effect on how tough on crime the administration of justice is. Indeed, some argue that 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the single most important factor in determining 
incarceration rates.109 The acceptance of a public interest criteria for making prosecutorial 
decisions serves to introduce policy considerations into the exercise of discretion.110 
The strength of prosecutorial discretion is aptly demonstrated by the case of R v 
Morrison.111 Douglas Morrison was an elderly man who used the internet to seek sexual contact 
with a young girl. Instead, he managed to engage in correspondence with a police officer posing 
as a youth. He was charged with using a computer to lure a minor. Under the provisions of the 
Safe Streets and Communities Act, this offence provided a mandatory minimum of 90 days 
incarceration for a summary conviction and one year for an indictable conviction. The 
prosecutors elected to proceed by indictment. The resulting one year mandatory sentence was 
challenged as being grossly disproportionate, and thus constituting a cruel and unusual 
punishment under Section 12 of the Charter. The trial judge upheld the challenge, declared the 
mandatory sentencing provisions invalid, and sentenced Morrison to a four-month period of 
incarceration deemed to be proportionate to the circumstances. In making this ruling, the judge 
noted that if the Crown had elected to proceed on a summary basis, “the issue of proportionality 
would not arise. The Crown elected to proceed by indictment and that changed the landscape.”112 
In his desire to impose a sentence that was justly proportionate, the judge was willing to declare 
an act of Parliament invalid but not to challenge or override the charging decision of a Crown 
prosecutor. 
The discretion of prosecutors was also demonstrated in R v Smickle. Leroy Smickle was 
visiting his cousin’s apartment. He was posing with a loaded handgun to post “cool” pictures of 
himself on Facebook when the police burst into the apartment seeking to arrest Smickle’s cousin. 
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The prosecutor elected to proceed with the resulting firearm charges on an indictable basis, 
thereby activating the three-year mandatory minimum sentence as outlined in the Tackling 
Violent Crime Act. Both the trial113 and appellate courts114 ruled that this produced a grossly 
disproportionate result and declared the mandatory minimum sentences invalid. The election 
decision that activated the mandatory minimums was not questioned. 
R v Morrison and R v Smickle are not anomalies. In 2000, the Director of Prosecutions for 
Newfoundland suggested that the passage of the Charter had created a vehicle for challenging 
prosecutorial discretion, but that such challenges had been “spectacularly unsuccessful.”115 This 
discretion, however, is not simply a function of individual whim, personality or values, but is 
bounded, shaped, and guided by systemic and organizational constraints.116 Tonry argues that the 
diversity of systems of prosecutions provides the basis for comparative research on determinates 
of justice outcomes.117 His analysis is confined to the national level, but is suggestive of national 
differences between Canada and the United States that contribute to tougher outcomes south of 
the 49th parallel. These national differences are useful to review before turning to interprovincial 
differences within Canada. 
In the United States, control over prosecutions and prosecutorial discretion is highly 
fragmented with prosecutors being appointed by and reporting to municipal, county, state, and 
federal governments depending on the issue offence.118 Each jurisdiction can, and does, have a 
different set of prosecutorial policies, priorities, and practices. 
The organization of prosecution services in Canada is more centralized. Prosecutions for 
criminal code offences are conducted by branches of provincial governments, while the Criminal 
Law Branch of the federal Department of Justice conducts criminal code prosecutions in the 
three territories. Federal prosecutors also conduct prosecutions for all federal offences contained 
in legislation other than the Criminal Code. Of most significance for this dissertation are 
prosecutions for violations of drug offences outlined in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
in all provinces except Quebec and New Brunswick. In these two provinces, provincial 
prosecutors conduct the prosecutions of alleged offences arising from investigations conducted 
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by municipal and provincial police forces, while federal prosecutors conduct the prosecutions 
arising from investigations by the RCMP.119 
The increased centralization of the Canadian system also applies to integration with other 
components of the justice system, most importantly corrections. In the United States, the local 
control of prosecutions is accompanied by state control and funding of corrections. As a result, 
the fiscal costs of being tough are externalized.120 In Canada, both prosecutions and a majority of 
correctional services are administered by provincial governments. While there is a departmental 
separation of budgets, the overall financial constraints faced by the province can fiscally restrain 
an enthusiasm for tough prosecutorial practices.121 
In addition to the different organizational framework for prosecutors, the relationship 
between partisan and electoral politics is very different in Canada and the United States. In both 
cases, the basis of prosecutorial discretion is seen as flowing from the people rather than the 
authority of the courts. As a result, the exercise of this discretion is almost impervious to judicial 
review or restraint.122 However, the mechanism of this democratic accountability varies greatly 
between the two countries. 
In most American jurisdictions except federal, the senior prosecutorial official is directly 
elected to the executive office. Federal district prosecutors are appointed, but the appointment is 
at the pleasure of the current administration with wholesale changes being common in the event 
of partisan changes in administration.123 Serving as a prosecutor is a common pathway to higher 
elected office, with 51 members of the House of Representatives and eight Senators in the 114th 
Congress listing “prosecutor” as their pre-election occupation—more than any other 
occupational identification.124 It is likely that considerations of political careers influence the 
handling of individual cases. Prosecutors as a group are also active politically in lobbying for 
tougher laws and harsher sentences, with the cynical or realistic suggesting that such a legislative 
sentencing regime assists with workflow by increasing prosecutor ability to successfully 
negotiate guilty pleas.125 
In Canada, democratic accountability is exercised indirectly. Prosecutors serve as agents 
of the Minister of Justice. The incumbent in this position is elected as a member of a legislative 
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body with a broad policy mandate rather than to a specific executive position. In Canada, 
Ministers of Justice report directly to legislatures rather than directly to the people.126 In Canada, 
a career in prosecutions is not seen as a pathway to elected office. There were no MPs serving in 
the Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, or Forty-first Parliaments listing “prosecutor” as their pre-election 
occupation.127 Prosecutors are generally career civil servants subject to the restrictions and 
protections inherent in public sector employment law. The lack of a prosecutorial service as a 
pathway to elected office is exemplified by the case of Emilie Tamon, a federal prosecutor who 
was denied leave to run for elected office on the grounds that this engagement in the political 
process “could be perceived as interfering with Ms. Tamon’s ability to independently perform 
her prosecutorial functions.”128 The management decision to deny Ms. Tamon’s leave was 
upheld upon judicial review129 but overturned on appeal.130 There is also no generalized practice 
of prosecutors lobbying for specific legislative changes in criminal law. During the Harper terms 
in office, prosecutors as a group made only one intervention into legislative debate, with the 
representatives of the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel (CACC) testifying before the 
Senate committee examining the Truth in Sentencing Act.131 In contrast to the normal position of 
American prosecutors, this tough legislation was opposed by the association representing 
prosecutors in opposition to the unanimous position of provincial ministers of justice. 
In the United States, prosecutions explicitly motivated by partisan politics and political 
considerations are far from rare.132 By contrast, in Canada the “independence of the prosecution 
decision-making function from inappropriate political control, direction, and influence” has been 
described as a “quasi-constitutional principle.”133 In the first substantive piece of legislation 
introduced by the Harper administration, the independence of prosecutorial decisions was 
enhanced and formalized with the passage of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act as part of 
omnibus legislation134 fulfilling platform commitments made to improve the accountability and 
transparency of governance. The commitment was made as part of an implicit accusation that 
partisan considerations guided prosecution decisions connected to the “Sponsorship Scandal,” 
which arose from the distribution of federal event and promotion grants in Quebec.135 The 
legislation created the position of Director of Public Prosecution with security of tenure and 
appointment by a committee that included representatives from all recognized political parties in 
the House of Commons. The government retained the right to issue policy directives, but 
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directives on the handling of individual cases could only be undertaken with procedures designed 
to ensure transparency and invite scrutiny.136 The opposition parties joined to force the passage 
of some procedural amendments to the legislation, but Bill C-2 itself passed through the House 
of Commons and the Senate without a recorded vote being called for. There is a certain irony to 
this. In order to advance its political critique of the previous Liberal government, the first 
substantive legislative act of the Harper administration was a measure that placed restrictions on 
its ability to be directive in implementing a tough-on-crime program. 
The Harper administrations’ strengthening of the independence of federal prosecutors 
from political influence directly affected a small proportion of prosecutions in Canada. During 
the period from 2006 to 2015, a total of 23,245,201 offences were reported to police resulting in 
6,264,739 individuals being charged. Of these, 1,326,960 (5.71 percent) offences and 731,637 
(11.68 percent) individuals were charged within the jurisdiction of federal prosecutors.137 The 
remainder of prosecutions were conducted by provincial government prosecutors. 
The organization of prosecution in Canada contains systemic limitations on the ability of 
a federal government to directly influence the executive government function of prosecuting 
federal offences. One aspect of this is the tradition of the independence in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. The simple fact is that all prosecutors are lawyers. As such, they have 
been trained and socialized to “think like lawyers,”138 which includes evaluating facts against 
established principles and laws while reasoning by analogy and deduction. In preparing and 
presenting sentencing recommendations to the court, prosecutors base their argument on the 
sentences imposed for similar offences in circumstances deemed to be similar. As I will discuss 
more fully in the section dealing with the judicial restrictions on the imposition of political will, 
this backward looking process has an inherently conservative tendency that discourages abrupt 
transformative change. Decision driven sentencing standards can change, but this comes from an 
incremental process of creating self-referential distinctions.139 Commentators generally 
acknowledge that individual prosecutorial discretion is an inevitable part of an adversarial 
system of justice, but in constant danger of foundering on the Scylla of generating coercive plea 
bargains even from the innocent140 and the Charybdis of using discretion to use leniency as a tool 
for expediency and efficiency.141 
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However, prosecutorial discretion is not simply a power attributed to an individual. The 
prosecutor who decides what charges to lay, whether to oppose interim judicial release, negotiate 
plea agreements, and make sentencing recommendations does so within the context of a system 
of policy and supervision.142 In Canada, the basis of the individual prosecutor’s authority is as an 
agent of the Minister of Justice who is politically motivated and accountable to the legislative 
body to which she or he is a member. The discretion of the individual prosecutor is bound both 
by explicit policy directives emanating, ultimately, from the Minister of Justice and by 
requirements for consultation with more senior colleagues and/or supervisors before exercising 
discretion in serious or potentially controversial cases. The corporate nature of prosecutorial 
discretion was demonstrated in R v Nixon. In this case, an individual prosecutor handling the 
case of an individual facing various charges arising from impaired driving causing death was 
dubious about the quality of some evidence and, accordingly, negotiated a plea agreement that 
was generally extremely lenient to the accused. This agreement proved controversial and resulted 
in the province’s Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice issuing an order that the plea agreement be 
reneged. The trial judge refused to accept the reneging of the plea agreement.143 This ruling was 
overturned on appeal.144 The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Crown to renege on the plea 
agreement.145The ruling has been interpreted as an affirmation of prosecutorial discretion,146 but 
this analysis is valid only when looking at the relationship of the prosecutor to the courts. 
Representatives of organizations for defence lawyers argued before the Supreme Court that “a 
plea bargain is an undertaking ‘like any other given by a lawyer’.”147The case attracted 
interventions from the Attorneys General of three provinces to argue that discretion included the 
right to renege on plea agreements, with Manitoba basing its argument on “the importance of the 
Attorney General’s supervisory role over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”148 In 
upholding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the corporate entity of a prosecutor’s office, 
the Supreme Court also upheld the ability of an elected official, the Attorney General, to have 
ultimate authority over discretionary decisions. 
The detailed impact of the exercise of discretion by individual prosecutors is beyond the 
scope of this study. I examine, however, the effect of prosecutorial discretion as exercised by the 
corporate entity of prosecutor’s offices serving as agents of the Minister of Justice in individual 
provinces. 
162 
7.2.2.1. Interprovincial Variation of Prosecutorial Policies 
The extent of punitiveness created by prosecutorial discretion arises from the patterns of 
discretionary decision-making on issues such as which charges to pursue for criminal events, 
election of charges, position on applications for interim judicial release, nature of plea 
bargaining, and sentencing recommendations. Formal direction to individual prosecutors takes 
the form of policy statement. A variety of names are used for these, including policy directives, 
guidelines, and practice notes. The majority are accessible to the public online with the 
remainder being provided after an informal request or freedom of information application. As 
such, these policy directives are universally treated by governments in Canada as public 
documents. In most provinces, the policies comprise a collection of statements on specific topics 
that are joined by website architecture. Presumably, within each prosecutor’s office they are 
available within a single binder. Individual statements are usually fairly terse and oriented 
toward articulating principles and directing action in specified circumstances. The federal 
government’s guidebook along with those of Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward 
Island are more substantive works that are organized into book format, attractively designed, and 
contain discussions of legal principles and operations appropriate for a lay audience. These are 
clearly intended for educational purposes as well as to direct the work of prosecutors in their 
capacity as employees. The guidebook for Prince Edward Island was based on Newfoundland 
and Labrador’s, with the appropriate modifications to reflect differences between the provinces 
and policies.149 
Changes to the policies are infrequent and appear to arise either from a periodic general 
review or in response to issues or controversial cases. Unless otherwise specified, the policies 
being referred to for each province were in effect during the entire period of the Harper 
administrations’ terms in office. Alberta completed a general review of prosecutorial policies in 
2008, so all references to that province refer to this compilation of policy directives. 
In every province, the formally stated policies contain silences. For example, only five 
provinces provide any explicit policy direction on the election of charges for hybrid offences. 
Among the other five, some provide direction for election in the case of particular offences or for 
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particular objectives. In cases where there are no explicit policies, the exercise of individual 
discretion may be influenced by the collegial consultation process and the judgment of individual 
prosecutors. 
A universal theme in the policy directives is the centrality of collegial consultation in 
maintaining some uniformity in the exercise of discretion. Individual prosecutors are repeatedly 
instructed to consult with more senior colleagues or supervisors before making decisions in cases 
that involve very serious offences, present unusual interpretations of law, or have the potential to 
generate public comment. 
7.2.2.1.1. Interim Judicial Release 
With the exception of the imposition of a reverse onus provision for those charged with 
criminal offences involving firearms, the Harper administrations left the legislative provisions 
governing access to interim judicial release (bail) untouched. That notwithstanding, there were 
dramatic differences in the remand admission and custody rates. These differences grew wider 
during this period. 
The prosecutorial policies of five provinces are silent on the general position to be taken 
on bail applications. New Brunswick instructs prosecutors to base their position on their 
anticipation of the court’s ruling and prohibits the use of pre-conviction custody as an 
investigative tool.150 Alberta and Nova Scotia articulate policies that are procedural without 
providing any direction as to positions that should be argued by the prosecutor.151 British 
Columbia, Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince 
Edward Island have special instructions for bail applications for those charged with spousal or 
domestic violence.152 British Columbia and Ontario have supplementary instructions to deal with 
those charged with sexual crimes.153 These special instructions direct prosecutors to prioritize 
victim and societal safety. Nova Scotia instructs prosecutors to actively oppose bail for all 
violent offences154 and New Brunswick does the same for all accused of offences involving the 
use of firearms.155 Ontario and Manitoba provide the most detailed policy guidance to 
prosecutors for the general conduct of bail applications. 
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Ontario’s policy dates from 2005 and remained unchanged during the Harper 
administrations’ tenure. It was issued in specific response to three homicides committed by 
individuals who were on bail at the time they committed their homicide. Prosecutors are 
instructed to consider: 
 protection of the community including victims and other individuals 
 the reputation of the administration of justice and public perception of the criminal 
justice process 
 society’s interest in ensuring that accused persons attend court 
 the liberty interests of the accused. 
Despite the tragic events leading to the issuing of Ontario’s policy directive, the 
document is even-handed. It is the only policy document from any province that specifically 
acknowledges the liberty interests of the accused and states that “efficiency should not be 
achieved at the expense of public safety or fairness to the accused.”156 This statement contrasts, 
for example, with the directive to Nova Scotia prosecutors instructing them to oppose bail 
applications for all those accused of offences involving violence. In 2007, the Nova Scotia 
Minister of Justice instructed prosecutors to use “every appropriate means” to prevent the pre-
trial release of alleged violent offenders stating, “We need to send a strong message to those who 
ignore the laws and inflict harm upon our citizens. Everything possible must be done to provide 
safety to the public so that there is a sense of security in our communities throughout the 
Province.”157 In this combination of denunciation and safety-driven policy, the distinction 
between accused and convicted is obscured. 
Manitoba’s policies toward interim judicial release predate the Harper administration but 
represent the most general punitive approach of any province. In 1990, Manitoba issued a policy 
directive stressing “the need to promote confidence in the administration of justice.” It was 
exclusively procedural and without guidance as to the position to be adopted by prosecutors.158 
This changed in 2002, when the NDP administration led by Gary Doer issued a comprehensive 
policy directive. Prosecutors were instructed to oppose bail for any individual charged with 
murder, aggravated sexual assault, any offence causing serious personal injury, or any offence 
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believed to be gang-related. In cases alleging domestic violence, safety was specified as the 
primary consideration. Prosecutors were instructed to consult with victims before taking a 
position on any bail application and to appeal any judicial granting of bail that had been opposed 
by the prosecution.159 In 2005, offences involving the intimidation of witnesses and any offences 
involving the use of firearms were added to the list in which bail was to be opposed in every 
case.160 In approaching all bail applications, prosecutors were reminded that “the safety of the 
public should be the paramount consideration in all cases.”161 Unlike in Ontario, there was no 
acknowledgement of a presumption of innocence for the accused or their liberty interest. The 
issuing of the bail policy directives to Manitoba prosecutors coincided with a sustained increase 
in remand custody in that province. 
Figure 7.7 compares the national trend with those in Manitoba and Ontario. The first 
vertical line represents the issuing of unreservedly tough guidelines to prosecutors in Manitoba 
while the second signifies the issuing of more balanced guidelines to prosecutors in Ontario. 
Figure 7.7
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
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In the early 1990s, the remand incarceration rates in Manitoba and Ontario closely 
tracked the national average. Ontario’s rate was slightly higher than Manitoba’s despite a lower 
crime rate. In the late 1990s, the rates began a general increase, with the rate of increase higher 
in Manitoba. The higher rate of increase in Manitoba intensified following the 1999 election of 
the NDP Doer administration. Following the 2002 issuing of a formal tough-on-crime policy 
directive to prosecutors, Manitoba’s remand incarceration rate continued to increase 
exponentially. The rate of increase in Canada and Ontario was more modest. Ontario’s 2005 
balanced policy directive appears to have had little impact on the general trend. By the end of the 
decade, remand incarceration rates stabilized nationally and began to trend downward in Ontario. 
In summary, most provinces did not issue substantive policy direction to prosecutors to 
direct their position on bail application except for dealing with those charged with domestic 
violence offences and, less commonly, other sexual, firearms, or violent offences. Ontario and 
Manitoba provided the clearest direction to prosecutors for all criminal offences, with 
Manitoba’s directive being explicitly punitive while Ontario stressed balance between objectives. 
The differential policy directives coincided with a different trend in the use of remand custody. 
7.2.2.1.2. Election of Charges 
Most provinces rely on the exercise of individual prosecutorial discretion for the election 
of charges. Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Alberta provide direction 
that stresses balanced consideration of several objectives including expediency, seriousness of 
the offence, and the ultimate sentencing range desired in the event of conviction.162 British 
Columbia does not provide guidance, except for sexual offences and offences involving the use 
of firearms. For these offences, indictment is to be elected except where specific permission has 
been obtained.163 Ontario and Saskatchewan have a general direction to summary election on the 
grounds of expediency and efficiency. Exceptions are permitted when the penalties arising from 
a summary conviction are deemed to be clearly inappropriate for the seriousness of the 
offence.164 
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7.2.2.1.3. Plea Bargains 
All provinces have a policy statement specifically authorizing plea bargains. These 
mandate prosecutors to enter into discussions with the defence to reach a negotiated plea and 
settlement. The practice is justified on the grounds of expediency and efficiency, with general 
warnings having both the process result in sentences that are too lenient and the use of charging 
practices to generate coercive plea bargains. 
An identified danger with plea bargaining is the ability to coerce guilty pleas from the 
innocent.165 Saskatchewan and Ontario specifically instruct prosecutors not to accept plea 
bargains knowing the accused is innocent.166 Alberta, New Brunswick, Quebec, and British 
Columbia instruct prosecutors to disclose a low probability of conviction to the defence and to 
agree to negotiated pleas only when the accused admits guilt.167 Nova Scotia requires a 
disclosure of a weak case168 while Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island 
require an “unequivocal acknowledgement of guilt.”169 Only in Manitoba is the policy directive 
on plea bargaining silent on the issue of innocence.170 
7.2.2.1.4. Sentencing Recommendations 
Saskatchewan policy is silent on the issue of sentencing recommendations. British 
Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward 
Island are generally silent about sentencing recommendations but have specific instructions for 
dealing with cases involving domestic violence. For these offences, prosecutors are told to 
prioritize denunciation, deterrence, and safety. Mandating consultation with victims prior to 
reaching sentencing recommendations and encouraging the use of victim impact statements are 
also a common feature of the directives dealing with domestic violence offences.171 British 
Columbia also specifies that prosecutors should seek victim impact statements for sexual 
offences.172 New Brunswick provides a general affirmation of prosecution discretion and 
restatement of the aggravating factors listed in the Criminal Code.173 In the case of offences 
involving firearms, New Brunswick prosecutors are directed to charge in a way that activates 
mandatory minimums and seek penalties in excess of the mandatory minimums.174 
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Manitoba and Nova Scotia issued policy directives explicitly in response to the passage 
of the Safe Streets and Communities Act. Manitoba informed its prosecutors that: 
In establishing mandatory minimum jail sentences, Parliament clearly intended that 
offenders who commit those offences were to be incarcerated for at least the minimum 
amount of time provided in the Criminal Code…. it would be inappropriate to take steps 
to avoid the imposition of a mandatory sentence of imprisonment.175 
Prosecutors in Nova Scotia received direction in the form of “practice notes” that were 
appended to existing policy directives. In dealing with the new and enhanced minimum 
mandatory sentences, Nova Scotia prosecutors were told: 
It may be appropriate in exceptional cases to pursue a charge which is not the most 
serious which could be supported by the evidence when it is apparent from the outset that 
the expected length of trial or the usual penalty for a particular type of charge is out of 
proportion to the gravity of the alleged criminal conduct. In order to maintain public 
confidence in the administration of justice, prosecutors who withdraw or otherwise 
discontinue prosecution of a charge with a mandatory minimum penalty when the 
circumstances apparently support such a charge should be able to provide to the court and 
to the public a reasonable explanation for their course of action.176 
Similar direction was provided for restrictions on the use of conditional sentences.177 
Manitoba thus responded to the tough-on-crime federal legislation by insisting that its 
prosecutors act to implement the intent of the legislation. Nova Scotia, on the other hand, 
provided a “wink and nod” reminder of the means to circumvent the legislation along with a 
cautionary note to use appropriate discretionary caution in so doing. 
As in the case of interim judicial release, the two provinces that provided the most 
general direction to prosecutors were Ontario and Manitoba. 
In 2005, Ontario issued a policy directive on sentencing recommendations that stressed 
the importance of balance between the competing objectives of sentencing.178 Separate policy 
statements stressed the importance for cases involving domestic violence179 and sexual offences. 
In the case of sexual offences, protection of the public and society was named as the primary 
objective.180 In dealing with offences involving firearms, prosecutors were told to stress 
denunciation and deterrence, and that their recommendations should be “premised on providing 
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the greatest protection to the community, not on considerations of expediency.”181 Ontario thus 
stressed a balancing of sentencing objectives except for specific offences. 
Manitoba’s policy directives, on the other hand, reinforced a tough approach. The policy 
statement on minimum mandatory sentences has been discussed above. In 2002, the province 
replaced a two-sentence policy statement recognizing the possibility of victim impact 
statements182 with a three-page statement mandating prosecutors to encourage their use and 
document their effort to enable or persuade victims to add their voice to the sentencing 
process.183 In 2005, prosecutors were instructed to oppose conditional sentences cases in all 
cases involving death, serious bodily harm, sexual offences against children, and “sexual 
offences where the victim has suffered psychological or physical harm” since “the granting of 
conditional sentences frequently does not reflect the denunciation and deterrence that is 
warranted where serious offences result in serious consequences for victims.”184 A year later, 
prosecutors were instructed to seek adult sentences in all youth cases involving firearms.”185 In 
domestic violence cases, prosecutors were instructed to make recommendations that “reflect 
public denunciation of this kind of conduct” to oppose recommendations for conditional or 
absolute discharges and conditional sentences.186 
7.2.2.1.5. Non-enforcement Policies 
In 2002, Nova Scotia issued a directive stating that “the Public Prosecution Service 
generally does not prosecute charges of simple assault” since “it is not necessary to bring the full 
weight of the criminal process to bear upon the situation.”187 In 2003, Nova Scotia also ordered 
prosecutors not to proceed with registration offences under the Firearms Act (long gun 
registry).188 
7.2.2.2. Comparative Case Study: Manitoba and Ontario 
The formal policy directives provided to prosecutors demonstrate a range of provincial 
government direction toward justice system outcomes. In many areas, provincial governments 
appear to be content to let the normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion determine policy 
direction. Given the number of references to the need for prosecutors to consult with senior 
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colleagues, the informal imposition of standards for the exercise of discretion clearly deserves 
further study but is beyond the scope of this project. However, the tendency of provincial 
governments to allow prosecutors to be prosecutors is overridden by concerns about particular 
offences. In general, policy attention results in the imposition of tougher standards as 
exemplified by the treatment of domestic violence, sexual, and firearms offences. Nova Scotia’s 
suggestion that simple assault cases not be prosecuted show that official policy attention can 
work toward leniency as well. 
The two provinces that have developed the most consistent and comprehensive formal 
policy direction to guide the work of prosecutors are Ontario and Manitoba. Ontario’s policies 
stress expediency (except for specified offences and in cases when this would lead to 
punishments incommensurate with the offence), efficiency, and balancing between competing 
objectives, while Manitoba’s have been singularly and uniformly in the direction of being tough 
on crime. It is impossible to conduct comparative analysis of the historical impact these different 
policies have on court decisions since Manitoba did not begin to report data on the type of 
sentence imposed until the fiscal year 2005–06189 and the province still does not report data on 
sentence length.190 This leaves assessment of results by measurement of incarceration rates. 
Figure 7.8 outlines the trends in the incarceration rates of provincial institutions for Canada, 
Ontario, and Manitoba. 
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Figure 7.8 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts of Adults in Provincial and Territorial 
Programs, Annual, CANSIM 251-0005. 
During the 1990s, the incarceration rates tended to follow a similar pattern, with 
Manitoba’s modestly higher rate reflective of a higher crime rate. In Manitoba, the 
implementation of tougher policy directives to prosecutors began occurring in 2002. This was 
followed by a sustained and substantial increase in the province’s incarceration rate. In Ontario, 
the formal enunciation of “balanced” policies occurred in 2005. A sustained but modest drop in 
the incarceration rate followed. During this period, both Ontario and Manitoba experienced a 
drop in the crime rate, and the incarceration rate per reported crime rose in both provinces. As 
illustrated on Figure 7.6, in Ontario this increase was 29.21 percent between 2006-07 and 2014-
15. In Manitoba, it was 117.47 percent.  
Another approach to measuring toughness of prosecution policies is the length of time 
taken to deal with cases. Being tough takes time. Opposing bail applications consumes court time 
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Seeking harsher penalties increases defendants’ incentives to fight charges aggressively and 
makes successful resolution of plea negotiations problematic. All things being equal, tougher 
prosecution policies should result in a slower court system.191 Figure 7.9 provides comparative 
data for Canada, Ontario and Manitoba. Neither Ontario nor Manitoba report data from superior 
courts, so the data from these provinces is consistent for the range of offences covered.192 
Manitoba did not begin reporting data until April 1, 2005, so comparative data is not available 
prior to this date.193 
Figure 7.9
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, Cases by Median Elapsed Time in Days, Annual, CANSIM 252-
0055. 
It is important not to read too much into these results. Differences in median court 
processing time can result from a different mix of criminal charges, the nature of case 
management systems, the vacancy rate for judicial positions, the availability and nature of legal 
aid services, and the informational handling systems used by the various components of the 
justice system.194 Courts can also develop a “culture of adjournment,” as getting through the 
day’s docket is accorded more importance than reaching substantive outcomes.195 However, the 
trends in court times are consistent with what would be predicted from the differential 
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identical median elapsed time for the processing of criminal code offences. As the differential 
policy directions were implemented, Ontario, with an emphasis on expediency and balance, 
experienced a decline in the processing time. Manitoba, with its emphasis on maximizing 
punitive consequences, experienced an increase. By 2011–12, Manitoba’s median elapsed time 
was 71.74 percent higher than Ontario’s. The gap has closed slightly since then. 
These differential outcomes in both incarceration and court processing time occurred 
despite both provinces operating under an identical federal legislative regime. 
7.2.2.3. Federal Prosecution Policies 
As noted earlier, most prosecutions in Canada are conducted by prosecutors selected, 
employed, and supervised by provincial governments. However, federally employed prosecutors 
conduct the prosecutions of various federal statutes. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
most important of these are conducted to enforce the terms of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act in all provinces except Quebec and New Brunswick. 
Policy direction of prosecutors employed by the federal government is provided by the 
Public Prosecution Service Deskbook.196 This 536-page document is considerably more detailed 
and offers more explanatory narrative than any of its provincial government equivalents. The 
current version was published in 2014 and replaced an existing policy compilation published in 
2005.197 Both the 2005 and 2014 versions of the federal prosecutors’ policy guidelines 
emphasize balancing of objectives and fairness. As such, both are much closer to the Ontario 
policy approach than that of Manitoba. The most substantive change is the 2014 inclusion of 
guidelines prohibiting using charging or plea negotiation discretionary power with the intent of 
avoiding mandatory minimum sentences or prohibitions on access to conditional sentences. 
7.3. Conclusion 
The Harper administrations’ legislative initiatives were processed by other systems. In 
this chapter, I considered two—the prosecution offices of provincial governments and the courts 
themselves. These systems produced different results. For example, the operation of prosecution 
offices in Ontario seems to have mitigated against the Harper administrations’ tough initiatives, 
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while in Manitoba these policies were accentuated. On balance, however, the court and 
provincial political systems appear to have muted the effects of punitive legislative initiatives. 
In chapter 8, I deal with another partial explanation for the limited impact of the Harper 
administrations’ legislative program. In that chapter, I argue that, to a degree, those leading the 
government did not really care if their initiatives had a substantive punitive effect. Their goal, 
according to this argument, was to mobilize political support for their overall program. Actual 
punitive toughness was desirable, but not strictly necessary for a legislative initiative to be 
deemed worth pursuing. 
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8. Symbolic Action and the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime 
Legislative Program 
In chapter 7, I provide a partial answer to the muted effect of the Harper administrations’ 
tough-on-crime legislative agenda. That is, I argue that the constraints of Canada’s federal 
political system and the operations of the courts makes it impossible for any federal government 
to impose a change in the outcomes in dealing with violations of criminal law. Like every other 
federal government in Canada’s history, the Harper governments introduced legislative changes 
and propelled them through Parliament. The law of the land was changed. However, these 
legislative changes were operationalized, mediated, transformed, and interpreted by the legal 
system and other political systems in ways that were unpredictable and contradictory. The last 
chapter argues that the Harper administrations did not have more of an impact because they 
could not do so. 
In this chapter, a very different partial answer to the question of muted impact is claimed. 
Here, I argue that the legislative changes did not produce more incarceration because this might 
not have been its primary goal. I argue that the Harper administrations effectively modified the 
famous aphorism of British Chief Lord Justice Hewitt that “not only must justice be done, it 
must also be seen to be done.”1 In the 21st century Canadian-politicized version, the guiding 
aphorism could be “it is not essential that justice be done, so long as it is seen to be done.” There 
was disconnection between the ends of the overall tough-on-crime program and the ends of 
individual acts that comprise the process of introducing and passing legislation. The analysis in 
this chapter is based on Edelman’s concept of symbolic action. 
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The evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument that the tough-on-crime 
legislative program appears to have been directed at positioning the CPC as the only party 
responsive willing to address Canadians’ fear of crime. On occasion, it appears to have been 
intended to foster this fear as well. The concrete result of increasing punitive responses was not 
always of primary concern. Instead, in the language of political manipulators of public opinion, 
“keeping the issue alive,” “driving wedges,” and “mobilizing the base” are of import. With this, 
actions in the form of holding press conferences, introducing legislation, and creating forums for 
“victims” to applaud the legislative initiatives are as important as the results of the legislation—
or indeed, whether it is even passed. 
It is difficult and dangerous to impute motivations to actions. People, and governments, 
usually have many motivations for actions. Any request for an explanation of a motivation will 
result in a justification—a constructed case in which the most reputable of these motivations are 
presented. Establishing intentions and motivations is thus difficult in normal situations. It 
becomes even more problematic when dealing with political decisions in which there is almost 
assuredly some degree of Machiavellian deceit. Rather than attempting to untangle motivations 
per se, I approach the question by analyzing actions as a comparative case study with actions in 
the United States and against an ideal type of a government truly alarmed by the level of criminal 
acts and truly believing that increased punitiveness is the appropriate public policy response. The 
actions of the Harper administrations are then compared to this ideal type2 of a truly punitive 
government. If there are discrepancies between ideal and real, it is postulated that these gaps are 
at least partially intentional. 
8.1. Characteristics of Being Tough on Crime as an Ideal Type 
Both in running for office and while in government, the elected members of the Harper 
administrations portrayed crime as an immediate and urgent problem threatening the safety of 
Canadians. The level and dangerousness of this criminal activity was asserted to be in large part 
the result of “soft-on-crime” Liberal administrations that preceded it. To rectify this situation, an 
ideal tough-on-crime government would likely possess a number of characteristics: 
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1. Temporal Urgency. If crime is deemed to be a pressing and real problem by an incoming 
administration, the legislative response should be introduced early in the administration’s 
mandate, be pursued through the legislative process with vigour, and be reasonably 
comprehensive in scope. An example of temporal urgency by an administration was U.S. 
President Bill Clinton’s introduction of omnibus tough-on-crime legislation during the 
first year of his mandate followed by a concerted effort to successfully secure legislative 
passage the following year.3 
2. Commitment of Resources. In addition to passing laws, a primary task of Parliament is to 
authorize the collection of revenue and allocate these resources for specified purposes. 
Allocation of resources is a signifier of substantive commitment to dealing with a 
problem.4 
3. Substantive and Real Increase in Sentencing Provisions. The goal of protecting the public 
from criminal acts can form the basis of either a rehabilitative or tough approach to 
dealing with those convicted. With a rehabilitative approach, the base assumption is that 
those who commit criminal acts have an underlying pathological condition that can be 
prevented or cured.5 In contrast, the tough approach is premised on a greater belief in 
individual agency. Criminal acts arise from individual choices that can be altered by 
increasing negative sanctions (deterrence) or constraining the ability of the individual to 
engage in such acts (incapacitation).6 
The ultimate expression of both deterrence and incapacitation is capital 
punishment. Corporeal punishments can also be used as deterrence, such as castration of 
those convicted of sexual offences7 or severing the hand of a pickpocket.8 In the absence 
of these potential punishments, incarceration becomes the primary instrument of both 
deterrence and incapacitation. Tough-on-crime political regimes thus seek to increase the 
use and duration of incarceration.9 Increased reliance on mandatory minimum sentences 
is often a feature of this approach in an attempt to ensure universal application of the 
principles of deterrence and incapacitation.10 
4. Streamlining of Legal Process While Maintaining Protections Against False Conviction. 
Both deterrence and incapacitation are premised on the need to impose sanctions 
expeditiously. The discounting of future consequences means deterrence is more 
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effective if applied quickly, while incapacitation does not become effective until the 
individual is incarcerated. At the same time, the effectiveness deterrence is undermined if 
the justice system produces a number of false convictions. 
In this respect, Texas serves as a North American archetype for combining 
sanctions that are very harsh compared to other political jurisdictions with legal 
protections that are more favourable to the accused than in other jurisdictions.11 A 
principled tough-on-crime approach would seek to both strengthen procedural protections 
for the accused and speed the adjudication process. An unprincipled one would simply 
seek to speed the process. In either case, a substantive tough-on-crime program would 
include changes to the legal process. 
5. Forging Political Consensus on Need for Action. In a Parliament in which the executive 
possesses only a plurality of seats, support from Opposition parties is necessary to enact 
legislation.12 Since a Parliament is sovereign within its field of jurisdiction temporally as 
well as geographically, if any legislative changes are to be assured of permanency, there 
must also be a level of support, or at least acquiescence, from other political parties that 
have a chance of forming government in the future.13 
Tough-on-crime justifications are often coloured by the language of deserts. However, 
this has been excluded from the construction of the ideal type since the concept of aligning the 
punishment to the nature of the crime can moderate punitive impulses as well as increase them.14 
8.2. Symbolic Aspects of the Harper Administrations’ Tough-on-Crime Program 
The substantive record of the Harper administrations can be compared to these ideal type 
components. In the previous chapter, the emphasis was on the systemic limitations faced by the 
Harper administrations. The political goal of toughness was implicitly assumed. In the analysis 
that follows, this assumption is removed. This analysis thus focuses on decisions and actions 
within the control of the government by comparing each of the elements of the Harper 
administration against the ideal type. 
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8.2.1. Temporal Sequencing and Symbolism 
In their 2006 election platform, the Harper-led Conservatives claimed urgency for their 
tough-on-crime program, stating that “the federal government must act decisively to ensure that 
all Canadians—particularly the most vulnerable members of society—can live in safe, healthy 
communities.”15 
The quickest way to pass and implement a broad range of legislative initiatives is with 
omnibus legislation that brings forward several acts in a single bill. Goertz argues that moderate 
legislators prefer single issue bills, while more radical legislators prefer omnibus legislation to 
impose comprehensive change with dispatch.16 The Harper administrations used omnibus bills to 
implement the democratic reform package promised in the 2006 election17 and later used 
omnibus legislation to change Canada’s environmental protection legislative regime.18 In 
contrast, in passing the tough-on-crime legislative package promised in the 2006 election 
platform, the Harper administration opted for a long series of individual pieces of legislation. 
Following the prorogation or dissolving of Parliament, omnibus legislation was sometimes used 
to pass the pieces of legislation that had previously died on the Order Paper.19 The reliance on 
individual discrete legislation to implement the tough-on-crime package was regularly attacked 
by both Liberal and NDP critics during the two minority Parliaments. The opposition members 
argued that eschewing omnibus legislation was an indication the government was more 
interested in symbolism than being substantively tough. A typical argument came from a Liberal 
member: 
The government has been trying to convince Canadians that it is hard at work ending 
crime and violence, but the facts speak otherwise. It has a plethora of justice bills before 
committees. Instead of doing omnibus reform and criminal bills, several at a time, it has 
chosen to do probably 20 by the time it is finished, because that is 20 news cycles, 20 
news stories.20 
In many cases, a tardy introduction of a tough legislative initiative was followed by a lack 
of prioritization in its passage. During the minority Parliaments, delay was commonly cited by 
government members as being the result of resistance from opposition members. These 
allegations were vigorously denied by opposition members who pointed to the government’s 
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control of the legislative calendar. Table 8.1 outlines the pace of passage of several key tough-
on-crime proposals contained in the 2006 CPC election platform. 
Table 8.1 
Timeline for Passage of Selected Tough-on-Crime Measures Promised in 2006  




Royal Assent Supported by  
During First 
Incarnation 
Restrictions on conditional 
sentences 
C-9 (39-1)* May 4, 2006 May 5, 2007 Liberal, NDP 
Presumption of dangerous 




Oct 17, 2006 Feb 28, 2008 Liberal, Bloc Québécois 
Repeal “faint hope clause” S-6 (40-3) June 5, 2009 Mar 23, 2011 Liberal 
Restrictions on credit for 
time served in remand 
C-25 (40-2) Mar 27, 2009 Oct 22, 2009˚ Unanimous 
No recorded vote 




June 22, 2006 Feb 28, 2008 Unanimous 
No recorded vote 
Legislation on “precursors” 





Apr 19, 2007 Mar 25, 2011 Unanimous 
Recorded vote 
Reverse onus for bail for 
offences using firearms 
C-2 (39-2) 
C-35 (39-1) 






Nov 20, 2007 Mar 13, 2012 Liberal, Bloc 
Québécois  ͣ
Mandatory minimums for 
child sexual offences 
C-10 (41-1) 
C-54 (40-3) 
Nov 4, 2010 Mar 13, 2012 Unanimous 
No recorded vote 
Mandatory minimums for 




May 4, 2006 Feb 28, 2008 NDP, partial Liberal 
*Bill C-9 was substantively amended during the legislative process over the objections of Conservative members. 
These opposition-driven amendments limited the scope of the restrictions. The full implementation of the 
promised restrictions on conditional sentences was not passed until Bill C-10 of the (majority) 41st Parliament, 1st 
Session. 
˚Bill C-25 received third reading in the House of Commons on June 8, 2009. Passage by the Senate did not occur 
until November 21, 2009. The legislation was amended by the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, but these amendments were rejected by the Senate as a whole. 
ˣBill C-27 was opposed by all three opposition parties during second reading debate but was referred to a special 
committee for examination. After six meetings of the committee, Bill C-27 died on the Order Paper with the 
prorogation of the 1st Session of the 39th Parliament. The terms were reintroduced as part of the omnibus Bill C-2 
in the 2nd Session of the 39th Parliament. An NDP-sponsored amendment to delete the reverse onus provisions was 
defeated by the Conservatives, Liberals, and Bloc Québécois members voting against. Bill C-2 as a whole was 
passed with only one dissenting vote from an NDP member. 
ͣThe Bloc Québécois supported the mandatory minimum provisions for drug trafficking offences when presented as 
Bill C-26 but opposed them as Bill C-15. 
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The urgency of implementation of Conservative tough-on-crime legislative changes 
varied greatly. In some cases, the administration was clearly determined to achieve quick 
passage. For example, in placing restrictions on the availability of conditional sentences, the 
Harper administration introduced legislation with dispatch and propelled it through the 
legislative process in the first session if its mandate. When the opposition parties objected to 
some aspects, the Conservatives jettisoned these provisions to secure expeditious passage of the 
remainder. The provisions that were removed from the original legislation were reintroduced and 
passed as soon as the Conservatives received a majority mandate. 
By contrast, increased mandatory minimum sentences for sexual offences against 
children were not introduced until the fourth year of the Conservatives’ mandate. The legislation 
was allowed to die on the Order Paper even though the opposition members did not even call for 
a recorded vote. When the provisions were reintroduced as part of the omnibus Bill C-10, 
government members argued passage had become possible. 
Judging by actions alone, hypocrisy trumped commitment. An extreme example of a lack 
of commitment to a election promise was the criminalization of the possession and sale of the 
precursor substances used in the manufacture crystal meth and ecstasy. This legislation was 
introduced as a private member’s bill on several occasions and allowed to die on the Order 
Paper. Private member’s bills are generally considered to be symbolic statements and rarely are 
passed into law.21 In one second reading debate, the Conservative member said, “I hope all 
members will join me in bringing to an end the possession, production, and trafficking of crystal 
meth and ecstasy in Canada. By directly targeting the ingredients of these devastating drugs, we 
can work to create a safer and stronger Canada.”22 The Liberal critic responded by 
complimenting the Conservative backbencher “for taking the initiative and trying to fix the 
Conservative government's omission in not bringing this forward as part of its own legislation” 
and expressing “extreme disappointment” that the legislation had not been passed earlier.23 
The decision to disaggregate the CPC’s tough-on-crime election platform commitments 
into discrete legislative initiatives contrasts with the Conservative commitments for democratic 
reform and accountability. There were 59 specific platform commitments related to this 
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programmatic area. Almost all commitments requiring legislative changes were included in the 
omnibus Federal Accountability Act.24 This controversial, complicated, and comprehensive 
legislation was introduced on the seventh parliamentary sitting day of the Harper 
administration’s first mandate. Despite opposition to many provisions by Liberal and NDP 
members, 28 days of committee hearings and eight recorded votes on amendment proposals, the 
legislation cleared the House of Commons on June 21, 2006, or sitting day 45. The Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs conducted another 30 days of hearings 
and proposed 156 amendments and observations. The Senate as a whole passed 158 amendments 
to the legislation, which caused another round of debate within the House of Commons along 
with three more recorded votes to deal with the proposed Senate amendments. Bill C-2 received 
royal assent on December 12, 2006, the 145th parliamentary sitting day of the Harper 
administration’s first session.25 
The contrast between these two key Conservative election programmatic areas is stark. 
8.2.2. Fiscal Commitments and Symbolism 
In the words of Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, “Budgets say something about your 
motivation and goals. They say something about your priorities.”26 
Punishing those who commit criminal acts requires resources. Police must be on the 
streets to apprehend and arrest those suspected of crimes. Prosecutors must present the case 
against the accused. Judges must pronounce guilt and impose sanctions. Jails and prisons must be 
available to house, feed, and confine prisoners. In the United States, the cornerstone of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was federal funding for the hiring of 
100,000 additional police officers27 and $9.7 billion in federal funding for prison construction.28 
From 1993 to 2012, real total justice spending in the United States increased by 74 percent.29 
The level of expenditure on criminal justice in Canada is difficult to establish with 
precision. Spending on corrections is almost exclusively devoted to the imposition of punitive 
sanctions, but even in this area, expenditures such as providing health care services to prisoners 
represent expenditures that would otherwise be in the health budget. Police expenditures are both 
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directed at items unequivocally dedicated toward imposing criminal sanctions and at items that 
are clearly unrelated to the task of punishing criminals, such as the RCMP’s Musical Ride. Other 
police expenditures are partially related to enforcement of criminal law, such as traffic patrol and 
emergency response preparedness. Expenditures on the courts include family law and civil 
litigation in addition to the adjudication of criminal cases. Accounting systems in different 
jurisdictions deal with these categorical cost allocations differently, if at all.30 Notwithstanding 
the methodological difficulties, the general tendency of expenditures on apprehending and 
punishing those committing criminal acts appears to have been on a general upward trend since 
2002.31 The trend to increasing expenditures in criminal justice predates the Harper 
administrations, but continued into this period. 
Expenditure levels in criminal justice involve decisions by three levels of government. 
The jurisdictional division of responsibility in Canada restricts the ability of the federal 
government to determine resource levels. The federal government determines the funding levels 
for the CSC, which operates prisons for those sentenced to terms longer than two years. It also 
appoints and pays superior and appellate court judges. Provincial governments are responsible 
for funding for prosecutors, the operation of the courts, most programs designed as alternative 
programs to incarceration, and jails for those sentenced to less than two years. Responsibility for 
funding policing is divided by municipal, provincial, and federal governments. A portion of 
policing is provided by the federal RCMP on a contractual and subsidized basis to provincial and 
municipal governments. 
As a result of this divided jurisdictional authority, the federal government has limited 
direct control over justice spending. If the federal government wants to allocate more resources 
to implement a tough-on-crime program, a major component would be a subsidy or cost-sharing 
initiative directed at provincial and municipal governments. In the 2006 CPC election platform, 
commitments for resources for the criminal justice system focused on police. The Conservatives 
promised to hire an additional one thousand RCMP officers and provide funding to provincial 
and municipal governments to hire an additional 2,500 police officers.32 
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We now examine the Harper administrations’ record on committing resources toward a 
tough-on-crime program. This treatment deals with the three main components of the criminal 
justice system: policing, courts, and correctional facilities. 
8.2.2.1. Fiscal Commitment for Policing 
As noted above, the primary 2006 Conservative platform promised the hiring of one 
thousand additional RCMP officers and a cost-sharing program with provinces and 
municipalities in order to increase the number of police officers by 2,500. Given the role of the 
RCMP in some jurisdictions in providing provincial and municipal policing, these commitments 
represent could have resulted in a political double counting of officers. Nonetheless, there was a 
clear commitment to fund at least 2,500 additional officers, with the impression being conveyed 
that the increase would be 3,500 more officers. This would have represented a four percent 
increase in the number of police officers in Canada33 or enough to sustain staffing levels to 
accommodate about two years of population growth. On a per capita basis, it amounted to about 
one-quarter of the 1994 American federal government’s assistance for additional police officers. 
In the Harper administration’s first budget, the Finance Minister announced $161 million 
to begin hiring the thousand promised RCMP officers and a $37 million expansion of the 
RCMP’s Regina training facility.34 There was no mention of the platform commitment for a cost-
sharing program for 2,500 more police officers. By the Harper administrations’ second budget in 
2007, the issue of resourcing for police disappeared completely35 and was not mentioned again 
until the last budget in 2015 when the Finance Minister stated, “Our government has also 
focused on making our streets and communities safer from crime.”36 There was no articulation of 
resources directed at this focus nor any new spending commitment. Ironically, in the 2015 
election, the NDP committed to “work with provinces, territories, municipalities, and indigenous 
communities to provide stable, ongoing funding to put 2,500 new officers on the streets and keep 
them there.”37 There was no acknowledgement that the commitment had been appropriated from 
the 2006 Conservative platform. 
Provincial governments clearly believed that the Harper administrations had effectively 
reneged on its commitment for cost-sharing of additional police officers. The official 
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communiqué of the 2007 annual meeting of federal, provincial, and territorial justice ministers 
was positive in tone, stating that: 
The federal Minister of Public Safety provided an update on the 2,500 additional police 
officers initiative. Provincial and territorial ministers asserted the importance of full and 
permanent federal funding. The federal minister reiterated the Government’s position that 
the program be cost shared. The federal minister also noted that it is his intention to move 
forward with a proposal in a timely manner that fully respects provincial and territorial 
jurisdictions on policing.38 
By the next meeting, the tone and content of the communiqué was less optimistic and 
congenial. 
PT Ministers reiterated their position for permanent federal funding for the Police 
Officers Recruitment Fund. The federal Minister of Public Safety indicated that the 
federal government had delivered on its commitment to provide a one-time allocation to 
assist the provinces and territories in a manner that respects their responsibility for the 
administration of policing. It was agreed that this item will be on the agenda for the next 
Ministerial meeting.39 
Identical wording appeared in the justice ministers’ communiqués for several years. In 
2012, the communiqué stated that “the federal government reiterated that there are no plans to 
renew the one-time funding.”40 Following that definitive statement, future meetings highlighted 
discussions aimed at improving “the effectiveness and efficiency of policing” in order to “help 
transform and strengthen policing.”41 
In the absence of an ongoing cost-sharing program to increase the numbers of police 
officers, provincial and municipal governments did increase the number of police officers. The 
total number of officers increased from 62,461 in 2006 to 68,771 in 2015.42 However, this 
increase was sufficient only to compensate for population increases during this period. Figure 8.1 
outlines the number of police officers per 100,000 population during this period. There was an 
increase from 191.8 officers per 100,000 population in 2006 to 203.1 in 2010. Increases in the 
number of officers then failed to keep up with population, resulting in population-adjusted police 
staffing levels returning to 191.8 in 2015. Police staffing levels by population were identical in 
the first and last years of the Harper administrations. 
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Figure 8.1 
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Personnel and Selected Crime Statistics, Canada, Provinces and Territories, 
CANSIM 254-0002. 
Changes in police staffing levels varied. Figure 8.2 outlines the change in the number of 
police officers per 100,000 population by province. This ranged from a 10.7 percent increase in 
population-adjusted police staffing levels in Nova Scotia to a 3.3 percent decrease in Prince 
Edward Island. Nationally, the police staffing levels on a per capita basis were identical at the 
beginning and end of this period. Increases in police staffing from 2006 to 2010 were offset by 









































Source: Statistics Canada, Police Personnel and Selected Crime Statistics, Canada, Provinces and Territories, 
CANSIM 254-0002. 
Provincial and municipal governments did express a fiscal commitment to policing in 
another way. Expressed in constant (2002) dollars, police salaries increased every year from 
2000 to 2013. Average compensation for police officers employed by non-First Nations police 
services increased from $67,865 (2002 dollars) in 2006 to $75,499 in 2015.43 In constant dollars, 
police salaries increased by 11.24 percent from the first year of the Harper administrations to the 
last. The increases in police salaries during the Harper era were part of a long-term trend in 
which police salaries increased in constant dollars by 40 percent from 2000 to 2013 compared 
with an 11 percent increase in the salaries of all employed Canadians during the same period.44 
The increase in police salaries was driven by collective bargaining outcomes and political 
decisions made by municipal and provincial governments. Federally controlled RCMP salaries 
lagged behind other forces during the terms of the Harper administrations.45 
8.2.2.2. Fiscal Commitment for the Courts 
During the terms of the Harper administrations, the median length of time required to 
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2015–16. This general modest increase in the length of time needed to adjudicate a case obscures 
variation between provinces and in the type of offence. Ontario (121 to 108 days), Saskatchewan 
(91 to 74 days), and British Columbia (105 to 104 days) experienced a drop in the median time 
to adjudicate a criminal code offence. All other provinces experienced an increase, with Nova 
Scotia going from 129 to 183 days and Quebec from 185 to 234 days. In general, the greatest 
increases in adjudication time were for crimes of violence. 
The median for crimes against the person increased from 154 to 176 days, while the 
median adjudication time for those accused of crimes against property rose from 111 to 113 
days.46 Delays in adjudicating criminal charges have been attributed to a complex package of 
factors including the increased complexity of technical evidence, the accessibility of legal 
representation for the accused, case management technology, a culture of adjournment,47 and 
resource levels.48 The administration and allocation of resources to the courts is within provincial 
jurisdiction. As a result, for the most part, resource allocation decisions about courts dealing with 
criminal offences are beyond the power of the federal government. The exceptions are the 
number of superior and appellate court judges available and the number of federal prosecutors 
available to prosecute alleged contraventions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
A long-term pattern of delays in filling vacant federally appointed judicial positions was 
identified by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.49 It has also 
been cited by the Chief Justice of the SCC as a major cause of delay in the adjudication of 
criminal cases.50 In 2006, the incoming Harper administration inherited 23 federal judicial 
vacancies.51 By September 2006, the new administration had made only two appointments. The 
number of vacancies grew to 47.52 Media coverage of the issue was followed by ten 
appointments the following week53 and another 43 by year end.54 During the remainder of the 
Harper administrations’ terms in office, the priority attached to filling vacant judicial positions 
appeared to ebb and flow, with another backlog created in 2010 when the government did not 
replace members of vetting advisory committees in a timely fashion.55 The number of vacant 
positions tolerated by the government appeared to be related to media attention to court delays 
and controversy,56 although the electoral cycle also appears important. An impending election 
produced a spate of judicial appointments.57 In June of 2015, the Harper administration made 43 
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judicial appointments, reducing the number of vacancies to 14. The positions being filled with 
the pre-election appointments had been vacant for as long as 18 months.58 
The bulk of criminal prosecutions in Canada are conducted by provincial prosecution 
services. As a result, the federal government has little role in determining resource levels for this 
component of the justice system. Federal prosecutors conduct prosecutions for drug offences in 
all provinces except Quebec and New Brunswick, all offences related to terrorism, and national 
security and all criminal code offences in Canada’s three territories.59 The format of reporting 
does not allow for comparative staffing levels dedicated to these functions prior to the Harper 
administrations’ assumption of office. Improvements to financial reporting allow for 
comparative reporting beginning in the 2007–08 fiscal year. At that time, 613 full-time 
equivalents (FTEs) were engaged in the prosecution of these offences.60 By 2014–15 (the last 
full year governed by the Harper administrations), this had increased to 677 FTEs.61 This 10.44 
percent increase in prosecutorial resources was slightly higher than the 8.95 percent increase in 
Canada’s population during this period.62 The activities of federal criminal prosecutors are 
directed at drug offences. Figure 8.3 outlines the number of drug cases dealt with during the 
Harper administrations’ terms in office. 
Figure 8.3 
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From 2006–07 to 2011–12, drug possession, trafficking, importing, and production cases 
increased from 25,608 to 29,675 or 15.88 percent,63 outstripping the increase in the number of 
federal prosecutors and thereby decreasing the prosecutorial resources available for each case. 
During this period, the median length of time required to adjudicate drug possession cases 
increased slightly from 80 to 82 days, while the median time for other drug offences increased 
from 216 to 249 days. The median case time continued to rise after the volume of cases began to 
drop, reaching 99 days for drug possession cases in 2015–16 and 277 days for drug trafficking, 
importation, and production cases.64 
The other portion of the workload of federal prosecutors is the conduct of all criminal 
code cases in Canada’s three northern territories. Volume of these cases steadily increased until 
2010–11 before beginning to decline. There were 3,429 criminal code cases in these territories in 
2006–07 compared to 3,478 in 2015–16. In Yukon and Nunavut, the median time to deal with a 
case exhibited a pattern similar to the volume of cases, while in the Northwest Territories the 
median case time continued to rise as volume decreased.65 
In summary, the Harper administrations’ record on the two aspects of the court system 
for which it controlled resource allocation was mixed. The priority attached to appointing judges 
appears to have been influenced by the existence of controversy and the electoral cycle. 
Personnel numbers for federal prosecutors increased at a rate slightly above population increases. 
During the first half of the Harper administrations’ mandate, federal prosecutors faced increased 
workload resulting from increased case volume. Prosecutorial workload was subsequently 
lightened by a reduction in the number of cases. Throughout the period, the median time required 
to adjudicate a case continued to increase at a rate higher than that experienced by criminal code 
offences prosecuted by provincial prosecutors. 
8.2.2.3. Fiscal Commitment for Jails and Prisons 
The relationship between funding for jails and prisons and a federal administration’s 
toughness on crime is ambiguous. At the most basic level, incarcerating more people creates the 
need for more cells and prisons. At the same time, resource allocation decisions can have 
contradictory effects. Increasing the number of prisoners without increasing the number of cells 
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results in more crowded conditions, poorer food and fewer educational, vocational, recreational, 
and therapeutic programming. In some instances, increased inmate numbers in the absence of 
increased physical capacity has resulted in family visiting rooms, libraries, and vocational 
training areas being converted into dormitory accommodation.66 Funding restraint can thus create 
a qualitative toughening of prison sentences. 
However, increased spending cannot automatically be equated with less harsh conditions. 
More money can result in more intrusive monitoring. Segregation or solitary confinement units 
and long-term segregated “super-max” facilities provide for “single-bunking,” but carry with 
them both a financial cost to the system and a psychological cost to the inmate. Further, 
admissions to correctional facilities are not controlled by the administrators of this system, but 
are instead determined by the interaction between legislatively prescribed sanctions, resources 
allocated to police, and the adjudication decisions of the courts. Finally, in Canada, only about 
40 percent of prisoners are held by the federal CSC and thus subject to resource allocation 
decisions by the federal government.67 
Any commitment for increased jail and prison resources to deal with the increased inmate 
numbers that could logically have been expected to arise from the myriad of “tough-on-crime” 
initiatives was absent in the 2006 Conservative election platform. The only indication directly 
related to the operation of jails and prisons was a commitment to “review the operations of the 
CSC with a view to enhancing public safety.”68 In its first budget speech, the new Harper 
administration said it was “setting aside funds to expand Canada’s correctional facilities to house 
the expected increase in the number of prisoners as a result of changes in sentencing rules.”69 
This was the only time prison capacity or resourcing was mentioned during a budget speech of 
the Harper administrations. 
The review of the operations of the CSC promised in the platform was completed in 
October 2007.70 The report contained recommendations that have been interpreted as attacking 
the human rights of prisoners and stressing punitive sanction over rehabilitation,71 although there 
were exceptions to the general punitive orientation. For example, a policy adopted in 2001 was 
criticized for requiring all prisoners convicted of murder to serve the first two years of their 
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sentence in a maximum security facility for denunciation and deterrence purposes regardless of 
the inmate’s actual security classification.72 The review panel report contained recommendations 
for increased capital expenditures to build new prison capacity, but the purpose was to replace 
existing capacity rather than to increase the overall supply of prison cells. The report did not 
contain any recommendation for, or mention of the need for, any actual increase in capacity. 
When the Harper administration assumed office, the CSC had a rated capacity for the 
incarceration of 14,261 prisoners. Of these cells, 737 (5.17 percent) were in facilities more than a 
century old and another 1,171 (8.21 percent) were in facilities more than 50 years old. The 
average age of in service facilities was 46 years. During the terms of the Chrétien and Martin 
administrations, most CSC construction had been directed at regional replacements for the 73-
year-old Prison for Women in Kingston, the 140-year-old Laval Institute, and the construction of 
several relatively small “healing lodges” for indigenous prisoners in the Prairie Region. The only 
major addition of core incarceration capacity was the 1998 opening of the Fernbrook Institute in 
Ontario, with a rated capacity of 404 medium security prisoners.73 
The 2007 review panel report recommended construction of new facilities to replace 
obsolete capacity. It suggested that newer facilities would improve conditions, but the primary 
stated motivation was increased operational efficiency and economy. Attention was drawn to 
facilities that lacked toilets in cells, resulting in a situation where “staff must release prisoners 
individually to use common facilities.”74 In 2012, the CSC announced the culmination of the 
capital spending program resulting from the recommendations of the review panel. A total of 
2,700 new incarceration spaces had been constructed.75 The new capacity allowed for the closure 
of two facilities in Kingston, Ontario that had been built in 1835 and 1855, and another in 
Quebec that had been built in 1961. Institutions with a rated capacity of 1,045, or 7.33 percent of 
the capacity when the Harper government assumed power, were taken out of service. After 
accounting for the replacement of this capacity, the actual increase in incarceration capacity was 
1,655 or 11.6 percent over the stock of prison cells in place when the Harper administration 
assumed office. During the same period, Canada’s population increased by 8.95 percent, 
resulting in a marginal increase in prison capacity per capita. 
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During the Harper administrations’ terms in office, some provinces engaged in 
construction of new jails. In his 2011 doctoral dissertation, Piché identified over three billion 
dollars in provincial prison construction ongoing or planned to create a capacity increase 
estimated between 6,312 and 7,348 new prison beds.76 As in the case of the federal capital 
program, some new provincial institutions replaced obsolete facilities. The largest capital 
projects in Toronto77 and Edmonton78 combined replacement with expansion. In the case of 
Edmonton, a remand facility with a rated capacity of 388 but a population of 800 was replaced 
with an institution with a rated capacity of 1,952.79 These two new facilities primarily house 
remand prisoners, the numbers of which are affected by decisions of police, prosecutors, and 
provincially appointed judges rather than any federal legislative change. 
Figure 8.4 outlines the spending on jails and prisons in Canada in constant (2002) dollars. 
There was an increase in federal spending on prisons during the first half of the Harper 
administrations’ tenure in government with an emphasis on capital expenditures. This was 
followed by a downward trend as the capital program instigated by the review panel report was 
completed. During the Harper administrations’ last full fiscal year in office, real federal spending 
on prisons was 4.33 percent higher than when it assumed office. This increase was less than half 
of the increase in Canada’s population. Real provincial spending on corrections increased by 
28.31 percent during this same period. 




Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Operating Expenditures for Provincial, Territorial and 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 252-0008. 
Figure 8.5 outlines the cost per day of incarcerating an inmate by jurisdiction. As noted 
earlier, increased spending can be used to either increase or reduce punitive conditions. 
However, spending levels do indicate a willingness of political decision-makers to devote 
resources to delivering a public service. During the Harper administrations’ tenure, real per 
inmate spending on incarceration increased in nine of the ten provinces, although only very 
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Source: Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Services, Operating Expenditures for Provincial, Territorial and 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 251-0018. 
In addition to the relative stability of federal spending on prisons, the secrecy of the 
federal capital spending program is noteworthy.81 Emblematic of the Harper administrations’ 
reluctance to engage in public debate about prison expansion is the announcement summarizing 
the results of the CSC capital program arising from the review panel report. Obsolete institutions 
that were being closed were identified, but there was no specific or disaggregated reporting of 
where capacity had been increased.82 This reticence to highlight, or even disclose, prison 
expansion contrasts with governmental behaviour in the United States. In the 1930s, the United 
States federal government chose the highly visible location of an island visible from downtown 
San Francisco for the site of its toughest prison as a symbolic statement of the expansion of its 
activities in fighting crime.83 During the three decades of dramatic growth in American 
incarceration, construction of new prisons was highly visible as politicians used their 












Daily Spending per Incarcerated Inmate by Jurisdiction
Constant 2002 Dollars
2006–07 and 2014–15 Comparison
2006-2007 2014-2015
  204 
construction as an indicator of their toughness on crime and communities competed for prisons 
as an economic development strategy.84 In some states, prison construction has been 
accompanied by interpretive museums at operating facilities to explicitly link prison construction 
with the promotion of community safety.85 The Harper administration did not engage in the 
celebration of the construction of prisons as part of its symbolic commitment to get tough on 
crime. Where prison construction was celebrated, the government’s focus was on the economic 
development and job creation benefits to communities rather than on the symbolic assertion of 
toughness.86 
8.2.2.4. Fiscal Commitment to Being Tough on Crime: Summary 
The tough-on-crime legislative commitment of the Harper administrations was not 
accompanied by a fiscal commitment. The 2006 election commitment for a cost-sharing program 
to increase the number of police officers was much more modest than a similar commitment by 
the federal government in the United States during the Clinton administration. In any event, the 
commitment was quietly abandoned. Commitment to providing prosecutorial and judicial 
resources for the components of the legal system within the purview of federal constitutional 
authority was modest and sporadic. 
There was some allocation of resources for new prison capacity. Almost half of this 
capital investment was directed to replacing capacity that was clearly obsolete. The remainder 
resulted in a capacity expansion that barely exceeded population increases. Unlike the aggressive 
and relentless promotion of legislative initiatives, resource allocation that did occur was done 
without being highlighted in communications vehicles such as budget speeches. In order to 
identify this construction, Piché needed to make extensive use of freedom of information 
requests.87 While the opening of new capacity was done quietly, the closing of institutions 
deemed obsolete was accorded a higher profile by the government.88 
The issue of resourcing was the subject of parliamentary debate. In the second reading 
debate on the Harper administrations’ legislation, the potential fiscal impact of the legislation 
and the lack of transparency on costing were the most common arguments raised by both Liberal 
(20.98 percent of arguments made) and NDP members (28.72 percent of arguments made). Bloc 
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Québécois members were much less focused on cost (9.55 percent of arguments made). 
Conservative members, on the other hand, almost never (1.49 percent of arguments made) 
focused on the fiscal impact of legislative initiatives. As a general practice, the government 
resisted providing estimates of the costs projected to result from the legislation.89 
In the absence of publicly accessible estimates of fiscal impact of legislative changes, the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) (a position created by the Federal Accountability Act 
passed during the first year of the Harper administrations) produced fiscal impact assessments of 
two tough-on-crime legislative initiatives. The PBO estimated that the changes in eligibility for 
conditional sentences contained in the Safe Streets and Communities Act would have resulted in 
an additional cost of $145 million if it had been in effect during the fiscal year 2008–09.90 The 
changes in the treatment of time served while in remand custody embodied in the Truth in 
Sentencing Act used a similar methodology based on the contra-factual scenario of this 
legislation being in effect during the 2007–08 fiscal year. The PBO estimated that the Truth in 
Sentencing Act would result in an expenditure increase in the range of one billion dollars per year 
by the CSC and approximately three billion dollars per year for provincial and territorial 
governments.91 The legislative changes were not followed by increases in incarceration or 
spending approaching the PBO estimates. It should be noted that while constructing their costing 
estimates, “CSC officials failed to meet with PBO during the time that the project was being 
undertaken. Undertaking this type of costing exercise without rigorous bottom-up data from the 
department, absent any discussion with the department (CSC), poses significant risks.”92 
Despite inaccurate predictions of the magnitude of fiscal costs of the Harper 
administrations’ legislative program, the PBO reports appear to have accurately identified the 
distribution of costs by government. In both of the legislative costing studies conducted, the PBO 
argued that the bulk of additional fiscal costs would be borne by provincial and territorial 
governments. This was a theme consistently taken up by opposition members in Parliament. 
These predictions about the federal government externalization of fiscal costs appears accurate, 
as demonstrated by the different trend lines in corrections expenditures outlined in Figure 8.4. 
However, the expressions of concern about the fiscal impact on provincial justice systems arising 
from legislative changes do not appear to have been a major issue for the provincial governments 
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themselves. The annual meetings of the federal, provincial, and territorial justice ministers 
featured regular complaints about the Harper administrations’ interpretation of its 2006 
commitment for cost-sharing of additional police officers and requests for additional federal 
funding for legal aid services. Even so, the financial impact of legislative changes on corrections 
was never officially raised by provincial justice ministers during Harper administrations’ 
tenure.93 In chapter 7, the differential justice outcomes by province were noted. This contrasts 
with the American experience. Each state entered the 1970s with a different incarceration rate, 
and the rate of growth in incarceration varied over the next three and a half decades. However, 
growth in incarceration occurred in every state.94 
A key driver in the uniformity and continuity of policy direction was the use of American 
federal funding power to provide grants for police professionalization and growth, prison 
construction, and sentencing reform initiatives beginning with the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Act grants program launched in 1968.95 Federal law enforcement granting programs even had a 
effect on academia with the creation of the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) aimed 
at increasing the educational level and professional training of police and correctional officers. 
Immediately prior to the institution of the program in 1968, there were 184 American colleges 
and universities with criminal justice programs. This increased to 1,500 in 1980. To assist with 
the production of qualified instructors for the programs, seven universities received LEEP 
funding to establish PhD programs in criminal justice.96 Quite simply, the Harper 
administrations’ commitment to tough-on-crime policies did not follow the American model of 
using the financial powers of the federal government to encourage provincial and municipal 
governments to increase punitive infrastructure. 
8.2.3. Sentencing Provisions and Symbolism 
Increasing legislatively prescribed sentencing ranges and imposing or increasing 
mandatory minimum sentences was clearly the major legislative focus of the Harper 
administrations. In addition to changes in the prescribed penalties for specific offences, such as 
street racing, use of firearms in the commission of crimes, drug trafficking, major fraud, and 
sexual offences against children, legislative changes to restrict the use of conditional sentences 
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also had the goal and effect of imposing incarceration outcomes in more cases. While these 
legislative changes certainly had punitive outcomes for some individuals convicted of these 
crimes, there are three grounds for arguing that this extensive legislative effort was at least partly 
symbolic. 
In some cases, the creation of new offences and new penalties simply represented a 
subdivision of existing offences. For example, creating the specific offence of criminal mischief 
toward war memorials is simply a situationally specific identification of the existing offence of 
mischief. 
In other cases, increases in penalties or imposition of a mandatory minimum sentences 
were narrowly prescribed. For example, the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentences for 
fraud was restricted to cases involving the misappropriation of over one million dollars. For drug 
offences, mandatory minimums were imposed in a circumstantially conditional way for factors 
such as using the property of a third party without permission or using children as agents. In 
most cases, judges would have treated these as aggravating conditions warranting more severe 
penalty even in the absence of the legislatively prescribed minimum. Further, mandatory 
minimum sentences were often established within the normal pre-existing sentencing range 
imposed by the court. Some individuals were adversely affected but little change was created in 
the total amount of incarceration for these offences. 
The third indicator of symbolic purpose to the program of legislatively increasing 
criminal sanction is the relatively small volume of criminal offences affected. In 2015, a total of 
2,118,681 offences were reported to police. A total of 258,209 or 12.19 percent were offences 
that could be potentially affected by either specific legislative increases to sentences or by the 
general impact of changes in eligibility for conditional sentences. A total of 586,305 individuals 
were charged in that year, with 101,952 or 17.39 percent facing charges potentially affected by 
the legislative changes.97 This estimate of the legislative changes potential coverage overstates 
the actual impact. For example, 94,425 incidents of fraud were reported by police. These resulted 
in 15,729 people being charged.98 The primary impact of legislative change on sentences was the 
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in cases involving the misappropriation of over 
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one million dollars. While it is unlikely that most of fraud cases in 2015 met this criteria, the data 
does not allow for a disaggregation so all cases were included in the estimate. The legislative 
toughening of punishments thus affected only one in five people charged. 
8.2.3.1. Case Study: Mischief to War Memorials 
On February 11, 2011, Conservative MP David Tilson introduced a private member’s 
bill, C-617. This bill created the crime of committing mischief on war memorials. It imposed a 
maximum sentence of 18 months incarceration for conviction on a summary charge and up to 
five years on an indictable charge. Regardless of how the Crown elected to proceed, Bill C-617 
provided for a mandatory minimum of a thousand dollar fine for a first offence, 14 days 
incarceration for a second offence and 30 days for subsequent offences.99 Like most private 
member’s bills, C-617 died on the Order Paper after first reading. Mr. Tilson reintroduced it in 
the next Parliament as Bill C-217. This time, with Conservative and Liberal support,100 it cleared 
third reading in the House of Commons before dying on the Order Paper in the Senate. The 
legislation was reintroduced a third time and received royal assent on June 19, 2014.101 
Prior to the passage of Bill C-217, people who committed mischief (vandalism) on war 
memorials were subject to prosecution under the general mischief provisions contained in 
Section 430 of the Criminal Code. This provides for a penalty for conviction on an indictable 
charge of up to ten years if the property is valued over five thousand dollars and a summary 
conviction penalty if the Crown proceeded on a summary basis. Mischief on less valuable 
property carried a maximum two-year period of incarceration for an indictable offence.102 In 
1995, the Chrétien Liberal administration introduced legislation adding the specific offence of 
mischief on a church or other place of worship that was motivated by hate. This carried the 
maximum penalty of ten years for a conviction on an indictable charge and 18 months for a 
conviction on a summary charge.103 Special crimes relating to mischief in relation to computer 
data104 and cultural property105 had also been added to the Criminal Code prior to the Harper 
administration assuming office. The precedent of creating specifically designated offences for 
mischief based on the nature of the target was therefore well established prior to Bill C-217.106 
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However, Bill C-217 differed from these other specially designated mischief offences because of 
the inclusion of mandatory minimum sentences. 
During the debate on Bill C-217, Conservative members listed examples where war 
memorials had been vandalized or treated with disrespect. It was acknowledged that penalties 
had been imposed under the general mischief provisions of the Criminal Code, but discontent 
was strongly expressed about cases where inebriated people had urinated on war memorials and 
received conditional sentences. The sponsor of Bill C-217 told the House of Commons, “It is 
time to take a stand against this desecration of our sacred memorials and punish those 
responsible for this type of destruction.”107 In opposing the bill, NDP members argued that the 
courts needed the capacity to distinguish between serious acts of destruction and inappropriate 
behaviour such as urination on the memorials. In the more minor cases, some mandated 
discussion with veterans had proven to be effective in changing both behaviour and attitudes. 
This was precluded by the mandatory minimum sentence.108 A lawyer appearing before the 
House Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights noted that the imposition of the 
mandatory minimum ensured a criminal record regardless of how minor the offence was or the 
success of any education arising from the charge.109 This line of argument prompted a 
Conservative committee member to observe, “I’m not at all convinced that the main point of this 
bill is deterrence. I believe it is more about denunciation. As a Parliament, we wish to send a 
message to Canadians that this conduct is abhorrent.”110 
The creation of the separate offence of mischief on war memorials has had a negligible 
impact on justice outcomes in Canada. In the five years since this offence was delineated from 
the general mischief provisions in the Criminal Code, a total of 1,379,624 cases of mischief have 
been reported to police. Of those, 12 involved war memorials. A total of 82,943 individuals have 
been charged with mischief offences—three of these charges for the special offence of mischief 
on war memorials.111 
8.2.3.2. Case Study: Quanto’s Law 
On May 12, 2014, the Minister of Justice introduced Bill C-35, the Justice for Animals in 
Service Act (Quanto’s Law).112 This legislation proceeded in fits and starts. After receiving all-
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party support and quick approval at second reading, Bill C-35 was not brought before the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights until April 27, 2015. Progress was then swift. 
The legislation received unanimous support in a recorded third reading vote on June 15113 and 
was introduced in the Senate on the same day. On June 23, 2015, Quanto’s Law was 
proclaimed.114 The legislation had taken 407 days to become law despite being unanimously 
supported in both the House of Commons and the Senate. 
Bill C-35 was named after an Edmonton police dog that was killed while assisting with 
the apprehension of a man who attempted to flee police after being stopped for driving a car with 
a stolen licence plate. Police Service Dog Quanto was released to catch the suspect and was 
fatally stabbed. The dog’s killer received a sentence of 26 months incarceration for a basket of 
charges, with the presiding judge specifying that 18 months of the sentence was attributable to a 
cruelty to animals charge for killing the dog.115 Despite this demonstration of the applicability of 
existing provisions in the Criminal Code to the case, Quanto’s handler lamented the lack of a 
specific law dealing with the killing of police dogs. Prime Minister Harper, accompanied by his 
wife and the Health Minister, travelled to Edmonton a short time later to announce the 
government would pass such a law. “This sends the message that violence against service 
animals is unacceptable and those who commit such callous acts will pay the consequences,” 
Harper said.116 
Quanto’s Law stipulated that the sentence for the indictable offence of killing or injuring 
a “law enforcement animal” or a service animal would range from a six-month minimum to 
maximum of five years incarceration. Conviction on a summary charge would carry a maximum 
sentence of 18 months incarceration and or a fine up to ten thousand dollars. Sentences under 
this provision are consecutive to the sentences of any other charges arising from the incident, and 
judges are instructed to give “primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and 
deterrence”.117 Prior to the passage of Bill C-35, those convicted of killing or injuring any animal 
without lawful excuse were subject to a maximum penalty of five years by indictment and 18 
months or a ten thousand dollar fine by summary charge.118 Bill C-35 left the maximum penalties 
unchanged but introduced a minimum for indictable charges, made any sentences automatically 
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consecutive, and specified the primary considerations in sentencing to be deterrence and 
denunciation. 
The parliamentary debate on Bill C-35 centred on the perception of heroism on the part 
of police dogs. While the second reading speeches of most tough-on-crime bills were made by 
Parliamentary Secretaries, Bill C-35 warranted the attention of the Justice Minister who said, 
“The intent of the bill is to elevate the importance of what these animals do, the service they 
provide, and the potential vulnerability that is present in their life because of their service.”119 
Passage of the legislation was presented as important as an act of societal denunciation. The 
Justice Minister said, “Sexually abusing a child or killing a police animal while it is conducting 
the task for which it is trained, in my view, requires serious denunciation…. This is one piece of 
legislation that transcends the lines of partisanship.”120 While making very muted protests 
against mandatory minimum sentences, the opposition parties joined in the celebration of police 
service animals. The NDP Justice Critic chastised the government for not going further in 
toughening criminal code provisions for those convicted of injuring or killing any animal. 
Pointing to two NDP-sponsored private member’s bills, she said under NDP legislation “animals 
would be considered people and not property.”121 
Committee hearings on Bill C-35 in both the House of Commons and the Senate 
consisted almost exclusively of a celebration of the virtues of police and service animals. The 
House of Commons Justice Committee summoned representatives of the Canadian National 
Institute for the Blind, the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies, and two police dog-
handlers as the sole expert witnesses. The Senate committee replicated this witness list, but did 
add two representatives from criminal defence lawyer organizations. The lawyer witnesses 
stressed their love of dogs and supported the creation of a special offence for police and service 
dogs. They did, however, question the deterrent value and potential unfairness of the mandatory 
sentence while noting that the existing cruelty to animal provisions of the Criminal Code had 
been adequate to send the killer of Quanto to jail for 18 months and the killer of another police 
dog, Breezy, for two years.122 
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For individuals, Bill C-35 has had more than symbolic effect. The first charge under the 
new legislation was laid in November 2015 after a police dog was injured in a raid on a home 
suspected of serving as an illegal gaming establishment. The accused faced the six-month 
mandatory sentence after the dog required five stitches.123 In Kingston, an inebriated young 
woman faced the same mandatory sentence for slapping the rear of a police horse during a 
Queen’s University Homecoming event. This charge was eventually downgraded to mischief.124 
As a symbolic statement celebrating service animals, Bill C-35 was successful for the 
government. A Google search of the term “Quanto’s Law” generates over 5,200 results. Almost 
all are positive about the legislation. From Ontario, there was some discontent that the law was 
not named after Brigadier, a police horse killed by a hit-and-run driver in 2006. The horse’s 
funeral had attracted over 1,200 mourners including Toronto’s mayor and Ontario’s Lieutenant 
Governor.125 Brigadier’s death had caused a Liberal MP to twice introduce private member’s 
bills similar to Bill C-35, albeit without the mandatory minimum sentence and the inclusion of 
non-police service animals.126 
The symbolic celebration of police animals surrounding the introduction and passage of 
Quanto’s Law does have implications. Police dogs can inflict considerable physical damage on 
humans.127 Revulsion at the use of these dogs on civil rights demonstrators is viewed as a turning 
point in public opinion around desegregation in the United States.128 In Canada, the use of police 
dogs using a “bite and hold” method is a not uncommon arrest tactic. Despite the injuries that 
this causes, courts have been “surprisingly tolerant of such violence”.129 Claims for redress have 
been rejected by the courts even when police dogs have injured innocent people sitting in their 
backyards130 or walking down the street to buy cigarettes.131 Once a police dog has been used to 
effect an arrest, it is often unclear whether resistance and/or flight is an attempt to resist arrest or 
an attempt to avoid being bitten.132 If the dog is injured in such a struggle, the person struggling 
with the dog is subject to an extra-legal hazard even if they were attacked in error or without 
cause. In the celebration of the nobility of police dogs surrounding the passage of Bill C-35, the 
harsh and violent uses of these dogs was rendered invisible or irrelevant. 
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8.2.4. Legal Processes and Symbolism 
The Harper administration did not undertake any comprehensive legislative reform of the 
rules or processes by which people are charged and judged for criminal offences. During this 
time, several specific measures were passed that affected the ease or speed with which people 
could be incarcerated. 
8.2.4.1. Reverse Onus for Bail 
In 2008, Bill C-2 or the Tackling Violent Crime Act added offences involving the use of 
firearms to the list of offences for which there was a reverse onus provision for bail 
applications.133 This has the effect of making release from pre-conviction custody more difficult 
to obtain for those charged with these offences. The provision fulfilled a 2006 election platform 
commitment.134 
8.2.4.2. Dangerous Offenders 
Bill C-2 also contained provisions to facilitate the process of declaring repeat violent or 
sexual offenders as long-term or dangerous offenders.135 The legislation also provided for an 
indeterminate period of incarceration for those convicted of breaching a long-term supervision 
order.136 The provisions fulfilled a 2006 election platform commitment.137 
8.2.4.3. DNA Testing 
In 2011, Bill C-10 or the Safe Streets and Communities Act added two offences for which 
the provision of DNA samples for testing was compulsory.138 
8.2.4.4. Possession for the Purposes of Trafficking 
The drug trafficking and production provisions in the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
facilitated convictions in addition to changing sentencing provisions by linking the “purposes of 
trafficking” to specific, measurable quantities of drugs.139 
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8.2.4.5. Citizen’s Arrest 
In 2012, Bill C-26 or the Citizen’s Arrest and Self-Defence Act expanded the legal ability 
of citizens to make arrests.140The legislation was introduced in response to the controversial case 
of a Toronto shop owner who was charged with a range of criminal offences after seizing, 
binding, and restraining a person who had been stealing from his store.141 
8.2.4.6. Online Crime 
In 2014, Bill C-13 or the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act contained 
provisions for police to obtain an order compelling people or internet service providers to 
preserve electronic data or a warrant to produce this information.142 The purpose was to facilitate 
police obtaining electronic evidence for the investigation and prosecution of crimes such as 
cyberbullying, spreading hate propaganda, and spreading computer viruses. The legislation also 
provided for the issuing of warrants to allow police to install tracking devices on things normally 
carried by people in order to track personal movements during investigations.143 
8.2.4.7. Not Criminally Responsible 
In 2014, Bill C-14 or the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act specified that public 
safety was to be the “paramount consideration” when deciding whether people who had been 
found not criminally responsible for a crime because of a mental disorder should be released.144 
The legislation also provided for a “high risk” designation for such people and for the 
involvement of victims in the adjudication process that determined whether such people would 
be released from secure-custody treatment facilities.145 The legislation was first introduced as 
Bill C-54 in 2013. In introducing the legislation, the Justice Minister stressed a public safety 
rationale and stressed that the bill did “not seek to impose penal consequences on people who 
have been found by the courts to be not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.”146 
However, the legislation was explicitly intended to maintain restrictions on the liberty of people 
who had not been criminally convicted of a crime but whose medical condition—which could be 
cured or taken under control—caused a normally criminal act. The legislation was introduced in 
response to controversies arising from the easing of restrictions on a man who had beheaded a 
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fellow passenger on a bus and a doctor who had stabbed his two young children. Both had been 
found not criminally responsible for their actions and both had been deemed by medical 
professionals to be no longer a risk to the community, subject to monitoring.147 
8.2.4.8. Legal Processes and Symbolism: Summary 
The Harper administration did not attempt any comprehensive change in legal processes. 
The functioning of the justice system operated as found. Changes that were made were tough on 
crime in direction but affected relatively few people. The only change that appears to be part of 
an integrated policy process are the changes in the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act 
in which the government responded to a changing technological and social environment with a 
package of changes to criminal law. Other changes appear to be more symbolically responsive to 
public controversies. The reverse onus for bail in cases involving the use of firearms and the 
changes to dangerous offenders’ legislation originated from the Conservative Party of Canada’s 
2006 election platform. The changes to provisions governing arrests made by citizens and the 
treatment of those found not criminally responsible were made in explicit response to cases of an 
extremely rare but highly controversial nature. As such, they were ideal candidates for symbolic 
legislation as the government promised to prevent events that were unlikely to occur with any 
regularity in any event. Finally, in the legislation dealing with bail provisions and those found 
not criminally responsible, the legislative changes had the explicit objective of maintaining 
carceral or quasi-carceral sanctions for people who have not been convicted of any criminal 
offence. In both cases, the government was careful to insist that the policy goal was public safety 
rather than punishment. 
8.3. Forging Political Consensus and Symbolism 
The passage of legislation is one stage in the process of enacting a governmental 
program. If there is political will to create long-lasting transformative change, chances of success 
are increased if proponents work to forge a broad political consensus so that a subsequent 
government will not overturn the legislative initiative. It will also create and strengthen 
institutions that will work to ensure a continuation of the policy direction.148 The record of the 
Harper administrations in pursuing the tough-on-crime program was weak in both these areas. 
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As outlined in discussion of the passage of specific pieces of legislation in chapter 5 and 
in the discussion of the timing of legislation, opposition parties supported most items in the 
tough-on-crime legislative program. In the two minority Parliaments, passage was predicated on 
obtaining support from at least one opposition party. This was almost always available. The basis 
existed for forging a broad political consensus by accentuating the points of agreement. Almost 
always, however, members of the Harper administrations accentuated cleavages in order to argue 
that the opposition parties were “soft on crime.” The introduction of legislation was very often 
presented as an ultimatum in which the choices were immediate passage or portrayal as being 
opposed to the safety of Canadians. On occasion, alleged obstruction of legislation was 
fabricated. For example, mandatory minimum sentences for sexual offences against children 
were initially passed during the Martin Liberal administration. The Harper administration made 
no effort to increase these mandatory minimum sentences until it introduced Bill C-54 on 
November 4, 2010, or 1,676 days after the first parliamentary sitting day of a Harper 
administration. Despite being unopposed by any opposition member, even to the extent of calling 
for a recorded vote, the increases in the minimum mandatory sentences were not passed prior to 
Parliament being dissolved for the 2011 general election. The lack of passage was blamed on 
“obstruction from the Ignatieff-led Coalition – true to its soft-on-crime ideology”.149 The 
platform proclaimed “enough is enough” and promised that “a Stephen Harper-led majority 
government will bundle these bills into comprehensive legislation and pass them within the new 
Parliament’s first 100 days.”150 
Opposition members regularly complained that Conservative members were more 
interested in creating cleavages for partisan advantage than in the expeditious passage of 
legislative initiatives. The politics of cleavage reached a rhetorical culmination when the 
Minister of Public Safety responded to a technical question on increased powers to police for the 
interception of electronic communications by telling a Liberal member, “He can either stand with 
us or with the child pornographers.”151 Maltzman and Shipan argue that inter-party consensus 
and participation in the legislative process is a key predictor of the long-term durability of 
legislative initiatives.152 The parliamentary tactics of the Harper administrations were clearly 
biased in favour of short-term partisan advantage over the longevity of its initiatives. In 
consequence, one of the top-ranked instructions given by Prime Minister Trudeau to the Justice 
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Minister following a change in government in 2015 was to “conduct a review of the changes in 
our criminal justice system and sentencing reforms over the past decade.”153 
In addition to forging partisan consensus, those implementing a legislative program can 
create and strengthen institutional support for the program’s continuation.154 In the United States, 
the federal fiscal support embodied in early tough-on-crime legislative initiatives expanded 
political constituencies of police and corrections workers which became actors in lobbying for 
additional punitive measures,155 such as the implementation of California’s “three strikes” law.156 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one indicator of the symbolic nature of the Harper 
administration’s tough-on-crime program was the relative absence of a fiscal commitment. This 
had the additional contra-factual effect of a failure to expand the size and political weight of 
occupational groups with a self-interested reason for promoting additional punitive measures. 
8.4. Conclusion 
For the Harper administrations, the tough-on-crime program contained a rich vein of 
potential symbolic acts to be mined as it sought to build and maintain enough political support to 
form a majority government. The Conservative members formed government with an 
accumulated stock of outrages that could be symbolically addressed. On many of these items, 
there was substantive overlap in interpretation with the platforms of other major parties. Quick 
passage of a reasonably comprehensive package was likely possible even in a minority 
Parliament. In marked contrast to the tough-on-crime initiatives, this occurred in the 
implementation of the Conservatives’ fiscal or taxation and democratic reform platform 
commitments.157 Esselment characterizes the slow progress of this legislation as having become 
“bogged down”.158 More likely, the slow pace of reform was at least partially intentional as the 
platform was disaggregated to produce a series of symbolic acts. As the platform commitments 
were eventually passed, the normal unfolding of events periodically generated controversies in 
which people were outraged or frightened by the unusual and despicable acts. The Harper 
administration was alert to these opportunities to pass legislation that often affected very few 
people but which provided a symbolic statement of the government protecting the safety of 
Canadians. 
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9. Conclusion: The Dog That Did Not Bark 
This dissertation began with the observation of a disconnection between the stated intent 
of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice policies and the substantive result. In the 2006 
election, the CPC made getting tough on crime one of the central features of their election 
platform. To a degree, they were joined by the Liberal Party and the NDP. At least in English 
speaking Canada, there appeared to be a consensus among political strategists that voters were 
concerned about the harm arising from criminal acts and that increased incarceration levels were 
required. This commitment to getting tough on crime was reflected in the legislative program of 
the Harper administrations as a large volume of tough-on-crime bills were introduced and 
passed. Despite this, on a per capita basis, incarceration rates in Canada remained stable while on 
a per-offense basis, incarceration rates increased across Canada, but with a high degree of 
variation between provinces. Canada did not witness the massive growth in incarceration 
experienced in the United States for two and a half decades beginning in the early 1970’s. As a 
result of this observation, two interdependent research questions were posed: 
1. Given the volume of tough-on-crime legislation, why did the Harper administrations have 
a muted substantive impact on incarceration rates? 
2. Given the modest substantive effect, why did the Harper administrations continue to 
make tough-on-crime legislation a cornerstone of their political agenda? 
9.1. Key Empirical Findings 
The first empirical task faced in the conduct of this study was to assess whether the 
stability in incarceration rates reflected stability in the disposition of criminal charges or whether 
it was a statistical artifact of factors such as population changes, rates of criminal offending or a 
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change in the composition of criminal offences. I argue that the substantive effect of the 
legislative changes appears muted rather than non-existent. When accounting for the ongoing 
drop in the rate of reported criminal offences, incarceration rates increased slightly during the 
Harper administrations’ tenure. The modest increase in incarceration rates began prior to 
Harper’s assumption in office. When examined by guilty cases rather than by population or the 
number of offences, the data suggests that there was a small increase in the likelihood of a person 
convicted of a criminal offence being incarcerated. This was offset by a reduction in the average 
length of incarceration. The net result was a modest decline in the total level of incarceration per 
person convicted. The clear exception to this general finding of either stability or softening in the 
response to those convicted of criminal offences was in the trafficking, importation or production 
of illicit drugs. The toughness of the response to these offences increased during the tenure of the 
Harper administrations. The other probable exception to the stability or softening of response to 
people convicted of sexual offences against children. In this case, the available aggregate data is 
ambiguous. However, drug offences and sexual offences against children constitute only a small 
portion of total criminal offences, charges, and convictions. The primary empirical conclusion is 
that there was only modest substantive change in carceral outcomes during the Harper era. 
The conclusion that the initial observation of relative stability in incarceration rates 
resulted primarily from stability in treatment rather than being a statistical artifact arising from 
changes in population or rates of criminal offending justified detailed examination of the causes 
of this muted outcome. The findings were can be subsumed under two headings. The first is that 
the federal government lacked the power to directly dictate outcomes in the Canadian criminal 
justice system. The second is that the actions of the Harper administration were not always 
consistent with the stated objective of getting tough on criminals. 
9.1.1. Empirical Findings of Systemic Limitations on Federal Powers 
Two key limitations on the power of a federal governmental administration to achieve 
outcomes desired by the federal government were identified. The first was the manner in which 
the courts adjudicated individual cases. The second was the manner in which provincial 
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governments administered the aspects of the justice system under their jurisdiction, with specific 
reference to the direction given to prosecutors. 
Judges are responsible for evaluating the facts of each case against the legislatively 
prescribed sentencing ranges, the objectives of sentencing enumerated in Section 718 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada and past decisions. It was found that judges offer a different set of 
justifications for the adjudication of individual cases than do legislators involved with 
establishing the range of permissible sentences. The judicial approach of weighing the facts of 
the current case against the facts and sentences of past cases results in judicial change being 
slower and more incremental than politically driven change. This crystallized in a number of 
cases where the Harper administrations’ prescribed mandatory minimum sentences were found 
to be in violation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis of comparability with 
sentences imposed in the past. 
The examination of interprovincial incarceration rates and case outcomes revealed 
variation between provinces even with a common legislative framework. This difference in 
carceral outcomes is consistent with different directives issued to prosecutors. For tough 
legislation passed by the federal government to have tough outcomes, there must be tough policy 
direction to prosecutors. The centrality of this was illustrated by the comparative case study of 
Ontario and Manitoba. In Ontario, where prosecutors were not issued tough direction, 
incarceration rates remained stable. In Manitoba, where prosecutors were directed to respond to 
legislative changes in a tough fashion, incarceration rates doubled. 
9.1.2. Empirical Findings Pointing to Goals Other Than Getting Tough 
While the members of the Harper administration often proclaimed their commitment to 
tough measures and introduced a large volume of legislation that had the stated intention of 
toughening Canada’s response to convicted criminals, their actions were not always consistent 
with a program of getting tough. 
The most important disconnection between the proclaimed goal of getting tough on crime 
and governmental action was in the allocation of resources. Locating, arresting, convicting and 
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incarcerating those who commit criminal acts is expensive. The Harper administration appeared 
unwilling to provide the financial resources necessary for a tough-on-crime program to be 
implemented. Its financial commitment to police, courts and corrections was lower than the 
commitments American governments were willing make in getting tough. Even where money 
was spent in corrections, transparency was limited. A 2006 election commitment to fund 
additional police officers was reneged upon. 
In the absence of a major fiscal commitment to implementing its tough-on-crime 
program, the members of the Harper administration relied primarily on legislative change. Even 
here, actions were sometimes inconsistent with the stated goal of toughness. The legislative 
program was divided into many components and introduction was spread over many years. Once 
legislation was introduced into Parliament, passage was sometimes pursued in a very desultory 
fashion, even where support or acquiescence from opposition parties existed. Announcements of 
action appeared often take precedence over acts to secure passage in an expeditious fashion. The 
substance of the legislation sometimes promised little substantive effect. Existing offences were 
subdivided to create new offences; laws were proposed to increase punishments for high profile, 
but very rare, offences; and mandatory minimum sentences were stipulated that were within the 
sentencing ranges already being imposed by the courts. Taken together, it appears that much of 
of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice legislation was driven by the desire to create the 
impression of toughness rather than to actually increase carceral outcomes. 
9.2. The Evidence and its Limitations 
A multi-faceted argument was made in this dissertation. This necessitated the utilization 
of a wide variety of data sources to be used as evidence. The four most important were the 
surveys and compilations of administrative data conducted by the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics and reported in Statistics Canada’s CANSIM series (acts of those committing crimes, 
police and the courts); the record of legislative acts presented on the Parliament of Canada’s 
LEGISinfo website (legislative acts of elected officials); the Hansard record of parliamentary 
debate (utterances by elected officials); and the compilation of judicial decisions compiled by the 
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Canadian Legal Information Institute (CANLII) (a combination of utterances and acts by 
judges). 
9.2.1. Statistics Canada’s Criminal Justice Statistics 
Statistics Canada’s presents data on incarceration, criminal offences reported to the 
police, and the results of court decisions in a series of sortable CANSIM tables. Analysis is 
limited to the categories established by Statistics Canada and is confines the user to descriptive 
statistics. Linkage between the data sets is impossible (i.e., tracking a case from offence to 
charge to court appearance to incarceration). Some of the data sets report on the basis of a 
calendar year while others report on the basis of the governmental fiscal year. This makes the 
means that rates combining data from different reporting series can only be estimates. 
The data on incarceration admissions and inmate census are appear accurate since they 
report on the counting of things that are easily countable. The statistics on criminal offences 
almost certainly under-report the actual incidence of criminal acts since they are based on 
individuals filing a complaint when they are victimized. 
The aggregate data on court results based on the ICCS is the most problematic since 
provinces began reporting at different times; coverage is incomplete because superior courts in 
several provinces still do not report; the complexity of the possible mixture of charges and past 
criminal records of those convicted cannot be controlled for; the election decisions by 
prosecutors for hybrid offences is not reported; and there is a lag between the commission of the 
offence and the disposition of the case. In this dissertation, I made the necessary assumption that 
the volume of cases mitigate against unobserved changes in these factors from biasing results. 
However, like all assumptions, this could be false. As a result, the analysis of trends in toughness 
in sentencing should be treated with some caution. However, these findings produce results are 
generally consistent with the more reliable data on incarceration. 
9.2.2. Record of Legislative Acts 
The Parliament of Canada tracks action on each stage of the legislative process. A high 
degree of certainty can be attached to the recording of these acts. 
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9.2.3. Record of Legislative Utterances 
The Parliament of Canada records, transcribes and provides French/English translation 
for all recognized speakers in both House of Commons and Senate debate and in committee 
hearings conducted by both legislative bodies. Arguments made in second reading speeches were 
coded and counted to identify the importance of different substantive arguments. Speeches and 
testimony of committee witnesses were also read to identify expressions of salient arguments. 
While problems of audibility and potential for minor editing exist, the largest problem with this 
source of data is the purpose to which it was put in this dissertation. The words being uttered and 
the justifications mounted during legislative debate was treated as an indication of the ends being 
pursued through legislative acts. As discussed in chapter 4, parliamentary debate often consists 
of the articulation of arguments that are arrived at in other forums and directed at audiences 
outside of the legislative body. It is possible that in some cases these statements are intended to 
conceal or distort the actual motivations for the legislative act. A richer source of data would be 
watching recordings or having access to the minutes of other deliberative bodies such as cabinet 
or party caucus meetings. These, however, are both legally and legislative inaccessible to 
researchers. In order to address the problem of utterances that are possibly intended to obscure 
rather than illuminate, I adopted the strategy of presenting both the arguments and acts in order 
to identify discrepancies. 
9.2.4. Court Rulings 
Relevant judicial decisions were selected from the CANLII data base collection 
(2,311,347 cases as of April 30, 2018)1 using a combination of keyword search and snowball 
sampling techniques. Coverage of cases is complete for the Supreme Court but becomes less 
complete the lower the level of court. As a result, the analysis in this dissertation is likely 
missing cases, particularly at the trial court level. 
The primary source of evidence for the substantive content of judicial rulings was the 
aggregated data compiled the ICCS and discussed above. The decisions examined were primarily 
analyzed as the utterances by judges and approached with the same combination of coding and 
selective identification of quotes used for the analysis of utterances by legislative actors. 
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9.3. Theoretical Implications of Empirical Findings 
This dissertation was informed by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and the theories 
of symbolic action developed by Murray Edelman. The explanatory power of these theoretical 
constructs will now be evaluated against in the empirical findings. 
9.3.1. Luhmann and the Problem of Systems Boundaries 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the essential aspect of Luhmann’s systems theory is 
that society is composed of a number of discrete systems each of which operates according to its 
own communicative code and systems logic. Each system processes the actions of other systems 
according to its own internal logic in an attempt to maintain the integrity of its own system’s 
boundaries and processes. One result is indeterminacy. As the political system chooses to deal 
with a perceived problem with the passage of legislation, the implementation and interpretation 
of this solution moves to other systems, most notably the system of law or the courts. These 
systems process the new legislative input according to their own logic with results that may be 
different from that envisioned by the political system. From this theoretical formulation, I 
suggest that one reason for the modest substantive effect of the Harper administrations’ 
legislative program was systemic limitations on the ability of a federal government 
administration to impose its will on the Canadian criminal justice system. Two systemic issues 
were dealt with, namely the court system and the system of the administration of justice. 
The record of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice initiatives before the courts 
supports Luhmann’s general theoretical propositions. Legislative initiatives were processed by 
the courts using different criteria than the political system. Even where words were the same, 
meanings appeared different. Proportionality for the courts meant the consistent treatment of like 
offences. For those in the political system, the concept was both broader and more imprecise as 
political actors attempted to establish proportionate penalties for unlike offences. Legislative 
initiatives were regularly modified or rejected by the courts through rulings on a series of cases, 
while controversial court rulings generated new political issues inviting legislative responses. 
The stresses between the two systems were evident in the volume of legislation modified or 
overturned by the courts, and by the unusually high level of acrimony between the federal 
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government administration and the judicial system. In this, it is worth noting that the federal 
government’s power to appoint judges as vacancies occur is not a tool sufficient for the political 
system to impose its will. 
Supreme Court judges appointed by Harper voted against the government’s interpretation 
of legislation on a majority of occasions. The sample is too small to be definitive, but it appears 
that the longer a Harper appointment was on the Supreme Court, the more likely he or she was to 
align with other judges than with the political interpretation of legislation. In the end, the Harper 
administration was deferential to the courts in accepting the results of Supreme Court decisions 
rather than using other constitutional or legislative powers to directly challenge the court’s 
authority. Once the government had removed a problem from the political system by passing 
legislation and announcing a problem as solved, there appeared to be little appetite for selecting 
the same problem once again for continued political controversy and solution. The system of law 
clearly operated to maintain the boundaries and internal processes. As one result, the substantive 
impact of much of the legislation was muted. However, as Habermas points out, the range of 
tolerance within the functioning of systems means that change can be induced without creating a 
systems crisis.2 While the courts appeared to have functioned to achieve autopoiesis, this should 
not be taken to imply the ongoing existence of a steady state. The operation of the political 
system during the Harper administrations did result in some changes to the decisions of courts, 
just as the operations of the courts affected political decisions. 
The more substantive problem exposed in Luhmann’s theoretical construct revealed in 
this analysis of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice policies arises from the actual 
boundaries of systems themselves. Luhmann suggests that “the state is the self-description of the 
political system.”3 The positing of the unity of the state and political system creates jurisdictional 
boundaries as a lacuna in analysis. As was discussed in chapter 7, a limitation on the powers of 
the Harper administrations’ ability to impose a tough-on-crime approach in a unified way across 
Canada was the constitutional authority over the administration of justice by provincial 
governments and the resulting differences in the exercise of prosecutors in different provinces. 
The system of politics is not embodied in “the” state but in several state systems each with 
jurisdictional boundaries that are constitutionally delineated and vigorously defended. Each 
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provincial government adopted a somewhat different response to the Harper administrations’ 
legislative initiatives, ranging from active support to resistance. As a result, the effect of the 
federal legislative regime was experienced in a differential fashion across Canada. 
The effect of the operations of the system of law (courts) and a portion of the system of 
politics (provincial governments) on the Harper administrations’ justice policies supports a 
systems-based explanation of the muted impact of the legislative initiatives. That is, the Harper 
administrations did not have more of a substantive effect because they lacked the power to 
impose their will. The implementation of their agenda was in the hands of others in different 
systems or subsystems. 
Unresolved with this approach is the question of effort. Changes to Canada’s criminal 
justice regime do not appear to have arisen in response to problems generated in other systems, 
most notably the economic. Further, the political emphasis on getting tough on crime originated 
during a period of declining crime rates. To address this question, I begin by noting Habermas’s 
argument that Luhmann bases the autonomy of the political system as a system on a 
differentiation between the administrative system and the legitimation system.4 This is held to 
present a problem by downplaying in the process of communication in both the identification of 
problems and the legitimization of decisions.5 Luhmann’s identification of the essential coding 
for the political system as the exercise of power and resistance hearkens back to Simmel’s 
conception that a relationship of superiority and subordination is an essential feature of human 
relationships even when lacking any sense of programmatic content.6 This ultimately causes 
Luhmann’s conception of the political system to become sterile. Problems are identified by the 
political system, processed according to a coding designed to maintain relationships of 
domination and subordination, and politically resolved by passing legislation that proclaims the 
problem to be resolved by moving it out of the political system. All of this leaves unaddressed 
the essential questions of why these particular problems were selected and why the particular 
responses were chosen. The closest Luhmann comes to dealing with this is a passing mention of 
the specificity of parliamentary democracy in a political system and the role of political parties 
therein. He notes that 
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Once the organization of political parties is consolidated, there is an organizational 
guarantee that no matter what the issue to be decided is, there will always be an 
opposition. The opposition is no longer disciplined by different alternative decisions but 
by the prospect of taking over government and of having to present a programme (which 
is feasible or, at least, acceptable and which could find sufficient political support).7 
This brief formulation introduces a cleavage into the system of politics. Within this 
system, different groupings labelled political parties compete for active support, or at least 
acquiescence, for the right to be in a position of power rather than subordinate and oppositional. 
This raises the possibility that the actions of a government administration are designed to 
maintain its position of superiority within the political system (in relation to other parties) as 
much as to maintain the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. The identification of this 
possibility is as far as Luhmann’s systems approach takes us. To explore the record of the Harper 
administrations’ criminal justice policies, we now explore this avenue using Edelman’s concept 
of symbolic action. 
9.3.2. Edelman and Contradiction Between the Efficacy of Symbolic and 
Substantive Action 
In earlier chapters, I argue that there was a level of symbolism in the Harper 
administrations’ tough-on-crime legislative initiatives. Legislative commitment was largely 
unaccompanied by fiscal commitment. The unfolding of the legislative program was slow and 
piecemeal, with the announcements accompanying the introduction of legislation appearing to be 
more important than actual passage. This is a practice that has been continued by the Trudeau 
administration with the limited number of initiatives to reverse tough measures passed during the 
Harper era. 
In the Harper era, legislation was primarily focused on sentencing rather than on criminal 
procedures that might have had more actual substantive effect. Even with the number of bills 
introduced and passed, the treatment of the vast majority of criminal offences—including those 
of most relevance to the protection of the person and property of Canadians—was not directly 
affected. As time went on, the legislative agenda became increasingly driven by controversial 
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cases. In short, there is clear support for the proposition that there was an element of symbolic 
action in the Harper administrations’ legislative program. 
From Edelman, I postulate that these symbolic actions were directed toward achieving 
the goal of building acquiescence to being ruled. The question that arises is “Acquiescence to 
whom or what?” Is it acquiescence to a relationship of domination and subordination of the 
political system as a whole (legitimization of the system) or is it acquiescence to rule by a 
particular group operating within this political system? As Luhmann hints, does the partisan 
organization of the political system in a parliamentary democracy transform the dynamic of rule 
and opposition into a struggle for acquiescence to the rule of a particular party rather than the 
legitimization of the system as a whole? The members of the parliamentary opposition during the 
Harper administrations had a clear and consistent answer to this question. On a very regular 
basis, they criticized tough-on-crime legislation as part of the Harper administrations’ strategy to 
mobilize and maintain political support for Conservatives. The opposition members claimed that 
partisan advantage was the primary purpose of legislative initiatives. When they perceived this as 
the acquiescence strategy of the government, the opposition members themselves made choices. 
They were not inevitably pushed into opposing the legislation. As was demonstrated in chapter 6, 
the members of opposition parties employed a range of strategies including active support for 
legislation, symbolic tokenistic opposition, deflection, and attempts to “out-bid” on toughness. A 
generalized critique of the overall tough-on-crime approach was accompanied by effective 
acquiescence to individual legislative initiatives. This acquiescence appears to have extended 
past the temporal boundaries of the Harper administrations, as the successor Trudeau 
administration has not reversed any of the tough-on-crime legislation passed during the 
preceding decade. 
Edelman postulates an inverse correlation between the importance attached to symbolic 
acts and substantive results, particularly resource allocations.8 At one level, that appears to have 
occurred with the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime legislative initiatives. Throughout its 
terms and into the election campaign in which it was eventually defeated at the polls, the Harper 
administrations devoted political energy to advancing the proposition that they were, in marked 
contrast to its partisan opponents, tough on crime. As it approached electoral defeat, 
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Conservative members were proposing new, largely symbolic, tough measures to differentiate 
from their political foes. However consistent the Conservatives were in pursuing this strategy to 
create ongoing acquiescence to their rule, the strategy itself appears to have become less 
effective over time. 
One reflection of this was the declining importance of tough-on-crime proposals in the 
election platforms of the major national political parties. In 2006, tough-on-crime measures were 
core components of the CPC platform and important parts of the Liberal and NDP platforms. By 
2015, tough elements were present, but not central. A decline in the power of tough-on-crime 
measures to mobilize partisan support appears to have been recognized by all national parties. 
Further, the Conservatives, who had invested political energy into transforming fear of crime 
into acquiescence to their rule, were defeated. In 2015, the NDP platform was considerably 
tougher than that of the Liberals, but the party was less successful in generating political support. 
Contrary to Edelman, a sustained program of symbolic mobilization on an issue produced 
declining returns in generating acquiescence. 
There are likely two major reasons for the diminution of the success of tough-on-crime 
symbolic action. The first is the experience of Canadians regarding crime itself. Unlike the 
beginnings of the American increased use of incarceration, the emergence of tough-on-crime 
politics in Canada occurred during a long-term decline in reported crime rates. This decline 
continued during the Harper administrations’ terms in office. The actual experience of being a 
victim of crime became less and less salient to most Canadians. The ability of symbolic action to 
mobilize fear appears to lose its potency as the substantive basis of these fears declines over a 
long period of time. 
The second reason is that the Conservatives’ use of both rhetoric and symbolic actions to 
mobilize political support on the basis of a fear of crime created a trap for themselves that 
became more dangerous the longer their term in power. Their basic narrative was that the safety 
of Canadians was endangered because of soft-on-crime policies of previous Liberal 
governments. Their tough legislative measures focused attention both on the danger and 
promised solution. At a certain point, the public is faced with either believing that the crime 
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problems have been solved and dangers reduced or being susceptible to an argument that the 
Conservative policies had failed. One way or the other, length of incumbency undermines the 
ability of a particular government to continue to use tough-on-crime initiatives as a basis for 
maintaining acquiescence to its rule. Edelman’s argument that substantive policy ineffectiveness 
serves to increase the potency and effect of symbolic action does not appear to be supported by 
the example of the Harper administrations’ justice policies. 
9.4. Policy and Sociological Practice Implications 
Tough-on-crime rhetoric and tough symbolic action for the purposes of being seen as 
tough ended fairly abruptly with the 2015 election. Since then, tough measures have been 
presented as being measures to achieve social justice rather than penal justice. The volume of 
tough proposals, both in the form of government and private member’s bills, has declined 
dramatically. When looking at the rise and fall of tough-on-crime politics in Canada, I am 
reminded of the narrative structure and pacing of kabuki theatre, with a slow scene beginning 
with the rise of and various permutations of the Reform Party using fear of crime as a central part 
of their appeal for political support, the slow adoption of this approach by all major national 
political parties, a period of intense and dramatic action, and the short, abrupt ending. For all the 
rhetoric and legislation, relatively little substantive change is visible. It is tempting to dismiss the 
entire episode merely as symbolic play-acting by politicians attempting to generate support for 
their party and acquiescence to their rule. It would, however, be a mistake to do so. 
While I have argued that the substantive effect of the Harper administrations’ legislative 
package was modest, it should not be implied from this that there was no effect. Sentences have 
gone up for some offences, most notably drug trafficking, production, and importation. The 
range of sentencing options has been restricted in ways that will produce perverse and harmful 
outcomes for some individuals even if the aggregate effect is small. Canada’s criminal justice 
system did become tougher, even if in a different order of magnitude than in the United States. 
The abrupt ending of the use of tough-on-crime measures to build political support has not been 
accompanied by any rollback of the measures, even the most egregious, passed during the Harper 
administrations. For example, changes to Canada’s system of pardons or record suspensions 
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were not part of the 2006 Conservative platform and explicitly did not form part of the Harper 
administrations’ early plans. The legislative changes arose because of a single controversial case. 
On the one hand, it was a classic case of symbolic action—but one that did have some effects on 
people whose criminal activity was far in the past. Despite this, and despite the explicit 
recognition by the Trudeau administration of harm being caused, two years have passed without 
even the introduction of proposals for change. 
Even with the end of tough-on-crime politics, Canadian justice policies appear to be a 
one-way valve. It seems far easier to generate tough legislation than to reverse the flow of 
punitive measures. If social and political circumstances change such that tough measures are 
once again perceived as a viable method of building political support for a political party, new 
tough measures will begin from a higher level of punitiveness than was the case slightly over a 
decade ago. 
9.4.1. The Difficulty and Indeterminacy of Change 
The muted effect of the Harper administrations’ tough-on-crime agenda illustrates the 
limitations of a government to impose, by political and legislative means, specific outcomes in 
the handling of those accused of committing criminal acts. There is not a single justice system, 
but rather systems of legislation passing, enforcement and adjudication. In Canada, each of these 
are fragmented by the jurisdictional boundaries inherent in a federal state. During the years of the 
Harper administrations, this systemic complexity appears to have contributed to the muting of 
the effect of legislation that had express punitive intent. However, it is possible that the existence 
of multiple systems can amplify rather than mute substantive impact. During the Harper era, the 
government of Manitoba, within a system of politics bounded by its own geographical and 
jurisdictional boundaries, chose to pursue its own tough-on-crime policies simultaneous to those 
of the federal government. The result was a increase in incarceration rates within that province. 
The results of the Harper era legislative change were very different in Manitoba and Ontario. It 
cannot be assumed that one result is inevitable. 
The writing of this dissertation occurs against the backdrop of a growing recognition in 
the United States that the level of incarceration in that country has become too high for both 
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moral and pragmatic reasons. This recognition has not yet produced a sustained attempt at 
national politically driven change, but it is possible this impulse will emerge. The Canadian 
experience outlined in this dissertation point to some political and policy challenges inherent in 
the task of reducing American incarceration levels. The first is the power of tough-on-crime 
appeals for political support. In a several successive Canadian federal elections, all major 
political parties made tough-on-crime commitments a major part of their appeal for electoral 
support, at least in English speaking Canada. Support (demand) for specific tough-on-crime 
initiatives can emerge very quickly in response to high profile, controversial cases even if these 
types of cases are very rare. The second challenge is the increased fragmentation of the 
jurisdiction over criminal justice in the United States as compared to Canada. Instead of one 
criminal code and eleven jurisdictions responsible for some aspect of the administration of 
justice and the operation of carceral institutions, in the United States there are fifty-one of each. 
This magnifies the possibility that some systems will pursue tough-on-crime initiatives. Finally, 
there is more similarity between the systems of politics and law in the United States than in 
Canada. Judges and prosecutors in Canada are appointed with a high degree of security of tenure, 
while in the United States most are elected. A comparative analysis of the justifications provided 
for decisions was beyond the scope of this study, but it is reasonable to suggest that different 
systems imperatives will produce different behaviours within these systems. 
In the end, the fundamental policy implication of this dissertation is the recognition of 
complexity in causing changes in the response to criminal acts. Whether someone believes 
incarceration rates are too high or too low, whether they believe the response to those convicted 
of criminal acts is too tough or too soft, causing directive change requires much more than the 
passage of a piece of legislation. The operations of several distinct but closely coupled systems 
work to produce indeterminate results. 
9.4.2. The Relationship Between Ends and Results 
As was discussed in chapter 2, a substantive portion of the literature dealing with the 
Harper administrations’ response to the handling of criminal acts is flawed in that it begins by 
assuming that Canadian incarceration rates increased during this era. The authors of this work set 
240 
out to explain what had not happened. In addition to a lack of rigour, such analysis is an 
indication of problem of sociological analysis embedded within a sociological conception of an 
act. As discussed in chapter 3, Parsons posited an act as a type of activity oriented to the 
achievement of a particular end. However, as Parsons noted, almost every act can be divided into 
several unit acts. He argued that these unit acts will be unified by a commitment to an ultimate 
end. As such, consistency of effort is expected. If action is successful – that is, if it achieves the 
desired ends – a congruence between ends and results will be achieved. From this expectation, 
the trap of treating stated intention as equivalent to substantive result is created. 
The findings of this dissertation challenge the Parsonian expectation of unity of purpose 
between the ends of the unit acts and the ultimate act. Informed by Luhmann, I argue that 
different actors involved in producing a final substantive result are not guided by the same ends. 
In this case, political actors in the national political system may have differing ends than those in 
provincial political systems. Those adjudicating individual cases have somewhat different ends 
than those involved in creating the legislative framework. There is, in short, no unified chain of 
unit acts guided by a single normative end. The problem of consistency becomes more acute 
when, informed by Edelman, it is observed that even the same actor may have different ends for 
different unit acts. It cannot be assumed that the series of unit acts, even by the same person, will 
be guided by a single ultimate end. In this instance, this point was illuminated by the potential 
contradiction between the ends of creating acquiescence to the exercise of political power and 
the ends of substantively getting tough on those who commit criminal acts. Intentions cannot be 
imputed from results, and results are not necessarily an accurate reflection of intentions. 
9.5. A Note on the Author’s Normative Position on Incarceration 
Whether for the stated purpose of deterrence, incapacitation, denunciation or 
rehabilitation, punishments for criminal acts are in fact punishments. They are intended to cause 
physical or psychic pain to the individual who is the recipient of the punishment.9 That is the 
nature of punishment. 
This dissertation was about the infliction of pain on those convicted of committing 
criminal acts, and the political claim that the level of this pain should be increased. I attempted to 
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conduct an analysis of the record of the Harper administrations’ dispassionately. However, I 
personally believe that the self-conscious and deliberate infliction of individual pain by the state 
is an activity that is sometimes necessary because some acts by individuals cause harm to others. 
Further, responses such as incapacitation can be undertaken with a non-punitive purpose but will 
inevitably have punitive effect. It is also possible to impose punishments that are both morally 
wrong and pragmatically unnecessary or harmful. Therefore, the imposition of punishments 
should be done cautiously and judiciously. Attempting to judge the “right” level of pain for an 
individual offender is a complex and difficult matter of evaluating facts and prioritizing 
sometimes contradictory objectives. Establishing and implementing policies that shape the 
aggregate level of state-imposed punitive pain is even more complex and difficult. Conceptually, 
this level of pain can be too little, about right or too much. Deciding what level of incarceration 
conforms to each of these standards involves both pragmatic and ethical considerations. I do not 
pretend to have the answer to this question from either a personal or policy perspective. I believe 
that the incarceration levels in some states in the United States are clearly too high both from a 
pragmatic and ethical perspective. However, I simply do not know if the level of state-induced 
punitive pain in Canada is too little, about right or too much. As a result, I neither agree nor 
disagree with the overall stated objectives of the Harper administrations’ criminal justice 
policies. When evaluating individual pieces of legislation, some appear to make a reasonable 
amount of sense on both pragmatic and ethical grounds. Other legislative initiatives, to me, fail 
one or both of these tests. When looking at the record as a whole, it seems to me that the fears 
this type of political action and legislative program had the potential to create a pathological and 
immoral level of incarceration were not groundless. To date, these fears have not come to 
fruition, but I share the common conclusion reached by Webster and Doob who strongly opposed 
the stated goals of the legislative program and Kheiriddin who supported them. I too believe that 
the long-term results are still indeterminate. 
1 Canadian Legal Information Institute, “Scope of Databases,” https://www.canlii.org/en/databases.html (accessed April 30, 
2018). 
2 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimization Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 3. 
3 Luhmann, Social Systems, 463.  
4 Habermas, Legitimization Crisis, 132.  
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10. Epilogue: The Trudeau Administration’s Criminal Justice Policies
In earlier sections, the Harper administrations record on criminal justice has been 
examined against its own rhetorical standard, against the policies adopted in the United States, 
and against an ideal type construct of the essential features of a tough-on-crime policy. Against 
each standard of comparison, the Harper administration produced relatively muted results and, in 
many cases, appears to have taken actions for symbolic rather than substantive reasons. The 
defeat of the Harper administration in 2015 and its replacement with the Liberal administration 
led by Justin Trudeau offers a fourth basis of comparison—that is, with the successor regime to 
the Harper administration. This epilogue will briefly survey the criminal justice policies of the 
Trudeau administration from its assumption of office on November 4, 2015, through to 
December 31, 2017. 
In the 2015 election campaign, the CPC focused on their record of fiscal and economic 
management. However, tough-on-crime proposals played an important secondary part in their 
appeal for support. Predominately, this appeal was based on past actions and orientation in 
changing a justice system that “had its priorities backward: it focused on the so-called ‘rights’ 
and concerns of criminals while victims and their families were left outside looking in.”1 This 
tough record was used to differentiate itself from the Liberals who were alleged to “allow the 
sale of marijuana in corner stores, making it more accessible to children” and the NDP’s 
“dangerous ideologically driven criminal justice policy that puts the so-called ‘rights’ of 
criminals ahead of the rights of victims.”2 Despite the rhetorical positioning, the CPC platform’s 
specific policy proposals were relatively muted and not universally tough in approach, as the 
platform included assistance for parents in dealing with drug consumption by their children and 
resources for suicide prevention in the “safe streets” section. Tough proposals were focused on 
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dealing with criminal gangs, protecting seniors from financial fraud, and passage of a handful of 
pieces of tough legislation introduced in Parliament just prior to the election call. 
The NDP platform described the Conservative record on crime as “failing,” leaving 
“middle-class families less safe.”3 In contrast to the Conservative approach of legislative 
initiatives, the promised NDP tough approach centred on providing more resources for law 
enforcement. The centrepiece was an unacknowledged revival of the unfulfilled 2006 
Conservative promise for federal funding for 2,500 more police officers.4 The Liberals avoided 
any general critique of the Harper administrations’ justice policies. Their central proposal was 
the legalization of cannabis. This signature soft proposal was posed in tough language, with a 
promise to “create new, stronger laws to punish more severely those who provide it to minors, 
those who operate a motor vehicle under its influence, and those who sell outside of the new 
regulatory framework.”5 Other Liberal tough proposals centred on domestic violence and the use 
of firearms to commit crimes.6 In 2015, tough-on-crime issues were not abandoned, but were a 
faint echo of the 2006 campaign. 
With the election of the Trudeau administration, the strategy of using tough-on-crime 
legislation to build acquiescence to the rule of the party in power appears to have abated, at least 
temporarily. The introduction of tough legislation continued, albeit at a much slower pace. 
Legislation making the presence of hate in crimes against transgendered people an aggravating 
factor in sentencing7 was passed expeditiously with the Conservative members split on the 
issue.8 Legislation with the stated objective of combating human trafficking was introduced on 
February 9, 2017,9 but as of December 31, 2017, has not been brought back for second reading.10 
Measures to expedite the criminalization of drugs, allow customs officials to inspect more 
packages, and make asset forfeiture easier have been passed,11 while measures that will limit the 
ability of those accused of sexual assault to present a defence12 have received third reading in the 
House of Commons and were before the Senate as of December 31, 2017. 
These tough provisions are not presented as an overall tough-on-crime strategy. Indeed, 
sometimes the tough provisions are hidden. The tough drug measures were contained in 
legislation that also eased the approval process for safe drug injection sites. This soft measure 
245 
was highlighted by both Liberal and Conservative members in the debate on the legislation.13 
Tough measures are also presented as progressive responses required to combat social ills, such 
as violence against transgendered people14 or women.15 There is not enough evidence to identify 
a trend, but it appears that while the Harper administrations’ tough measures focused on carceral 
sanctions, the Trudeau administration is more inclined to use the forfeiture of assets as a 
sanction.16 It also appears to be more likely to reduce the ability of an accused to present a 
defence.17 
A change in political approach to tough-on-crime measures is also reflected in private 
member’s bills. During the first two years of the Trudeau administration, 29.79 percent of CPC 
private member’s bills contained tough-on-crime proposals, down from 47.91 percent during the 
Harper administrations. During the Harper administrations, 6.99 percent of NDP private 
member’s bills contained tough-on-crime measures. In the first two years of the Trudeau 
administration, this dropped to one percent. Liberal members remained consistent, with 17.24 
percent of their private member’s bills introduced while in government containing tough-on-
crime measures compared with 17.69 percent while they were in Opposition.18 
As noted in chapter 8, the new Prime Minister’s 2015 mandate letter to the Justice 
Minister directed her to review the legislative program implemented during the period of the 
Harper administrations. Little has emerged from this mandated review. As of December 31, 
2017, a period in which Parliament sat for 252 days, not a single piece of tough-on-crime 
legislation passed during the Harper administrations’ terms in office has been repealed or 
amended.19 On October 21, 2016, or sitting day 95 of the First Session of the Forty-second 
Parliament, legislation to increase judicial discretion in imposing victim surcharges was 
introduced.20 On June 19, 2017, or sitting day 197, amendments to the Harper era legislation 
restricting conditional release and early parole were introduced.21 Neither of these legislative 
initiatives have been brought back to Parliament for second reading. In some cases, action has 
not even included the introduction of legislation. In January 2016, the Public Safety Minister 
described the Harper government’s changes to the legislation governing pardons as “punitive” 
and the result of a “certain ideology.” Changes were promised.22 Over 19 months passed before 
any action was taken. Instead of introducing legislation, the Public Safety Minister released 
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results of an online poll indicating that Canadians supported making it easier for people 
convicted of minor crimes to obtain pardons.23 The record suggests an element of symbolic 
(in)action in rolling back the tough-on-crime legislation inherited by the Trudeau administration. 
The Trudeau administration has also introduced measures to abolish criminal sanctions 
that predate the Harper administration. On November 15, 2016, legislation was introduced to 
abolish the criminal sanctions against most instances of anal intercourse.24 The Justice Minister 
said at a press conference that the criminal code provisions being abolished were 
“discriminatory” and “outdated”.25 In the subsequent 145 parliamentary sitting days through to 
December 31, 2017, the legislation has not been brought back for second reading.26 Forty-three 
parliamentary sitting days after the introduction of the legislation to decriminalize anal sex, the 
provisions were included in an omnibus bill to formally rescind eight laws that had previously 
been declared invalid by the Supreme Court.27 The legislative summary explained: 
Although some provisions of the Criminal Code are no longer in force because courts 
have found that they violate the Charter, the provisions themselves remain in the Code 
until they are amended or repealed by Parliament. Bill C-39 carries out this update to the 
Code, along with some consequential and coordinating amendments.28 
While the sanctions against anal intercourse had not been reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, they had been ruled unconstitutional in Ontario in 1995,29 with this supported by the 
courts in Quebec, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Alberta.30 The legislation abolishing the 
so-called zombie laws has not been returned to Parliament for second reading. Thus the Trudeau 
administration has twice introduced—but not advanced—legislation to remove from the criminal 
code sanctions that have no legal effect in five of Canada’s ten provinces, including the four 
most populous. 
The only unequivocal soft legislation in which the Trudeau administration has moved 
past first reading has been legislation to expedite expunging criminal records for those convicted 
prior to 1969 of same-sex intercourse.31 This legislation was introduced on November 28, 2017, 
and received third reading in the House of Commons 11 sitting days later. As of December 31, 
2017, it was before the Senate.32 
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The cornerstone of the Trudeau administration’s softer positioning on justice issues is the 
legalization of the purchase and possession of cannabis for recreational use. In fulfillment of a 
commitment made in the 2015 Liberal election platform, the Trudeau administration introduced 
Bill C-45, the Cannabis Act,33 on April 13, 2017. This was parliamentary sitting day 166 of the 
First Session of the Forty-second Parliament. The legislation received third reading on 
November 27, 2017, or 73 sitting days later. At the time of writing, Bill C-45 is being debated in 
the Senate. The legislation was propelled through Parliament in a determined fashion over the 
objections of Conservative members. Time allocation was invoked twice, and there were nine 
recorded votes associated with the passage of this legislation.34 In parliamentary terms, both the 
government and official Opposition exhibited determination. 
The legalization of possession of cannabis for recreational consumption could have a 
impact on the number of Canadians being convicted of a criminal offence. In the 10-year period 
from 2007 to 2016, an average of 23,987 people per year were charged with cannabis possession. 
This represented 3.85 percent of all individuals charged with an offence against the Criminal 
Code or other federal statute during this period.35 Removing criminal sanction for the possession 
of cannabis for personal recreational consumption could be—and is portrayed as—a soft-on-
crime initiative.  
That being said, cannabis legalization is being implemented with tough elements. 
Possession of up to 30 grams of “dried cannabis” becomes legal. Possession of 31 grams is an 
offence with a maximum penalty of five years less a day of incarceration. This penalty is 
identical to the maximum penalty currently stipulated36 except for a limitation of the maximum 
penalty of a fine of up to $1,000 and six months incarceration for possession of less than three 
kilograms.37 In short, in the process of “legalizing” cannabis possession, the maximum carceral 
penalty for possession of an amount between 30 grams and 3,000 grams is being increased by 
1,000 percent. Abrupt lines between legal and illegal are a common feature of Bill C-45. For 
example, cultivating up to four plants is legal. Cultivating five plants is illegal with a maximum 
sanction of up to 14 years’ incarceration. Mandatory minimum sentences are abandoned, with 
the Harper administrations’ distinctions of seriousness for specified behaviour while offending, 
such as using children in trafficking and using a residence without the permission or knowledge 
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of the owner, and are converted into aggravating factors to be considered during sentencing. Bill 
C-45 is a paradox in being both soft and tough on crime simultaneously. The contradictory 
nature of the Trudeau administration’s flagship soft initiative is illustrated by numerous police 
forces demanding budget increases to pay for increased resources needed to enforce the 
provisions of Bill C-45.38 
In summary, after over two years in office and 252 parliamentary sitting days, the 
Trudeau administration has not passed a single measure with the stated purpose of reducing 
carceral results by undoing legislation passed during the Harper administrations. The legislation 
legalizing the possession of cannabis, once passed and proclaimed, could have an impact on 
incarceration. However, given the punitive provisions in the legislation, it is by no means certain 
that this will necessarily be in a soft direction. With other legislation, the Trudeau administration 
has emphasized soft elements of legislation to obscure hard provisions. This administration has 
used both hard and soft legislative provisions to express support for both women in general and 
for people who have hitherto faced discrimination as a result of their sexual orientation. 
Legislation containing hard provisions have been pursued with more vigour and dispatch than 
those containing soft measures. The Trudeau administration’s legislative program is sufficiently 
modest and new such that evaluation of systemic limitations on its powers is impossible. 
However, it appears that the Trudeau administration, like the Harper administrations, uses the 
introduction of justice legislation as a symbolic act to create and maintain acquiescence to its 
own rule. 
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Appendix: Statistics Canada Data Tables 
On June 4, 2018 Statistics Canada launched a major redesign of its website and 
organization of data. This redesign included a renumbering and, in some cases, a renaming of the 
data tables that form a portion of the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation. Following 
is the concordance information for the data tables utilized in this dissertation.  
CANSIM table identifier Product descriptor post June 4, 2018 
Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts 
of Adults in Provincial and Territorialf 
Programs, CANSIM 252-0005. 
Average counts of adults in provincial and 
territorial correctional programs, Table: 35-
10-0154-01. 
Adult Correctional Services, Average Counts 
of Offenders in Federal Programs, CANSIM 
252-0006. 
Average counts of offenders in federal 
programs, Canada and regions, Table: 35-10-
0155-01. 
Youth Correctional Services, Average Counts 
of Youth in Provincial and Territorial 
Correctional Services, CANSIM 251-0008. 
Average counts of young persons in 
provincial and territorial correctional 
services, Table: 35-10-0003-01. 
Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and 
Community Admissions to Provincial and 
Territorial Programs, CANSIM 251-0020. 
Adult Admissions to Correctional Services. 
Table: 35-10-0014-01. 
Adult Correctional Services, Custodial and 
Community Admissions to Federal Programs, 
CANSIM 251-0028. 
Adult admissions to federal correctional 
services. Table: 35-10-0022-01. 
Adult Correctional Services, Operating 
Expenditures for Provincial, Territorial and 
Federal Programs, CANSIM 252-0018. 
Operating Expenditures for Adult 
Correctional Services, Table: 35-10-0013-01. 
Crime Severity Index and Weighted 
Clearance Rates, CANSIM 252-0052. 
Crime Severity Index and Weighted 
Clearance Rates, Table 35-10-0026-01. 
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Adult Criminal Courts, Cases by Median 
Elapsed Time in Days, CANSIM 252-0055. 
 
Adult criminal courts, cases by median 
elapsed time in days, Table: 35-10-0029-01. 
Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by 
Amount of Fine, CANSIM 252-0062. 
 
Adult criminal courts, guilty cases by amount 
of fine, Table: 35-10-0036-01. 
Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean 
and Median Length of Custody. CANSIM 
252-0059. 
Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Mean 
and Median Length of Custody. Table: Table 
35-10-0033. 
Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most 
Serious Sentence, CANSIM 252-0057. 
Adult Criminal Courts, Guilty Cases by Most 
Serious Sentence, Table: 35-10-0031.  
Adult Criminal Courts, Number of Cases and 
Charges by Type of Decision, CANSIM 252-
0053. 
 
Adult criminal courts, number of cases and 
charges by type of decision, 35-10-0027-01. 
Estimates of Population: Canada, Province 
and Territories, CANSIM 051-0005. 
Population Estimates, Quarterly. Table: 17-
10-0009-01 
Homicide Survey, Gang-Related Homicide, by 
Region, CANSIM 253-0008. 
 
Victims of gang-related homicides. Table: 35-
10-0075-01. 
Incident-Based Crime Statistics, by Detailed 
Violations, CANSIM 252-0051. 
 
Incident-based crime statistics, by detailed 
violations, Table: 35-10-0177-01. 
Police Personnel and Selected Crime 
Statistics, Canada, Provinces and Territories, 
CANSIM 254-0002 
 
Police personnel and selected crime statistics, 
Canada, provinces and territories, Table: 35-
10-0076-01. 
Youth Custody and Community Services 
(YCCS), Youth Commencing Correctional 
Services, by Initial Entry Status, CANSIM 
252-0009. 
 
Youth commencing correctional services, by 
initial entry status, Table: 35-10-0004-01.  
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Bills 
Thirty-ninth Parliament, First Session 
C-2. An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and 
measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability (Federal 
Accountability Act). 
C-9. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment). 
C-10. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (minimum penalties for offences involving firearms) 
and to make a consequential amendment to another act. 
C-17. An Act to amend the Judges Act and certain other acts in relation to courts. 
C-18. An Act to amend certain acts in relation to DNA identification. 
C-19. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (street racing) and to make a consequential 
amendment to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. 
C-21. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act (non-registration of firearms 
that are neither prohibited nor restricted). 
C-22. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (age of protection) and to make consequential 
amendments to the Criminal Records Act. 
C-23. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal procedure, language of the accused, 
sentencing and other amendments). 
C-25. An Act to amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 
and the Income Tax Act and to make a consequential amendment to another act. 
C-26. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal interest rate). 
C-27. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (dangerous offenders and recognizance to keep the 
peace). 
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C-32. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (impaired driving) and to make consequential 
amendments to other acts. 
C-35. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (reverse onus in bail hearings for firearm-related 
offences). 
C-48. An Act to amend the Criminal Code in order to implement the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. 
C-57. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
C-59. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (unauthorized recording of a movie). 
S-3. An Act to amend the National Defence Act, the Criminal Code, the Sex Offender 
Information Registration Act and the Criminal Records Act. 
Thirty-ninth Parliament, Second Session 
C-2. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other acts 
(Tackling Violent Crime Act). 
C-13. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal procedure, language of the accused, 
sentencing and other amendments). 
C-17. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
C-24. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act (non-registration of firearms 
that are neither prohibited nor restricted). 
C-25. An Act to amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act. 
C-31. An Act to amend the Judges Act. 
C-53. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by 
crime). 
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C-361. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (law enforcement animals). 
S-3. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with 
conditions). 
Fortieth Parliament, Second Session 
C-14. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and protection of justice system 
participants). 
C-15. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related and 
consequential amendments to other acts. 
C-19. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with 
conditions). 
C-25. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (limiting credit for time spent in pre-sentencing 
custody) (Truth in Sentencing Act). 
C-26. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by 
crime). 
C-31. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and 
the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another 
act. 
C-34. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and other acts (Protecting Victims from Sex Offenders 
Act). 
C-35. An Act to deter terrorism, and to amend the State Immunity Act (Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act). 
C-36. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act). 
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C-42. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Ending Conditional Sentences for Property and 
Other Serious Crimes Act). 
C-43. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Criminal Code 
(Strengthening Canada's Corrections System Act). 
C-45. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
C-46. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act (Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act). 
C-52. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing for fraud) (Retribution on Behalf of 
Victims of White Collar Crime Act). 
C-53. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (accelerated parole review) 
and to make consequential amendments to other acts (Protecting Canadians by Ending 
Early Release for Criminals Act). 
C-54. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to the 
National Defence Act (Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple 
Murders Act). 
C-55. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision 
in R v Shoker Act). 
C-58. An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of internet child pornography by persons who 
provide an internet service (Child Protection Act (Online Sexual Exploitation)). 
C-59. An Act to amend the International Transfer of Offenders Act (Keeping Canadians Safe Act 
(International Transfer of Offenders)). 
S-4. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (identity theft and related misconduct). 
S-5. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and another act. 
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Fortieth Parliament, Third Session 
C-4. An Act to amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to make consequential and related 
amendments to other acts (Sébastien's Law (Protecting the Public from Violent Young 
Offenders)) 
C-5. An Act to amend the International Transfer of Offenders Act (Keeping Canadians Safe 
(International Transfer of Offenders) Act). 
C-16. Keeping Canadians Safe (International Transfer of Offenders) Act (Ending House Arrest 
for Property and Other Serious Crimes by Serious and Violent Offenders Act) 
C-17. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with 
conditions) (Combating Terrorism Act) 
C-21. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing for fraud) (Standing Up for Victims of 
White Collar Crime Act) 
C-22. An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who 
provide an Internet service 
C-23. An Act to amend the Criminal Records Act and to make consequential amendments to 
other acts (Eliminating Pardons for Serious Crimes Act). 
C-23A. An Act to amend the Criminal Records Act (Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act). 
C-23B. An Act to amend the Criminal Records Act and to make consequential amendments to 
other acts (Eliminating Pardons for Serious Crimes Act) 
C-30. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision 
in R v Shoker Act). 
C-38. An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other acts (Ensuring the Effective Review of RCMP Civilian Complaints 
Act). 
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C-39. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other acts (Ending Early Release for Criminals and Increasing Offender 
Accountability Act). 
C-43. An Act to enact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Labour Relations Modernization Act 
and to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other acts (Royal Canadian Mounted Police Modernization Act). 
C-48. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to the 
National Defence Act (Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple 
Murders Act). 
C-49. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act (Preventing Human Smugglers 
from Abusing Canada's Immigration System Act). 
C-50. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (interception of private communications and related 
warrants and orders) (Improving Access to Investigative Tools for Serious Crimes Act). 
C-51. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act (Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act). 
C-52. An Act regulating telecommunications facilities to support investigations (Investigating 
and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act). 
C-53. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mega-trials) (Fair and Efficient Criminal Trials Act). 
C-54. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual offences against children) (Protecting 
Children from Sexual Predators Act). 
C-56. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Preventing the Trafficking, 
Abuse and Exploitation of Vulnerable Immigrants Act). 
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C-59. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (accelerated parole review) 
and to make consequential amendments to other acts (Abolition of Early Parole Act). 
C-60. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (citizen's arrest and the defences of property and 
persons) (Citizen's Arrest and Self-Defence Act). 
C-61. An Act to provide for the taking of restrictive measures in respect of the property of 
officials and former officials of foreign states and of their family members (Assets of 
Corrupt Foreign Officials Act). 
C-617. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mischief relating to war memorials). 
S-2. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and other acts (Protecting Victims From Sex Offenders 
Act). 
S-6. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and another act. 
S-7. An Act to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act (Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act). 
S-9. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by 
crime) (Tackling Auto Theft and Property Crime Act). 
S-10. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related and 
consequential amendments to other acts (Penalties for Organized Drug Crime Act). 
Forty-first Parliament, First Session 
C-2. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mega-trials) (The Fair and Efficient Trials Act). 
C-10. An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State Immunity 
Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act and other acts (Safe Streets and Communities Act). 
  310 
C-12. An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(Safeguarding Canadians' Personal Information Act). 
C-19. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act (Ending the Long-gun Registry 
Act). 
C-26. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (citizen's arrest and the defences of property and 
persons) (Citizen's Arrest and Self-Defence Act). 
C-30. An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications 
Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other acts (Protecting Children from Internet 
Predators Act). 
C-31. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship 
and Immigration Act (Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act). 
C-36. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (elder abuse) (Protecting Canada's Seniors Act). 
C-37. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims 
Act). 
C-42. An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and to make related and 
consequential amendments to other acts (Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Accountability Act). 
C-43. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Faster Removal of Foreign 
Criminals Act). 
C-51. An Act to amend the Witness Protection Program Act and to make a consequential 
amendment to another act (Safer Witnesses Act). 
C-54. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the National Defence Act (mental disorder) (Not 
Criminally Responsible Reform Act). 
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C-55. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision 
in R v Tse Act). 
C-65. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect for Communities Act). 
S-7. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of 
Information Act (Combating Terrorism Act). 
S-9. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Nuclear Terrorism Act). 
S-16. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (trafficking in contraband tobacco) (Tackling 
Contraband Tobacco Act). 
Forty-First Parliament, Second Session 
C-2. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect for Communities Act). 
C-10. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (trafficking in contraband tobacco) (Tackling 
Contraband Tobacco Act). 
C-12. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (Drug-Free Prisons Act). 
C-14. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the National Defence Act (mental disorder) (Not 
Criminally Responsible Reform Act). 
C-24. An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts 
(Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act). 
C-26. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Sex Offender 
Information Registration Act, to enact the High Risk Child Sex Offender Database Act 
and to make consequential amendments to other acts (Tougher Penalties for Child 
Predators Act). 
C-32. An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain acts (Victims Bill 
of Rights Act). 
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C-35. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (law enforcement animals, military animals and 
service animals) (Justice for Animals in Service Act (Quanto's Law)). 
C-42. An Act to amend the Firearms Act and the Criminal Code and to make a related 
amendment and a consequential amendment to other acts (Common Sense Firearms 
Licensing Act). 
C-44. An Act to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other acts (Protection 
of Canada from Terrorists Act). 
C-51. An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel 
Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential 
amendments to other acts (Anti-terrorism Act, 2015). 
C-53. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and 
to make related and consequential amendments to other acts (Life Means Life Act). 
C-56. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and to make a 
consequential amendment to the International Transfer of Offenders Act (Statutory 
Release Reform Act). 
C-60. An Act to amend the Criminal Records Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the International Transfer of Offenders 
Act (Removal of Serious Foreign Criminals Act). 
C-69. An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in R v Nur (Penalties for the Criminal Possession of Firearms Act). 
C-70. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related 
amendments to other acts (Protection of Communities from the Evolving Dangerous 
Drug Trade Act). 
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C-71. An Act to amend the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code (Victims Rights in the 
Military Justice System Act). 
C-73. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences in relation to conveyances) and the 
Criminal Records Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts (Dangerous 
and Impaired Driving Act). 
S-7. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil Marriage Act and 
the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other acts. 
Forty-second Parliament, First Session 
C-14. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other acts 
(medical assistance in dying). 
C-16. An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code. 
C-28. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victim surcharge). 
C-32. An Act related to the repeal of section 159 of the Criminal Code. 
C-37. An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related 
amendments to other acts. 
C-38. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons). 
C-39. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (unconstitutional provisions) and to make 
consequential amendments to other acts. 
C-45. An Act respecting cannabis and to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the 
Criminal Code and other acts. 
C-46. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make 
consequential amendments to other acts. 
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C-51. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make 
consequential amendments to another act. 
C-56. An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Abolition of Early 
Parole Act. 
C-66. An Act to establish a procedure for expunging certain historically unjust convictions and 
to make related amendments to other acts. 
